CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004400130001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 28, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 March 1959
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Rumania-Israel: Rumanian officials have stated that Jew-
ish emigration to Israel will be resumed, but the date has not
j yet been specified, according to an Israeli official. In a recent
meeting in Bucharest between officials of the two governments,
the Rumanians attributed the current stoppage to "unfavorable
j p publicity:' A resumption of the emigration, which has been
j halted for nearly a month would lead to strong Arab resent-
ment and protests .
25X1 II. ASIA-AFRICA
j Iraq: The American Embassy in Baghdad, assessing the
situation as it has developed since the Mosul revolt, believes
there is grave danger that "in the short run" Iraq will come
j under preponderantly Communist control. The embassy feels
j that although popular and military loyalties are still primarily
attached to Qasim, Communist control of the press and pop-
ular organizations, together with the growth of Communist
j cadres in the army and bureaucracy, present a clear possi-
bility that the Communists could nullify Qasim's popular appeal
if he attempted a showdown with them. The embassy further
believes that Nasir no longer has the assets to reverse the trend
in Iraq, and that a successful military coup against Qasim is
unlikely.
Kuwait: LUembers of Kuwait's ruling Subah family y have
j
shown increasing awareness of their total dependence on Brit-
ish military protection. As a consequence of developments in[
j Iraq and last month's local manifestation of nationalist hostility
j ,vO to Subah rule, the younger Subah sheiks have united behind.
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their elders, while British-Subah relations have improved mark-
edly.
28 Mar 59
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Southeast Asia: A new effort to promote regional coop-
eration in Southeast Asia is planned by Thailand. The Thai
foreign minister hopes to call within several months a meet-
ing of Southeast Asian leaders from Thailand, Burma, Laos,
Cambodia, South Vietnam, Malaya, and possibly Singapore to
discuss regional security, economic problems, and the estab-
DV\ lishment of a permanent association. The regional grouping
may be expanded later to include the Philippines and Indonesia.
III. THE WEST
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France: Ce Gaulle is now thinking of a separate Western
.n defense organization for Africa- He apparently realizes that ari
j {y v
28 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF
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NATO members, and has givenup the idea of attempting to
revise the NATO charter in this respect.
extension of NATO to Africa would be unacceptable to several
Bolivia: Juan Lechin, the country's key labor leader and
an important leftist member of the Bolivian Senate, is sched-
uled to go to Moscow at Soviet expense for the May Day cele-
brations. Lechin's presence in Moscow will give the USSR the
opportunity to suggest the possibility of Soviet economic as-
sistance in view of Bolivia's current economic difficulties.
Lechin left La Paz and. went abroad on 23 March.
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28 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
(No Back-up Material)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Communist Strength in Iraq
The American Embassy in Baghdad, assessing local
Communist strength, believes 1959 will be "the year of the
bear" in Iraq. It sees grave danger that "in the short run"
Iraq will come under preponderantly Communist control, and,
in view of events since the Mosul revolt, thinks it highly doubt-
ful whether Qasim, in spite of his popular standing, could re-
verse the trend even if he wished to.
The Communists now dominate the press, radio, and the
growing and proliferating "mass organizations," such- as trade.
unions, students' unions, the teachers' association, and the league
for women's rights. They appear to have almost complete con-
trol of the Popular Resistance Force, which has shown itself
willing and able to defy civil and military authority in some
parts of the country.
Already strongly entrenched in the ministries of Econom-
ics, Development, Agriculture, Education, and National. Guid-
ance, Communist sympathizers appear to be making new in-
roads throughout the bureaucracy. The Ministry of Economics
under Ibrahim Kubba is well embarked. on a program to tie Iraq
as closely as possible to the Soviet bloc. In addition to agree-
ing to large-scale Soviet aid. for economic development, Kubba's
ministry has succeeded in discouraging foreign and domestic
private investment, leaving the way open for the growth of state
capitalism. Prime Minister Qasim in his press conference of
24 March hinted at a. new specific measure..in..this..field by. an-
nounc ingthat Iraq would study, nationalization of France's share
in the Iraqi Petroleum Company.
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The Iraqi Communist party continues to work behind a
"popular front" facade and appears to be attempting to entrench
itself in a government still headed by Qasim and containing
other elements. Moscow has apparently been concerned that
open manifestations of Communist control in Baghdad would in-
vite possible retaliation, as well as harm Soviet relations
with other Arab and Asian countries.
Communist gains have been accompanied by a sweeping
campaign of purges and arrests of non-Communist elements
and central and local government officials. Estimates of the
number arrested. since 7 March run as high as 15,000? Key
army officers,, suspected of complicity in the Mosul affair, or
of independent, nationalist attitudes, have been arrested or
displaced.
