CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004300440001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 22, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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22 January 1959
Copy No. C
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
ULCLASS;F!E D
CLA.S3. CI HAN?C) D TO: T 2 C
NLXT RE'JIEW DATE:
AUTI-14 H 70-2
DATE. REVIEWER:
State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
i"
gin shortly. Official statements by the Finnish Communist
Dartv however, have severely criticized the ~ew minority
in Helsinki that the long-def erred trade negotiations can be I
ast month toppled Finland conservative
pressures which 1
coalition vovernment is the statement by the Soviet charge'
22 January 1959
.DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Finland: tThe first sign of relaxation of the Soviet
-
I
Agrarian government formed last week. Meanwhile~ Pres-
ident Kekkonen has left on a "Private" visit to Leningrag
Watch Committee conclusion- -Taiwan Strait: The Chi-
nese Communists contifiue to have the capabilitTof seizing
some of the smaller offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait area
with virtually no warning. A review of the evidence does not
reveal an intent to initiate a major attack in the immediate
future.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
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Watch Committee conclusion- -Middle East and Southeast
Asia: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet
hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the
Middle East and Southeast Asia.
Middle East: Although the situation in the Middle East re-
mains precarious, a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostil-
ities is unlikely in the immediate future. Communist influence
and activity in Iraq continue to pose the threat of Communist
control of the government.
Southeast Asia: In Cambodia, Premier Sihanouk's aware-
ness of political plots against him, abetted by Thailand and 25X1
South Vie-nnm- may el him to seek increased Communist
support.
22 Jan 59 DAILY BRIEF ii
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Lebanon: Clashes between Christian and Moslem students,
over a plan" to offer in the Arabic language training in law which
has hitherto been available only in French at a Jesuit school,
are symptomatic of the continuing pressure of Lebanon's Mos-
lems for control of the state. Controversies between the Chris-
tians and Moslems in Lebanon will continue to create public
tension and dissension in the cabinet.
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Italy: Vice Premier Saragat predicts that several dep-
uties of his small Democratic Socialist party will split away
o join the Nenni Socialists as a result of Nenni's victory over
he pro-Communists at the recent party congress. Such a
ove would wipe out Premier Fanfani's present three-vote
parliamentary margin. There is reason to believe, however,
hat a government crisis may be postponed until after the April
con ress of Fanfani's Christian Democratic party.
DAILY BRIEF
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Approved or
whom Portuguese police officials regard as a real reat to the
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Portugal: Che escape of ex-army Captain Henrique Galvao,
long-time Portuguese opposition leader, from a Lisbon hospital
on 15 January has aroused the concern of key members of the
Salazar regime, Galvao,
government, could provide the leadership, heretofore lacking,
for the increased popular opposition to the regime and at the
same time obtain decisive backing from dissatisfied. elements
among regime supporters to effect Salazar's retirement at an
early date.
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j 22 Jan 59 DAILY BRIEF
ass
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Eases Pressure on Finland
Moscow has begun to relax the pressures which tope e
Finland's "rightist" coalition government last month, but has
not yet indicated firm approval of the new minority Agrarian
government formed. last week by V. J. Sukselainen without
Communist representation
(The Soviet charge informed Finnish officials on 19 Jan-
uary that long-deferred trade negotiations can begin soon and
that the USSR would be prepared to receive a delegation "within
a matter of days:' According to the Finnish press, suspended
Soviet payments to several Finnish industries have been re-
sume._
CTlie USSR, at Finland's request, renewed an invitation ex-
tended last May for a "private visit" by President Kekkonen.
Soviet officials had ignored earlier attempts by the Fagerholm
government to arrange such a visit. The new Finnish Govern-
ment's desire to adopt a conciliatory posture toward the USSR
is reflected in its prompt reply to the Soviet proposal fora on-
ference to draft a German peace treaty which stated that Fiand
is ready to "contribute" to the success of such a conference:
he USSR still has not replaced. its ambassador to Finland,
withdrawn last September, but Peiping, which followed the Soviet
action in October, has now requested approval for its new am-
bassadoD
C'ficial press statements by the Finnish Communist party
(FCP , however, have asserted that the Sukselainen government
is incapable of "restoring relations of trust with the USSR" and
have accused it of "preparing the way for a rightist return to
power:' The Finnish Communists' attacks, quoted by TASS, sug-
gest that they will continue to agitate for inclusion in the govern-
ment,
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The Lebanese Situation
A student strike over the question of teaching law in the
Arabic language at the government-controlled Lebanese Acad-
emy has aroused religious antagonism and caused clashes be-
tween Moslem and Christian students. Up to the present time
the teaching of law in Lebanon has been confined to Universitd
St. Joseph, a French-financed. school sponsored by the University
de Lyon, and instruction has been in French. The president of
the Arabic-language Lebanese Academy, sometimes referred to
as the Lebanese University, has no college degree, and its fac-
ulty and educational standards are far below those at St. Joseph.
