CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700360001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

izz/.
9. Approved For Release
TO*/21SE4MTf00975AA004700360001-0
25X1
12 October 1959
Copy No. C
65
25X1
DOCUMErvr rvo. -a4-
25X1 25X1 /
/
DA1y4.QV_,_REvlEWLR:~~I
25X1
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Releas /2 P WQ4T00975A004700360001-0
1yr
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700360001-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700360001-0
 Approved .o%,F~, 700360001.0
CENTRAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25X1
12 October 1959
BRIEF
DAILY BRIEF
DAILY COMMUNIST BLOC
I. THE
publicly revealed in a speech e<
USSR: Khrushche.
Bratsk this yea.xv has publicly revealed in a speech at?vniu've w "slightly less"
Bratsk that this year's grain harvest will be "slightly less"
than last year's bumper yields. Crop prospects in fact ap-
pear to be poorer than Khrushchev's phrase would imply. Un-
favorable weather and reduced grain acreage make it probable
oK
that the current grain harvest will be well below last year's.
Khrushche~v, continued o timistic over industrial prospects.
25X1
II. ASIA-AFRICA
CN Secretary General Hammarskjold plans to arrive
Laos:
when informed of the plan. Earlier, Bammarskjold had been un-
willing to appoint a UN representative ,to Laos without a specif A
mandate from the General Assembly or the Security Council.
i
Approve el 2002/10/21 - 75A004700360001-0
~a pending implementation of his plan. Hammarskjold reported that 25X1
1r Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov raised no objection
25X1 in Laos on 2 November to make arrangements, for the establish-11
ment of a UN presence there under his administrative authority.
Some subordinates of the subcommittee are to remain in Laos
 Approved Fo;R Temp 7nn711ni71 ? c-1n-Rnp7aTnna46004 6b360001-0
25X1
UN representative operating under the direction of the secretary
general would have more authority to investigate incidents and.
make recommendations than the present Security Council sub-
committee] 25X1
Ceylon: Governor General Goonetilleke assured the Amer-
ican ambassador on 8 October that Prime Minister Dahanayake
is sincere in his private assurances of a firm anti-Communist
and pro-Western position. Goonetilleke made a strong appeal
25X1
for increased US aid.
IN
ME
so
lV~
25X1
The opposition parties have e-
cided to introduce a no-confidence motion when. Parliament re-
convenes on 27 October; they may make only a token effort,
however, since many members are reluctant to face elections.
South Korea: The threatened split in South Korea's only op-
position party may have been averted by the decision of Demo-
cratic party coleader Cho Pyong-ok to withdraw from the party's
presidential race in favor of Vice President Chang Myon. Cho
probably estimates that the administration will use all necessary
means to prevent a Democratic victory in 1960, and that his candi-
dacy-would encur the enmity of President Rhee, with whom he is on
good terms. The decision also puts Cho in a good position to cap-
ture the party's titular leadership.
12 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF
Approved For Relea - 004700360001-0
25X1
I
25X1 %
 Ar~r~rnvnrl Gnr Dnln~ 0 9nn9/1n/91 (-IA_DIlD7QTnnQ7r.
0470031
1-0
8
III. THE WEST
25X1
25X1
Brazil: L azil's relations with the US are cooling under
the pressure of financial difficulties, popular unrest over eco-
nomic conditions, and exploitation of this situation by demagogic
politicians eyeing the 1960 presidential elections. The latest
irritant results from attempts by opponents of US investment to
blame the present serious meat shortage on the foreign packers
and to urge nationalization of their plants. Three US packers
and one British firm control some 40 eecent of plant capacity
British West Indies: The recent constitutional conference of
the West Indies Federation has reached an impasse because of
Jamaica's unwillingness to compromise its demand for increased
representation. Absence of progress toward wider federal powers
and early independence may cause Trinidad's anti-American pre
Indian nationalist sentiment- - such as a renewal of his campaign
mier, Eric Williams, to use dramatic means to stir up West
against the US naval base at Chaguaramaso
12 Oct 59
DAILY' BRIEF iii
25X
j
S
000
25X1 O
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00975A004700360001-0
25X1
j
 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700360001-0
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrus,hchev on Soviet Economic Prospects
In a speech at Bratsk on 8 October, Soviet Premier Khru-
shchev admitted for the first time that the grain harvest will be
"slightly less than last year," but he said there would be "enough
grain;' Khrushchev displayed his usual optimism for this year's.
industrial output, which he says is running 4 to 5 percent ahead
of schedule.
Precipitation this year has been well below normal in some
grain areas, and only average yields can be expected in others.
Also, the acreage devoted to grain crops in the USSR this year is
some 10-15 million acres less than during the past several years.
Thus it seems probable that the current grain harvest will be well
below, rather than "slightly less" than, the record harvest of
130,,000,000 metric tons last year--possibly in the neighborhood
of the mediocre,. 105,000,000-ton harvest of 1957.
Because Soviet agricultural production has been much higher
since the New Lands were first brought to use in 1954 and 1955, the
smaller crop will not create a domestic food shortage. Soviet of -
forts to catch up with the US in production of livestock products will
be affected by the smaller feed supply, however, and less grain
will be available for export. The relatively poor crop this year,
the first of the Seven-Year Plan, will probably heighten criticism
of shortcomings in agriculture, which are to be discussed at the
plenum on agriculture scheduled for late November.