Despite Qasim's personally cordial attitude., American
Embassy personnel are being subjected to new "security" con-
trols and harassments; several Iraqis employed by the em-
bassy have been arrested,, and American staff members are
under recurrent surveillance. Forei ners in Baghdad conclude
that "the iron curtain is descending:'
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Developments in Kuwait
c he growth of Communist influence in neighboring Iraq,
together with last month's public call by Kuwaiti nationalists
for an end. to rule by the Subah family, have impressed the
Subah sheiks with their total dependence on British military
protection. At the same time, the younger "liberal" Subahs
have rallied in support of the family's old guard
Relations between the Kuwaiti Government and. the British
have grown more cordial than at any time in the last year, ac-
cording to the American consul in Kuwait. The British :mil-
itary adviser's association with the British Government is no
longer being played down by the Kuwaitis J
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Luwaiti authorities have cracked down hard on anti-Qasim
activity by pro-UAR Kuwaiti nationalists, and otherwise striven
to avoid antagonizing Iraq. The main impetus to the curtail-
ment of nationalist activity was the public attack on the Subah
regime at a nationalist rally on 1 February honoring formation
of the UAR. If the Subahs' action is not fol- 25X6
lowed by a meaningful attempt to liberalize the apparatus of
government, however, the heretofore moderate nationalist op-
position may be driven to advocate more uncompromising re-
sistance. The Ruler of Kuwait has balanced his action by
informing the Egyptian-dominated Arab League of readiness
to contribute $14,000,000 to the Arab Economic Organization)
While the pro-UAR nationalists have been temporarily
brought under control, a Kuwaiti Government official has re-
ported a sharp increase in complaints to the Ruler by Iraqis
resident in Kuwait, The official fears that the pattern may
reflect Communist inspiration, and the American consul com-
ments that the KuwaitLpublic security department is not ade-
quately staffed for effective counter subversion worked 25X1
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Thailand Plans to Sponsor Southeast Asian Regional Meeting
Thai Foreign Minister Thanat, with the full support of Pre-
mier Marshal Sarit, is planning to invite the heads of government
from non-Communist Southeast Asian mainland countries to a
conference to develop regional cooperation, discuss mutual eco-
nomic problems, and, if possible, establish a permanent: re-
gional secretariat with a program of annual meetings. The
first meeting is projected to coincide with the visit of Malay's
acting premier, Dato Razak, to Bangkok in late April or early
May; if necessary arrangements cannot be completed by then,
the meeting may be held in June or July.
The Thai foreign minister expects no difficulty in gaining
approval from Malaya, Burma, and Laos. He feels, however,
that South Vietnamese - Cambodian antipathy may present a
problem. Invitations may also be extended. to the Philippines
and Indonesia.
The Thais hope to reduce regional tension arising from dif-
fering national policies ranging from neutralism to close West-
ern alignment. Thanat indicated that,a major selling point for
regional association would be the strength to be gained against
Communism by closer cooperation. This first Thai initiative
toward regional leadership follows similar proposals for area
cooperation by Malayan Prime Minister Abdul Rahman and
Philippine President Garcia.
Although the proposed regional organization would have no
connection with SEATO, it could provide an improved climate
for SEATO operations in the area.
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III. 'THE WEST
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De Gaulle Reported Thinking of Separate Defense Organization
For Africa
ODe Gaulle, w o believes organization of the defense of
Africa is an "essential buttress" to NATO,, may soon propose
establishing a separate defense organization for that continent,
according to his diplomatic adviser. Whether this defense ar-
rangement would include African countries or countries with
African interests other than France, Britain, and the United
States would be determined in tripartite discussions. De Gaulle
apparently realizes that an extension of NATO to Africa would
be unacceptable to several NATO members, and has given up
the idea of attempting to revise the NATO charter in this re-
spect
CThe French President's thinking appears to have shifted
since 11 March when French Chief of Staff General Ely, appar--
ently quoting a government policy paper, had indicated to Gen-
eral Norstad that De Gaulle would soon propose creation of a
NATO southern command to cover the Western Mediterranean,
Algeria, and perhaps the Sahara. The North Atlantic treaty
includes the Algerian departments in the NATO area, but the
French withdrew them from the NATO command structure in
1954. At a press conference on 25 March, De Gaulle stated
that NATO's "area" does not extend south of the Mediterranean,
and in any case he seems to have a much broader area in mind
for the new organization
CThe ranking career official in the Foreign Ministry, Secre-
tary General Louis Joxe, will attend. the tripartite talks on Africa
scheduled in Washington next month. I
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Key Bolivian Leader May Visit Moscow
Juan Lechin, key labor leader in Bolivia and an important
leftist member of the Bolivian Senate, is scheduled to go to
Moscow at Soviet expense for the May Day celebrations. His
presence in Moscow will give Soviet officials an opportunity to
suggest the possibility of economic assistance.
Lechin may have wanted to leave Bolivia at this time to dis-
sociate himself from an impending renewal of the struggle between
the Bolivian Government and the armed miners over the unfreez-
ing of mine commissary prices. The implementation of the com-
missary decree of 13 March is to begin on I Aprils although it
reportedly will be restricted at first to certain miners long
loyal to the government.
The crisis arising from the struggle over frozen commis-
sary prices in early March caused the US Embassy to start
sending American dependents out of the country. The govern-
ment decree permitted the US Government to release ICA funds
of $500,000 to Bolivia, but the Bolivian Central Ban : still has
a deficit of $2,,000.,000.1
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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