Moslem students throughout Lebanon went on strike sev-
eral days ago in support of the Academy's efforts to add a law
curriculum. French-oriented secondary students struck in
retaliation. The dispute, now drawn along religious lines, has
reached into the cabinet, reportedly causing a rift between its
two Christian and two Moslem members. While this particular
dispute may be resolved, new controversies of this kind will
continue to spring up to disrupt the cabinet, which is not being
given effective leadership by President Shihab.
Recently there have been reports of threats by Communist
and extreme Arab nationalist elements to continue to foment
labor strife in Lebanon. These elements' efforts are primarily
directed against pro-Western unions in the fields of transporta-
tion, dock workers, public utilities, and the textile mills.. The
textile workers and truck drivers now are on strike. Next on
the extremists' list are the workers of the tobacco monopoly.
With some unemployment and reduced economic activity as a
consequence of last summer's rebellion, the field is fertile for
extremist elements to incite labor troubles, and Communist trade
unionists, according to spokesmen for all democratic trade union
elements, are enjoying favor with Prime Minister Karami.
There have been reports that the Syrians again have been
smuggling arms to antigovernment forces in Lebanon.
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III. THE WEST
Italian Government Continues in Jeopardy
Statements made by Vice Premier Saragat to US Embassy
officials on 20 January suggest that the victory won over the
pro-Communists by Pietro Nenni's autonomist faction at the
Italian Socialist party's (PSI) congress may lead to a cabinet
crisis. Saragat, leader of the Democratic Socialists, who
are part of the government coalition, predicted that two to six
of his party's 22 deputies will split away to join Nenni. This
would erase the government's three-vote margin and could
topple Prime Minister Fanfani unless he can gain tacit support
from the PSI as a whole or from other parties outside the gov-
erning coalition, or unless Nenni decides to throw the support
of some of his deputies to Fanfani, as has apparently happened
on certain secret ballots.
On the other hand, right-wing Christian Democrats, fear-
ful that Fanfani will get additional parliamentary support from
the PSI,now may decide to oppose him openly. They have been
voting against the government on secret ballots, but they appar-
ently prefer to postpone the real battle until their party's congress,
scheduled for 11-13 April.
Whether the left-wing Democratic Socialists decide to break
with Saragat immediately or stay with him depends somewhat on
their estimate of their eventual ability to pull the rest of the party
with them into a unified Socialist party with Nenni. Presumably,
their action will also be influenced by Nenni's decision as to
whether or not he wants to bring down the government at this
time.
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Portuguese Government Reported Nervous Over Opposition
Leader's Escape
fnn 15 January Henrique Galvao, a leading opponent of the
Salazar regime, escaped from a Lisbon hospital. Sentenced
last year to a long prison term on charges of antigovernment
plotting., he is regarded as a martyr by a large segment of the
publi
Galvao's escape
has accentuated the nervousness o Key members of the Salazar
regime, already apprehensive that an opposition movement of
unknown intensity may underlie the known political unrest. Po-
lice officials regard Galvao as a real threat who could provide
a rallying point for all dissident elements]
[Galvao is an ex-army captain said to retain the respect
of many key army officers. He is a friend of General Humberto
Delgado whose opposition presidential campaign last year alarmed
the government by the unrest it revealed. Galvao was formerly
an inspector of colonies and a parliamentary deputy whose sharp
criticism of the government's domestic and colonial policies sub-
jected him to the special enmity of Premier SalazaO.
hough dissatisfaction with Salazar seems to be increas-
ingly widespread, no group seems prepared yet to act on it.
Galvao could provide the leadership which the popular opposi-
tion to the regime has heretofore lacked.. At the same time, he
could probably obtain backing from dissatisfied elements among
regime supporters who feel that Salazar has outlived his polit-
ical usefulness and that it is time for a change of government
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 ApprovedFo Release 2002/09/04 m -
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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