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700360001-0
12 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
25X1
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700360001-0
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700360001-0
 25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700360001-0
'"me _AW
Situation in Ceylon
Lvernor General Goonetilleke, in is sing a political
situation in Ceylon with the American ambassador on 8 October,
assured him that Prime Minister Dahanayake was sincere in ex-
pressing privately to the ambassador his anti-Communist posi-
tion and his desire to work closely with the West. Goonetilleke
appealed. strongly for increased American economic aid. during
the next two "crucial" years. He expressed the belief and hope
that Dahanayake would be able to survive the present crisis and
last out the remaining 18 months of the government's constitu-
tional term?
(Goonetilleke's strong endorsement of Dahanayake probably
is motivated by fear that his own position as Governor General
is secure only as long as the present government remains in of-
fices
25X1
25X1
Dahanayake's command of a working majority in Parliament
remains in doubt, The combined opposition parties have decided
to introduce a no-confidence motion when the House of Representa-
tives reconvenes on 27 October. Opposition spokesmen are vig-
orously protesting the government's continuation of a state of
emergency, its stringent censorship regulations, and its failure
to reconvene Parliament immediately. Despite their publicly
expressed determination to defeat the government, leftist ele-
ments apparently continue to be reluctant to face elections and may
therefore abstain or absent themselves in sufficient numbers to
enable Dahanayake to win the test vote. The prime minister's
own divided party is likely to give him nearly unanimous support
in order to stay in office
umors apparently are widely prevalent in Colombo of a con-
spiracy behind the recent assassination of former Prime Minister
Bandaranaike, implicating certain ministers and high government
party officials.
maintenance o close press censorship, with any speculation on
Bandaranaike's assassination specifically banned, probably is
lending substance to reports that members of the government were
involved
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700360001-0
12 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
25X1
25X1
 25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097ZP04700360001-0
III, THE WEST
25X1
Political Exploitation of Brazilian Meat Shortage Threatens
The serious shortage of meat in Brazil, fo owing hard on
shortages of other staples which. caused near-riots in Septem-
ber, has put the public in an ugly temper. This has caused
deep concern among Brazilian officials and prompted calls for
nationalization of the large packing houses. Public impatience
with shortages, corruption, and high living costs was demon-
strated in the municipal elections on 7 October in Sao Paulo,
Brazil's largest city, when a "rhinoceros--a "write-in candidate"--
polled the largest vot
US Investments
trol Vital of some 40 percent of plant capacity- -suspended opera-
tions during late August and. early September, protesting they
were losing money under price ceilings. They resumed slaugh-
tering in mid-September after the government threatened to take
over temporarily all large packing houses unless normal supplies
of meat reached the market immediately, Some Brazilian pack-
ers are also under close government scrutiny, but the govern-
ment privately admits it cannot police all of the small packers,
many of which are selling in the black market. Meat has been
rationed, and butcher shops closed. three days a week,]
be situation is susceptible to exploitation by demagogic pol-
iticians eyeing the 1960 presidential elections, as well as by ex-
treme nationalists and Communists who oppose US investment
and influence in Brazil. A government official has stated
present, and. that consideration for foreign investment is tem-
porarily secondary. These considerations also influenced Pres-
ident Kubitschek last June to suspend talks with the International
Monetary Fund which were to precede a request for US financial
The three large US packers and one British firm--which con-
that concern over social unrest is the overriding factor at
assistance.-)
25X1
25X1
25X1
pproved or a ease
12 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 4
 25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097004700360001-0
No Progress at West Indies Constitutional Congress
Lack of any progress at the constitutional conferen a among
members of the West Indies Federation may cause Trinidad's anti-
American Premier Eric Williams to seek dramatic means to
achieve his goal of wider federal powers and early independence
(The conference reached an impasse over the first agenda
item of representation and adjourned on 7 October, apparently
leaving for committee consideration this and other issues--in-
cluding federal finances and taxation and the question of a cus-
toms union. The deadlock resulted from Jamaica's demand. for
49 percent of the legislative seats in order to reflect its numer-
ical and economic preponderance in the Federation. Trinidad
and, the smaller islands were willing to increase Jamaican rep-
resentation by offering 40 percent of the seats in an enlarged
legislature instead of Jamaica's present 37.7 percent)
The delegates apparently preferred to delay political and
economic evolution of the Federation rather than take decisions
unpalatable to Jamaica, which has threatened to secede.. Di-
visive factors have been accentuated by the open clash between
profede.list forces led by Williams and Jamaica's insistence
on "states' rights.' Williams wants broader federal powers in-
volving a budget nearly 15 times the present size. Jamaica ve-
hemently opposes a federal income tax and customs union, which
it considers threats to its present economic advantage. Future
developments will be influenced. by whether London continues its
present role as observer or intervenes more actively in an of -
fort to keep the Federation together and proceeding toward in-
dependence- -which London hopes to grant within about five years,'
(Williams evidently seeks to create a strong federal system
which would give him a wider political forum if he becomes its
prime minister. He may revive his now quiescent campaign
against the US naval base at Chaguaramas in an effort to arouse
West Indian nationalism, He may also maneuver to unseat the
weak federal prime minister, Sir Grantley Adams.
12 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved Fob Release 9009110171 ? rim-RnRZ910097pp 04700360001-0
.r
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations. Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States, Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0p4700360001-0
 Approved For..ReleaseTOR/2SE TT00975`AO04700360001-0
Approved For Releas1Op/25 EtRf 00975AO04700360001-0