CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 15, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

7/7/47////////////////////////////////////////////i
Approved For_Release7OP/2SECRIBIV00975AO04600130001-6
VAW ter-
25X1 V/
15 July 1959
25X1
Copy No. C /
0
I-
@-mom
0.00
0
DOCD
T /
ryry
Gyc~r4TE5 OF -~~J
DATE. 25X1
REVIEWER:
*1~
25X1
TOP SECRET
State Dept. review cd H 3f& For Release 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A004600130001-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600130001-6
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600130001-6
 V
pp0130001-6
25X1
1. THE COMMU
NIST BLOC
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
USSR: During the first six months of the USSR's- Seven-
25X1
Year-PTE, industrial production was 12 percent, above the
corresponding period of last year, according to a TASS sum-
mary of the semi-annual status report, The midyear figure
in the past has usually been a good indication of performance
0 for the full year. The Seven-Year plan calls for an avers e
annual increase of 8.6 percent. 25X1
(Chart)
Hungary-. UA Hungarian official recently informed the
British inister in Budapest that if the United States were
not dissuaded from actively pushing discussion of the Hun-
garian question in this fall's UN session, Hungary would be
obliged to undertake additional restrictive measures against
American officials in Budapest. The United States Legation
believes that the regime is prepared to go to considerable
lengths to accomplish this objective
25X1
25X1
II. ASIA-AFRICA
25X1
25X1 M,l
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600130001-6
 Approvedor:Relea a 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A 04600130001-6 25X1 %i%
UAR: Syria's economy has gradually deteriorated since 25X1
,
the establishment of the UAR last year. The failure of the
wheat crop, [n top of the loss of about 2,000,000 sheep--some
40 percent of the tota3-as the result of last winter's severe
~L weather, has now brought about a critical economic situation.
1) Local Syrian officials have hinted that they may seek US sur-
plus agricultural commodities. The situation may provoke an
increase in anti-Egyptian feeling. F 25X1
(Page 4)
vllzl.
III. THE WEST
Greece: /vidence is continuing to accumulate that the en-
trance of the ~--o--rmer Greek Cypriot terrorist leader, General
Grivas, into Greek politics may be imminent. Relations be-
tween this extreme right-wing nationalist and Greek Premie
Karamanlis have continued to deteriorate. Grivas' popularity,
combined with the desire of some right-wing politicians to
might be such as to enable him ultimately
destroy Karamanlis
,
t~\o to bring down the present government. His emergence as a power
\` in Greek politics would severely hamper implementation of the
Cyprus accords which he opposes, and would seriously affect
Greece's relations with Turkey, Britain, and possibly with the
United States
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with all
SNIEs relevant to the Berlin situation.
1. The USSR is attempting to reassure the Western
powers that the USSR will continue to respect their rights
in Berlin during an indefinite period of East-West negotia-
tions, even after a failure of an all-German committee to
reach agreement. This in part reflects Soviet anticipation
15 July 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
25X1
MM
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600130001-6
 Approved Eor Relea e 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79TO09t5AO04600130001-6
of an interim arrangement on Berlin which Moscow could
present as superseding the postwar agreements on which
existing Allied rights are based and which would, in addi-
tion, be subject at any time to continuing threats of unilat-
eral action.
V
ZE
25X1
31
2. So long as the Russians estimate that the prospects
for negotiation with the West over Berlin are favorable to
them.. they will not conclude a separate peace treaty with
the GDR or turn over access controls to the East Germans.
The USSR will continue to use threats of such action as a
form of pressure on the West. The actual physical trans-
fer of controls could be accomplished with little or no
warning.
3. While there are no reliable indications of a bloc
intent to deny Allied or West German access to West Berlin
or to seal off West Berlin in the immediate future, such ac-
tions. could be. taken with.. little or no warning.
4. There has been no significant change in West Ber-
lin's favorable economic situation. Public morale continues
high.
5. There have been no significant changes in Soviet
capabilities to respond to possible Western actions in the
event of turnover., harassment., or blockade.
6. There were no major intelligence indications of
Western allied diplomatic intentions., apart from information
obtained through official contacts with US representatives.
15 July 5 9
DAILY BRIEF iii
25X1
,~qgqg
N
MIN
0
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO04600130001-6
 Approved For Rse 2003/01/29,: CIA-RDP79T00975A600130001-6
(Million Metric T
ns
Percentage Increase
Percentage Annual Rate
o
Production
Production
First Half 1959
of Increase Needed
Unless Otherwise
First Half
First Half
Over
to Achieve
Specified)
1958
1959
First Half 1958
Seven-Year Plan Goals
Crude Steel
27
29.3
8, 5%
6.6-7.4%
Pig Iron
19.3
21
8.8%
7.4-8.5%
Rolled Metal
21.3
23.1
8.5%
6.3-7.4%
Coal
245
252
2.9%
2.7%
Petroleum
54
61, 7
14.3%
11,1%
Electric Power
114
126
10.5%
11.8%
(Billion K. W. H. )
Percent Increase First Half
1958 Over First Half 1957
Gross Industrial
10.5%
12 %
8.6%
Output
Labor Productivity
6 %
8 %
5.6%
in Industry
USSR : TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600130001-6
 Approved For R4
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Midyear Statistical Report
A TASS summary of the Soviet plan-fulfillment results
for the first six months of the Seven-Year Plan, announced
on 13 July by the Central Statistical Board, indicates good
progress toward Seven-Year Plan goals. Total industrial
production is reported to be 12 percent over the corresponding
period of last year. Six-month statistics in the past have usual-
ly been a good indication of performance for the full year. The
Seven-Year Plan calls for an average annual increase of 8.6
percent.
