CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700510001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 29, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved Fq,~eleaseQ~Q1/2~GI~rIRQ~T0097~A004700510001-3
29 October 1959
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State Department review completed
Approved For Releas~~~/2~~~1~~~~00975A004700510001-3
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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004700510001-3
 25X1 Approved For 7~-0047
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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USSR -Communist China: A recently completed study
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of Soviet party journals and newspapers published between
March and September 1958--the period of conception and
initial organization of the Chine~ce communes--suggests an
USSRm [Khrushchev told Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky,
during the recent visit of the Austrian delegation to the USSR,
that he could have declared an e:nd to Western occupation of
West Berlin instead of offering his "generous" free city pro-
posal. The Soviet premier said he was absolutely convinced
that the Western powers would r.~ot have gone to wars and cited
the effect of Bulganin?s threatening letters to Britain and France
during their attack on Suez in 1956? Khrushchev also stated that
Soviet plans for raising the standard of living are based on in-
cxeases in px?.oductivi~y undex? the Seven Year Plan and not on os-
sible savings from disarmament
(Page 3)
Communist China - Indonesia; ~ eported sharp protest
by the Chinese Communist Embassy over Indonesia's treatment
of Overseas Chinese reflects the intense friction over this issue,.
~~ which has developed, into a major irritant to Sino-Indonesian re-
lations. Peiping's action was prompted by measures. being taken
now in small villages in Java to round up and move by truck to
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pprove
or
~?
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absence of coordination between the Soviet and Chinese par-
ties on this issue. During this 1>eriod Soviet journals con-
tinued to treat Chinese agricultural policies with an approval
D ~ .which contrasted to their attitude after the full implications
of the commune program emerged. The seeming lack of
prior liaison on an issue of such importance to the bloc calls
into question the effectiveness o:f Sino-Soviet consultation on
other doctrinal matters.
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.larger cities alien retailersp who are primarily Chinese. Pei-
ping's action through diplomatic channels ma foreshadow eco-
nomic retaliation against Diakartal
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IIe ASIA-AFRICA
India -Communist China. Nehru
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drawal of Indian diplomats from Peiping as a mark of protest
if the Chinese continue to act aggressively along the frontier.
New tactics for dealing with border problems are being consid-
in the direction of a tougher policy toward Peiping, New Delhi is
unlikely to take any action drastic enough to prevent negotiations,
which both sides apparently still hope to bring about. Nehru also
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ered; growing public resentment over the government`s 'inaction"
e ~o i am ass r i old Selwyn ~ %~%
Lloyd on 23 October that the USSR was absolutely opposed to a %i
UN presence in Laos. The USSR probably feels that even tacit
acquiescence in Hammarskjold's plan would undercut its position %i,~
that the only international framework on which to base a solu- 25X1 ski
Lion in Laos is the Geneva agreements.Meanwhile Hammarskjol
continues to search for a way to establish a UN resence in Laos ~~~~//~,,
that would get around Soviet objections %%'
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