CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700140001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 16, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 SEPTEMBER 1959
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ehrushchev may visit New Delhi
on way home from Peiping to dis-
cuss Sino-Indian border dispute.
Khrushcbev may offer to "close"
agreements while visiting US but
defer signing until a summit meet-
ing.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iranian-Soviet rapprochement pros-
pects.
Pakistani-Nepalese negotiations to
establish diplomatic relations.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
16 September 1959
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I --I DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-India: Soviet Premier Ehrushchev, who plans to
go to Peiping or the 1 October anniversary celebrations, has
F
offered to visit New Delhi on his way home in connection with
_
on
101
ON
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the Sino-Indian border dis Ute F
I Nehru apparently as n-
formed Moscow th e wele ies the Soviet premier's proposal,
while making it clear that India stands by the McMahon line and
that only minor adjustments could be cuscussea.
chev~ Fw~~l -oj~e ~1.1~c~oe~"
L in t e United States Ehrushchev will offer to "close"
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an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tel ; SEs, out prefers to
defer actual signing of any agreements until a summit meeting.
Elirushchev also reportedly believes a "limited face-saving
agreement" is possible which will recognize Western rights to
r-
remain in West Berlin for "several years."
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I Jhe USSR would not sign a separate peace
treaty with East Germany or take any unilateral action on Ber-
lin. Moscow reportedly believesq however, that peaceful co-
eNistence on the basis of the status quo in Europe will ultimately
result in Western recognition of East Germany and a "perma-
nent solution" of the German and 13erlin problems) F
11. ASIA.-AFRICA
. Iran-USSR:(-There is increasing prospect that talks con-
cern7e-d ~with Iranian-Soviet rapprochement will be held. Irani-
an prdss comment on such a possibility has, increased~ and a)
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CForeign Ministry official stated on 14 September that neaotia-
Lions are expected to be reopened. soon. Soviet Ambassador
Pegov, who left Iran about six months ago, is now en route by
train from Moscow and is scheduled to arrive in Tehran on
16 September, In any new talks, the Soviet Union would prob
ably press for a pledge against. "foreign bases" in Iran, while
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Shah, and. possibly consider accepting Soviet economic aid
(Page 2)
Pakistan-Nepal:
Nepalese Prime Nlatnister Koirala s an-
nouncement on 12 September that Pakistan and Nepal were
negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations is likely
to cause concern in New Delhi. The Indian Government is deeply
disturbed by its border dispute with Communist China and may
fear diplomatic activities by its rival, Pakistan., in sensitive bor-
der regions India claims as its own special sphere of influence.
New Delhi would almost certainly see a connection between
Pakistani-Nepalese negotiations on diplomatic relations and
President Ayub's cam ai n favorin
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of the subcontinent against Communist China. India would find
it difficult effectively to protest the establishment of diplomatic
relations, however, in view of Nepal's recent expansion of rela-
tions with a number of other countries and the proximity of Pak-
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Soviet Union last February. Identification with the Castro revolu-
tion rather than with a local Communist party would make the
congress more attractive than otherwise to certain non-Commu-
III. THE WEST
Cuba: CRaul Castro in a strongly anti-US speech on 11 Sep-
tembpr endorsed the calling of a Latin American people's con-
gress. This may be the congress planned in Moscow at a spe-
cial conference of delegates of the 18 Latin American Communist
parties attending the 21st congress of the Communist party of the
nists and provide opportunities for Communist penetration of
future hemispheric activities.
16 Sept 59
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Proposed Khrushchev Visit to India
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Premier rus c ev offered to visit India in
connection with the Sino-Indian border dispute,
Khrushchev
said if India had no objection he would go directly to New Delhi
following his forthcoming visit to Peiping.
The offer is in line with Moscow's appeal on 9 September
for a peaceful settlement of the dispute based on mutual inter-
ests and "traditional friendship" between India and China. 0
Soviet spokesmen have indicated concern over the issue,
and Khrushchev may have hoped that such an offer at this time
would prevent a worsening of the situation which might embarrass
him during his visit to the US. Khrushchev probably is also seek-
ing a way out of the dilemma which the border dispute has posed
for the USSR's relations with both countries.
Nehru apparently has sent word to Moscow that he welcomes
the Soviet premier's proposal, but made it clear that New Delhi
stands by the McMahon line as the Sino-Indian frontier and that
only minor modifications could be the subject of diplomatic dis-
cussions. Nehru. probably regards Khrushcbev's.proposal. as, an
opportunity for bringing about negotiations without loss of face
by India. While he seems to feel Chinese objections could still
bloc the Soviet leader's initiative, he probably hopes Khrushchev's
personal influence will soften Peiping's unyielding attitude to-
ward Sino-Indian problems. It is unlikely that Khrushchev would
have approached India with this offer without first having obtained
at least Peiping's agreement in principle.
The Chinese would probably expect the Soviet premier to
confine himself to urging that Nehru accept Chou En-lai's call
for return to the "status quo" which existed along the McMahon
line before the Tibetan revolt. As a preliminary step to nego-
tiations, Peiping would want Khrushchev to press for withdrawal
of Indian troops from points on the McMahon line they occupied
last spring.
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VAW
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Soviet-Iranian Relations Entering New Phase
(Soviet Ambassador Pegov, who left Iran six months ago
following the abrupt breakdown in nonaggression talks, and the
pro-Soviet Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Masud-Ansari, are
returning to Tehran amid increasing official and unofficial spec-
ulation of renewed efforts- to end the tension that has severely
strained Soviet-Iranian relations during the past seven months.
Pegov is scheduled to arrive in. Tehran on 16 September. While
some significant new development appears in prospect, its
character remains unclear.)
