CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700390001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 15, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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15 October 1959
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Copy No, C
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OOCUMFNT 140.
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15 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR - Communist China: Pavel Yudin, Soviet ambassador
to Communist China since December 1953, has been replaced by
a relatively obscure Ukrainian party secretary, Stepan Chervo-
nenko. Yudin, once one of the Soviet Union's top ideologists, was
due for reassignment and has been absent from his post for long
periods during the past two years. Chervonenko accompanied
Khrushchev on the Chinese trip and was apparently designated
for the job well in advance of the official announcement. Yudin's
transfer, therefore, may be routine. However, the action' com-
ing at a time when 5ino-Soviet relations apparently are strained,
and the obscurity of the replacement, could be further indica- 25X1
tion f irrit t' b
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ween Pei yin and Moscow
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Watch Committee Conclusions: Situations, susceptible of
direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeop-
ardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, par-
ticularly in Ira o,
~issident activity has remained at a low level. The
Laos CD
dissidents, however, with probable North Vietnamese assist-
ance, continue to have the objective of establishing themselves
in a strong position which they could use as the basis for polit-
ical bargaining or for the expansion of military operations
Middle East: The situation. in Iraq remains tense. While
order has been well maintained, factional strife may break out
and further attempts against Qasim are possible. In these cir-
cumstances, the UAR may become more deeply involved?
?15Oct59
DAILY' BRIEF
77
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