CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600110001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 13, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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13 July 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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13 July 1959
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DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST .BLOC
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USSR-Berlin: Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin told
the est rman ambassador in Moscow that the USSR would
accept a compromise time limit of two years, during which
the Allies could remain in West Berlin and an all- German
committee would attempt to negotiate a permanent settlement.
Zorin stated that the USSR would not challenge Western rights
in West Berlin at the end of this period if agreement had not
been reached by the Germans. He observed that a separate
peace treaty with East Germany would be a very serious step
and that Moscow would resort to this alternative only after all
attempts to reach a negotiated settlement had failed. Zorin's
remarks make more explicit the hints contained in Foreign
Minister Gromyko's public statement of 28 June that the USSR
would continue to respect Western rights in Berlin during an
indefinite period of East-West negotiations following the expira-
tion of the time limit on all-German talks.
Speaking at a reception for the Emperor on 11 July,
Khrushchev said that he and President Voroshilov had ac-
ent of Ethiopian industry and agriculture. A trade and eco-
omic agreement has also been reached, the communique said.
ch trade has, to date., been negligible. The Emperor's ac-
eptance of Soviet assistance is probably intended to demon-
rate his independence from the United States and thereby to
ssociate Ethiopia more closely with pan-Africanism.
erm, low-interest loan of about $100.,000.,000 for the develop-
USSR--Ethiopia: According to a joint communique issued
on 12 July at the conclusion of Emperor Haile Selassie's two-
week visit to the USSR, Moscow has agreed to extend a long-
cepted an invitation to visit Ethiopia at some futu
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
N
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13 July 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Bolivia- Czechoslovakia:
Czechoslovakia
and the USSR had made a joint offer of $100,000,000 to the
Bolivian Government, primarily for agricultural purposes
and to be disbursed in goods rather than currency. This
overture continues a series of reported bloc offers of eco-
nomic aid to Bolivia, which is facing an acute economic crisis
and was probably intended. primarily for propaganda pur-
poses.
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*Honduras: The attempted coup initiated early on 12 July
by a retired officer with the backing of dissident police and mil-
itary elements in the capital was poorly organized and failed to
gain the support of leading military units. The ringleaders of
the coup effort have surrendered and have been given political
asylum in a neutral embassy. The attempt, however, further
intensifies the long-standing frictions between the armed forces,
which in Honduras are :virtually. independent of the chief ex-
ecutive, and a strong and violently antimilitary faction of the
governing Liberal party. The significant support given the
government during the 12 July fighting by groups of armed
civilians may embolden the antimilitary, element to push for
a showdown with the military. If a military coup were to suc-
ceed, it would probably encounter widespread and. sustained
civilian resistance.
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13 July 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Seeks to Reassure West on Continuation of Allied
Rights in Berlin
fIn a recent private conversation with the West German am-
bassador in Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin made more
explicit the hints contained in Gromyko's public statement on 28
June that Allied rights in West Berlin under an interim agree-
ment would not be challenged at the end of a time limit on nego-
tiations by the Soviet-proposed all-German committee. Zorin
stated that the foreign ministers would again meet to review the
West Berlin problem at the end of the time period and that
Allied rights would be the same as they were at the beginning
of the period. He also told the ambassador that the USSR would
be prepared to accept a compromise time period of two years.
According to press reports from London, Gromyko has also as-
sured the British ambassador that Western rights would be main-
tained during a Big Four foreign ministers' review of the situa-
tion following the expiration of the time limit on all- German talks)
grin remarked to the West German ambassador that a sep-
arate peace treaty with East Germany would be a very serious step
and that the USSR would resort to this alternative only after all
attempts to reach a negotiated settlement had failed. He also in-
dicated that Gromyko will attempt to reopen discussions in Geneva
of the USSR's proposals on a peace treaty with both German states
and European security measures..