(Ambassador Pegov's return apparently resulted from Ansari's
recent interview with Khrushchev, who indicated that Pegov should
return "as soon as possible" to present Soviet views to the Shah.
Ansari is returning at his own request to report to the Shah on
his talks. He recommended that no proposals be offered the
USSR until Pegov's return to Tehran and Soviet propaganda at-
tacks are halted. While Radio Moscow has greatly tempered its
recent broadcasts to Iran, and. has even offered. "the hand of
friendship," the Soviet-sponsored clandestine broadcasts to Iran
are as vituperative as ever regarding the Shah and Prime Minis-
ter Eqbal>
According to Ansari, Khru.shchev pointed to American mil-
itai'yactivities in Iran as threatening the southern borders of the
USSR and warned that the USSR may be obliged. to avail itse] of
the provisions of the treaty of 1921 and occupy Iran. Khrushchev
asserted that the USSR only asked "that Iran should. not join the
American aggressors who want to encircle us...." He admitted
there had been errors in Soviet policy toward Iran., but assured
that everything possible was being done to redress- the past.
Khrushchev reportedly argued the advantages of neutrality for
Iran,noting that Iran could bargain for many times as much Amer-
ican aid and at the same time get Russian assistance. He empha-
sized that Iran is more important to the USSR than any of the
neutral countries in the area.)
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c hrushchev claimed that "our spies furnish us with very
accurate information everywhere" and that he had docu- , .
mentary evidence of American pressure on Iran not to sign the
nonaggression pact with the USSR last February and "precise
information" of persons, even in the entourage of the Shah, who
"want to benefit" ..from the pr.esent.tension)
(Meanwhile, Iranian officials are expressing considerable
concern over the open and threatening tone of Ehrushchev in his
interview reported by Ansarie Eqbal inquired of Ambassador
Wailes what the United States is prepared to do in the event of
a Soviet paratroop invasion and has requested public assurances
that the United States will defend Iran if attacked]
Iranian officials have offered assurances to the US ,ambassa-
dor hat Iran will remain firm despite Soviet threats and blandish-
ments The Shahs, however, influenced by neutralists among his
advisers and attracted by the prospects of increased foreign as-
sistance, may again consider the advantages of a nonaggression
pact and become embroiled in serious negotiations with the USSR.)
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Pakistan and Nepal Negotiating to Establish Diplomatic Relations
Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's announcement on 12 September
that his country and Pakistan are negotiating regarding the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations is likely to cause irritation in New Delhi
and may wipe out some of the good will created by Prime Minister
Nehru's talks with Pakistani President Ayub on 1 September.
Despite the fact that Nepal is recognized as an independent country,
India considers it and the other Himalayan border states of Sikkim and
Bhutan to lie 'within its own special sphere of influence. New Delhi has
therefore attempted to keep foreign activity in Nepal to a minimum. It
is especially sensitive at the present time, when it is taking military
precautions and negotiating with both Nepal and Bhutan to prevent fur-
ther Chinese incursions from Tibet into the subcontinent. In fact, For-
eign Secretary Dutt has warned the American Embassy in New Delhi
that any US move to establish diplomatic relations with Bhutan would be
regarded as a "definitely unfriendly act."
India would find it difficult effectively to protest the establishment
of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Nepal, in view of Nepal's
recent expansion of relations with a number of other countries and the
proximity of Pakistan as a close South Asian neighbor. However, the
Indian Government may press Nepal at least to limit its diplomatic con-
tacts to accrediting its ambassador in New Delhi to Pakistan and the
Pakistani high commissioner in New Delhi to Katmandu. Pakistan's
interest in developing relations with Nepal at this time presumably
derives from its desire to foster defense cooperation on the Indian sub-
continent against Chinese Communist expansionism. The Pakistani
Government has already approached Nepalese representatives to discuss
this matter.
Karachi's concern over Chinese Communist intentions along the
Himalayan frontier is suggested by a reported move to strengthen its
control over Pakistani territory bordering the Chinese province of
Sinkiang. Five platoons of Northern Scouts have been sent to the bor-
der state of Hunza, which lies west of Ladakh on the Sinkiang border. )
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Raul Castro Speech May Advance Soviet Strategy
In Latin America
(3iaul Castro, whose influence in the Cuban Government
headed by his brother is steadily increasing, in a speech on
11 September threw the prestige of the Cuban revolution be-
hind a Latin American people's congress to be held some time
during the next year. Such a congress appears to be part of
the Communist plan of action in this hemisphere
(The Latin American delegates to the 21st Soviet party con-
gress in Moscow resolved to hold a people's congress ostensi-
bly dedicated to some popular cause which could be used. to
attract the sponsorship of popular Latin American leaders like
Fidel Castro. The sponsors would be drawn into association
with the Communists,who would remain in the background, guid-
ing the congress in an "anti-imperialist," anti-US direction)
Considerable progress toward a congress was made during
discussions by Communists and. other Latin American leftists--
including the Cuban minister of education- -held in Santiago,
Chile,, in an effort to influence the American foreign ministers'
meeting there in August. These elements agreed that a meeting
of all democratic and representative groups and persons should
be called to consider common Latin American problems and to
oppose colonialism
(The congress may be planned to coincide with the Eleventh
Inter-American Congress scheduled. to be held in Quito, Ecuador,
in February 1960. It could be used to detract from that meeting
sponsored by the Organization of American States, a favorite
target of Communist propaganda attacks as an instrument of "US
imperialism:)
(Meanwhile, Ernesto Guevara, a pro-Communist leader of
the Castro revolution, told a TV audience on 14 September that
the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay made Cuba a target for nu-
clear attacks. An intensified, campaign against US military bases
and missions was another important tactic in the action program
adopted in Moscow.)
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps,
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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