CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700270001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 October 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: The substantial relaxation of jamming of Voice of
America broadcasts to the USSR has continued since Khru-
shchev's departure from the United States. Jamming of VOA
broadcasts intended for Eastern European audiences, howevers
has continued. Fln a talk with US officials on 15 September in
Washington, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation
was an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pur-
suing the cold war:]
* USSR - Communist China: Soviet Premier Khrushchev's
emphasis on peaceful coexistence in his 30 September speech
in Peiping is apparently designed to convey the impression to
the West that he intends to maintain the atmosphere of detente
by dissociating the USSR from Peiping's harder foreign policy
line. His remarks that "we must do everything possible to
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preclude war" and that "we should not attempt to test the sta-
bility of the capitalist system by force" vary markedly in tone
from recent Chinese Communist pronouncements. Both Khru-
shchev and. Soviet party presidium member Suslov, who spoke
in Peiping on 28 September, reflected Moscow's continuing re-
luctance to endorse Communist China's current economic pol-
icies-, although they made the usual affirmations of Soviet sup-
port and friendship. Both speakers avoided any reference to
China's commune program and to the "leap forward;" and Sus-
lov's extended. praise of Soviet industrial and agricultural tech-
nology appears to be an indirect suggestion to the Chinese that
they would profit cloaely to the USSIVs methods
in these fields.
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Watch Committee conclusions. f-Situations susceptible of di-
rect exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would. jeopard
ize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East. particu-
larly in Ira and. Iran
Laos: (ssident activity has remained at a low level. The
dissidents, however, with probable North Vietnamese assistant
continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a
strong position which they could use as the basis for political
bargaining or for the expansion. of military operations.
Middle East:lounting tensions in Iraq have increased the
possibility of early aL-ttempts to assassinate or overthrow Qasim.
Whether successful or not, such moves might well be followed
by anarchy or civil war between nationalist and Communist forc s.
Under these circumstances, direct UAR involvement in Irach wi h
a consequent increase in the danger of broader hostilities in the
area, is possible.7~
1 Oct 59
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Latin America - Communist China: The top leaders of
the Argentine, Brazilian, and Venezuelan -Communist parties,
who are in Peiping for the Chinese tenth anniversary celebra-
tion, , each spoke: at the formal, opening ceremonies. The pres-
ence of these and other prominent Latin American Communist
leaders provides an opportunity for Chinese officials to discuss
with them new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives
in Latin America, and to review accomplishments since the last
meeting of Latin American leaders in Peiping early this year.
The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guid-
ance of Latin American Communists, have stepped up their cul-
tural and Propaganda activity in the area in 1959.
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Cuba: Prime Minister Fidel Castro's attack of 28 Septem-
ber on press and. other critics of his revolutionary program re-
vealed a concern over his increasing difficulties. His high praise
of "Che" Guevara, whom he placed in charge of industrial plan-
ning, may reflect awareness of the distrust which many respon-
sible Cubans feel for Guevara, who is generally regarded as pro-
Communist. Castro may react vigorously to editorials on 29
September in leading Havana dailies which claim that freedom of
the Cuban press, is limited.
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Continues Selective Jamming
LMonitoring of Voice of America transmissions to the USSR
reveals that the selective relaxation of Soviet jamming has con-
tinued since Khrushchev's departure from the United States. Jam-
ming of all broadcasts, to the Eastern European satellites has
continued. During the period 25-29 September, 88 percent of
Russian-language broadcasts, 86 percent of Latvian, 92 percent
of Lithuanian, and 54 percent of Estonian were audible
CIn _a talk with US officials in Washington on 15 September,
Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Rela-
tions, with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation of jamming was,
an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pursuing
the cold. ware' He expressed hope that the US could halt transmis-
sions by such anti-Soviet stations as Radio Baikal and Radio Free
Russia and said if this, were done the USSR would stop jamming
altogether. He warned, however, that if results were "negative,"
jamming would be resumed,j
Zhukov further said the Soviet (lovernment was also prepared
to enter into reciprocal agreements which would increase the cir-
culation of Amerika and USSR magazines, open reading rooms in
Moscow and New York public libraries, and. implement the article
in the US-:Soviet exchange agreement concerning radio-television
exchanges on political subjects].
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Key Latin American Communist Leaders Gather in Peiping
The presence of several prominent Latin American Commu-
nist party leaders at the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations
provides an opportunity for them to discuss with Peiping officials
new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin
America and to review their accomplishments since the last such
meeting in Peiping early this years Luiz Carlos Prestes$ Victor
Codovilla, and Jesus Faria, top officials of the Brazilian, Argen-
tine, and. Venezuelan parties respectively, spoke at the opening
ceremony. Key representatives of the Colombian, Cuban, Uru-
guayan, Ecuadoran, Chilean, Panamanian, and Costa Rican Com-
munist parties are also in Peiping, along with a number of non-
Communist political, congressional, and cultural figures from
several Latin American countries
The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the
guidance of Latin American Communists, have registered some
successes in the program they outlined to the representatives of
12 Latin American parties who met in Peiping after the 21st
Soviet party congress in early 1959. These plans included in-
creased. Latin American travel to China, the training of Latin
American Communists in China, and. the development of a Chi-
nese propaganda network in Latin America. Subsequently, a
Chinese journalist delegation visited four Latin American coun-
tries, and. the official New China News, Agency has opened a
branch in Havana and reportedly hired correspondents in Chile,
Colombia, and Venezuela, Latin American travel to China dur-
ing the first six months of 1959 far surpassed the total for all of
1958.1
None of the 20 Latin American nations has diplomatic rela-
tions with Communist China. Cuba, however, recently became
the first Latin American nation since 1952 to abstain in a United
Nations General Assembly vote on the question of Chinese UN
representation,
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Status Report on Cuba
Fidel Castro's preoccupation with growing economic prob-
lems which threaten the realization of his reform program have
heightened his marked sensitivity to criticism and his reliance
on trusted companions from active revolutionary days. This
was particularly evident in his TV appearance on 28 September.
Castro made prolonged attacks on Havana dailies which have
questioned government actions and on the decision of the In-
ter-American Press Association to discuss whether freedom
of the press exists in Cuba. Havana's leading newspaper,
Diario de la Marina, which has Catholic and conservative
backing, did not back down under the attack but charged ed-
itorially on 29 September that press freedom is limited by
the revolutionary government in many ways short of censor-
ship. It was, surprisingly, joined by other independent pa-
pers, in the first such strong and open exception to Castro's
words since the revolutionary victory on 1 January.
In the same speech Castro emphasized his great reliance
on "true revolutionaries," naming among others "Che" Guevara,
whose strident anti-Americanisrn and. suspected pro-Commu-'
nism add to the general suspicion of him among Cubans. Castro
announced that a government program for industrial planning
would be headed by Guevara and that although private invest-
ment would be accepted, outside help was not really needed.
A reference to "investigation" of two large US-owned nickel
and cobalt plants at Moa Bay and Nicaro indicated that the gov-
ernment hopes to increase its income from them but has not
yet decided by just what means.
Castro's drastic solutions are only complicating the eco-
nomic problems arising from his reform program.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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