These Soviet moves to reassure the Western powers that the
USSR will continue to respect their rights in Berlin during an in-
definite period of East-West negotiations following a failure of the
all- German committee to reach agreement reflect the Soviet lead-
ers' desire to obtain new arrangements on Berlin which, in their
view,, would supersede the postwar agreements on which existing
Allied rights are based. Ambassador Thompson believes accept-
ance of the Soviet proposal would mean virtually the end to the
occupation status. In his efforts to induce the West to agree to
the creation of an all-German committee, Gromyko probably will
offer to extend the time limit on its negotiations to two years or
more. He may also make "concessions" on such issues as the
level of Western "token" forces in West Berlin and on the inclu-
sion of East Berlin in a city-wide prohibition on subversive activ-
ities and nuclear weapons and missiles`'
13 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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W
I I L THE WEST
Soviet Bloc Reportedly Offers Sizable Economic Aid to Bolivia
Czechoslovakia and the USSR
had made a joint offer of $100,000,000 to the Bolivian Govern-
ment, primarily for agricultural aid and in the form of goods
rather than currency. This reported overture, which may be
for propaganda purposes only, appears to continue the series
of reported bloc offers of economic aid to Bolivia in recent
months, such as the alleged Soviet offer in late 1958 of large-
scale assistance to the Bolivian national oil company. The
Czech Legation, the only resident bloc mission in La. Paz, has.
been the medium for presenting Czech offers of technical aid
and scholarship grants to Bolivia since 1958.
Bloc economic overtures would have considerable prop-
aganda value to local leftist and Communist groups in their
opposition to President Siles' shaky regime. The regime's
ability to carry out the conditions of the US-backed stabiliza-
tion program is threatened by widespread political and labor
opposition. The government reportedly has decided to delay
its planned unfreezing of all mine commissary prices--set
for 15 July to meet its commitment to the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF). The miners still strongly oppose the un-
freezing of prices.
According to the press, former President Paz, head of
the ruling party who returned to Bolivia on 8 July, visited
Czechoslovakia and other bloc countries in June. He was
probably investigating reported bloc economic overtures and
is likely to use any such offers in an attempt to extract con-
cessions from the IMF or reduce Bolivia's dependence on US
aid.
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Honduran Coup Attempt Further Intensifies Military-
Civilian Frictions
The attempted coup initiated early on 12 July by retired
Colonel Armando Velasquez against the moderate government
of President Ramon Villeda Morales was suppressed after
about 12 hours of fighting in the capital city. Velasquez ap-
parently had the backing of some dissident military elements.
Major military elements apparently remained loyal, however,
and civilian groups were armed by the government for action
against the rebels. By late in the day the rebel ringleaders
had surrendered,, with the condition they be granted asylum
in the Costa Rican Embassy.
Velasquez, who returned recently to Honduras from exile
after an abortive effort early this year to lead a revolution
from neighboring Nicaragua, probably did not have Nicaraguan
support in his latest effort. He apparently estimated that the
long-standing and deep-seated frictions between the armed
forces and the dominant faction of the governing Liberal party
had reached such a peak that the military was on the point of re-
volt. The armed forces, under the constitution virtually inde-
pendent of the chief executive, have been regarded with deep
suspicion by the Liberals since they came to power in Honduras'
first free election in 1957. The Liberals regard the military
as the instrument of repression employed by past dictatorial
governments, and the more extreme Liberals have even pro-
posed that the army be abolished. Constant efforts to weaken
the position of the military, despite generally ineffective of -
forts by the President to maintain a balance, have antagonized
armed forces leaders. The prospect of almost certain wide-
spread and sustained civilian resistance to any military coup,
however, has restrained them.
Although most of the army apparently remained loyal dur
ing the 12 July coup attempt, the extreme antimilitary Liberal
faction may now feel emboldened to force a showdown with the
military. The large number of armed civilians in the capital
late on 12 July suggests that further disturbances are likely.
A factor which may have brought the civilian-military feud
to a head was the recent Honduran Army capture of two Cuban-
supported rebel groups preparing to launch invasions of
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Nicaragua. The army took this action in the face of wide-
spread popular support in Honduras for the Nicaraguan rebels.
Although he denies it, President Villeda is known to have of -
fered at least his moral support to the Nicaraguan rebels.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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