Official Soviet production indices are .accepted as statistical-
ly accurate, but they are not directly comparable to US statistics.
The plan was fulfilled by all union republics and economic
areas (sovnarkhozy). Industries overfulfilling their plan includ-
ed iron ore, pig iron, steel, rolled metal, nonferrous metals,
machine tools, electricity, coal, and oil. In chemicals, the
only sectors reported as overfulfilling target figures were
synthetic resin and plastics and artificial and synthetic fibers.
In agriculture, reported overfulfillment of the state pur-
chase, plan for livestock products and of spring sowing quotas
are the results of good feed supplies from 1958's bumper crop
and of an early dry spring.
25X1
25X1
25X1
15 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600130001-6
 Approved For Relo
Hungary Threa ens Further Moves Against United States
/The Hungarian regime has threatened to take further ac-
tions against American officials in Hungary if the United States
does not stop what the regime characterizes as "anti-Hungarian
activities." Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Peter, in making
this threat to the British minister, implied that the 6 July action
restricting US diplomatic travel in Hungary might be only a first
step if US policies were not altered. The Hungarian note of 6
July, which imppsed severe travel restrictions on American of-
ficials in Hungary, was the implementation of an earlier threat
that the US role in barring the Hungarian delegation from the
International Labor Organization would adversely affect rela-
tions between the two countries.
[he American Legation in Budapest believes that the regime
is prepared to go to considerable lengths to keep the United States
from actively pushing discussion of the Hungarian question in the
General Assembly this fall. Regardless of the position taken by
the United States, Sir Leslie Munro must report to the assembly
about his failure to gain entry into Hungary as the UN's representa-
tive.
During the past several months the Hungarian regime has
followed an increasingly antagonistic course vis-a-vis the Ameri-
can diplomatic representatives in Hungary. In addition to travel
restrictions, surveillance of US personnel has intensified and the
regime appears to have been preparing to eel the American
army attac
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
15 July 5 9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 2
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600130001-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600130001-6
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600130001-6
 Approved For ~elease 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600130001-6 25X1
WUW
Syria Facing Agricultural Crisis
Syria`s worst wheat crop in recent years, [together with the
loss of about 2,000,000 sheep--some 40 percent of the total--asi
a result of last winter's severe weather has created a crisis in
Syria's economy. Although official Syrian sources still claim
publicly that the current wheat crop will more than meet domestic
requirements, trade sources believe Syria will have to import
between 300,000 and 400,000 tons of wheat. Local officials of a
US oil company report that sales of oil products to farmers dur-
ing the harvesting season dropped 15 percent compared with last
year, and that the total crop will be only a third of the earlier
official estimate of 700,000 tons.
Cairo, increasingly aware of growing local criticism over
worsening economic conditions in the Syrian region, has sent a
number, of high-level delegations all promising rapid economic
development within the framework of ambitious five- and ten-year
plans. Although the present agricultural crisis can be attributed
mainly to weather, there is likely to be a serious increase in
anti-Egyptian feeling. Egyptian efforts to dominate the Syrian
economy by establishing joint Egyptian-Syrian companies to con-
trol cotton and wheat marketing have been only reluctantly ac-
cepted.
In addition, implementation of the agrarian reform last year
contributed to the crisis. New farmers lacking "know-how" and
capital sold government-supplied seed stocks for food money. The
fears of landlords not yet affected by land reform that the govern-
ment would confiscate crops also reduced the area planted.
Local officials have hinted that they, like the Egyptians? may
seek US surplus agricultural commodities.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
15 July 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 4
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600130001-6
 Approved For Re ease 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975 004600130001-6 25X1
III, THE WEST
Grivas Apparently to Enter Greek Politics
iiridence continues to accumulate indicating that General
George Grivas,. EOKA leader on Cyprus during the struggle
against the British, is about to enter Greek politics. Grivas
has repeatedly shown dissatisfaction over implementation of
the Cyprus.accords, accusing the Greek Government and Arch-
bishop Makarios of granting too many concessions to the Turks
and British.
rivas, who was given a hero's welcome when he returned
to Greece in February, is an extreme right-wing nationalist
with a history as a fanatical anti-Communist. His entrance into
politics would provide a new leader for those rightists who have
previously supported Karamanlis' moderate right-wing govern-
ment because of the absence of any promising alternative. This
could include several deputies of Karamanlis' own National
Radical Union.. Relations between Grivas and Greek. Premier
Karamanlis have worsened recently. Opposition politicians,
who have long sought to destroy Karamanlis politically, see a
potential rallying point in the popular EOKA leader and have tried
to lure him into politics. If Grivas were able to attract prom-
inent politicians to his cause, he could bring down the present
government.
L rivas is expected to advocate a hard line against Commu-
nism., the Cyprus accords, Turkey, and Britain, and he may
charge the present Greek Government with being overly depend-
ent on the United State
(Makarios, in press interviews and in blistering letters to
the general, has condemned Grivas' interference in Cypriot af-
fairs. A formal denunciation of Makarios by Grivas- -expected
within a few days--will destroy right-wing unity among the Greek
Cypriots at a time when these conservatives face a serious chal-
lenge from a well-organized Communist-led left wing)
25X1
25X1
25X1
15 July 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 5
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600130001-6
 Approved For Rel
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600130001-6
 i i ii i
Approved For Ree~eP/2~f00975A000130001-6
TOP SECRET
III op IIIIIIIpIIIIIIII IIIIIJIF 11111, 1 111 1111111111, ,111
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00 ,75A004600130001-6