CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004300260001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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12 February 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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12 February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Iran- USSR: CF_ ollowing the breakoff in Soviet-Iranian
0
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came "abusive, insulting, and very threatening," and left with
manifest shortly:' According to Eqbal, the last session of the
negotiations was very heated. The Soviet representatives be-
pressed great concern over the threat of dangerous reper-
cussions which he claimed the Russians said would "become
negotiations on 10 February, Iranian Prime Minister Egbal ex-
sults, and threats.
the foreign minister a lengthy document of "accusations, in-
Watch Committee conclusions--Middle East: Situations
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which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East
susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet hostile action
situation remains precarious, a deliberate initiation of large-
r__
Middle East: Elsewhere in the Middle East, although the
subversive and other measures short of direct military action.
strong economic and diplomatic pressure, and probably with
ment, the USSR will certainly retaliate with violent propaganda.,
particularly in Iran and Iraq.
Iran: With the breakdown of Iranian-Soviet negotiations
and the anticipated signing of an Iranian-US bilateral agree-
scale hostilities is unlikely in the imn*ediate future
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Yemen-USSR: Yemen, under the influence of pro-Soviet
Crown Prince Badr, now has concluded an aid agreement with
the USSR for 10,000 tons of wheat. The first Soviet wheat ship-
ment is scheduled. to arrive at the Yemeni port of Hodeida about
20 February. The first American aid wheat is to arrive at Mocha
about 12 Fdbruar
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will end exclusive French control of Laotian military training.
Laos: he Laotian Government announced on 11 February
that it is no longer bound by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Thi:
action will probably provoke strong adverse reactions not only
from France but from the Sino-Soviet bloc and India as well. It
III. THE WEST
Venezuela: The government is taking extensive precautions
to prevent further mob violence in Caracas and to ensure ac-
complishment of Romulo Betancourt's inauguration on 13 Feb-
ruary. There are, however, rumors of a coup attempt by dissi-
dent junior officers, and the atmosphere remains tense.
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Iranian-Soviet Negotiations Broken Off After Heated. Exchange
Iranian-Soviet negotiations on a nonaggression pact, which
had -been in progress for nearly two weeks, ended abruptly about
midnight on 10 February following a heated exchange, according
to Iranian Prime Minister Eqbal. The special Soviet delega-
tion headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov departed for
Moscow in anger, leaving with Foreign Minister Hekmat a 14-
page document of threats and accusations
fEgbal said. the Soviet representatives became "abusive, in-
sulting, and very threatening" during the final session and gave
the impression that Moscow was almost at the point of severing
diplomatic relations with Iran. He said. the Russians accused
the Iranian Government, the Shah, and himself of. failure to rep-
resent the Iranian people, of being "abject lackeys" of the United.
States, and of leading the country along the path to disaster:3
[The Shah and Eqbal are greatly concerned over possible
"dangerous repercussions" from the Soviet Union which the
Russian representatives warned would "become manifest shortly."
The Shah, through Eqbal, even appealed urgently for an American
declaration "within the next 24 to 48 hours" to the effect that the
United States "will defend Iran in the same manner as American
territory.'
Moscow can be expected. to follow up with a propaganda cam-
paign aimed at discrediting the Shah's regime. The American
ambassador in Tehran believes that this could result in "serious
internal political damage" to the regime]
Other possible Soviet measures include military demonstra-
tions on the frontier and threats to exercise the right to advance
troops into Iran under the 1921 treaty. The Kremlin might also\
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encourage dissident groups and stimulate labor trouble or
sabotage by Arab workers in Iran's oil fields. Moscow fur-
thermore could cause some disruption of the Iranian econ-
omy by cutting off trade; in 1958 bloc countries received 11
percent of Iran's exports and provided 25 percent of its im-
ports.
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La 6s Rep diates 1954 Geneva Agreements
he Laotian Government, in a move apparently designed
to free itself from exclusive French control of military train-
ing, has announced that it no longer considers Laos bound by
the restrictive 1954 Geneva Agreements. The formal state-
ment recounts Laos' fulfillment of its obligations under the
1954 armistice and points out that as a fully independent and
sovereign nation, it cannot tolerate foreign intervention in its
affairs. An immediate consequence of this act is that it pro-
vides a legal basis for introducing American military training
into Laos. It also precludes reactivation of the International Con-
trol Commission in Laos, as sought by the Communist bloc and
India.)
Like France, which recently has shown renewed determina-
tion o maintain its special position in Laos, the Communists are
expected to react sharply. The Sino-Soviet bloc, which maintains
that the Geneva Agreements are applicable to Laos and Cambodia
pending Vietnam's reunification, looks upon them as an effective
device to frustrate American efforts to increase the anti-
Commu-nist defenses of these countries. India, in its capacity as ICC
chairman and in an effort to preserve the status quo in Indochina,
previously has expressed strong fears that any unilateral abroga-
tion of the 1954 armistice machiner by the West might provoke
Communist military reaction.
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Tension l'urrounds Venezuelan Presidential Inauguration
The explosive atmosphere surrounding the preparations for
inauguration of Romulo Betancourt as president of Venezuela..
on 13 February is pointed up,, by serious mob violence in Caracas
on 10 February and rumors of a coup attempt by dissident junior
officers. The situation is complicated by the concentration of
disorderly opposition elements in the politically strategic Federal
District, where Betancourt has only limited support. Leaders
of Betancourt's Democratic Action party (AD) have for some weeks
feared disturbances, plots to block the inauguration, and even pos-
sible assassination attempts against the president-elect. There
have been several incidents of mass opposition to Betancourt in
Caracas since his electoral victory last December. The govern-
ment is taking extensive precautions to protect visiting foreign
delegations and to control any outbreaks of violence.
I Larrazabal.,; the popular former junta
president, has kept himself in the political spotlight by appearances
at public ceremonies, especially during the recent visit of Fidel
Castro. There is some indication that he may postpone assuming
his ambassadorial assignment in Chile until after the inauguration.
His presence in Caracas on 13 February would be an embarrassment
to Betancourt and could possibly provoke disorders.
Betancourt apparently has made progress in alleviating the
traditional military hostility toward himself and his party
The
.
o Military thus backed-the election results! 25X1
The loyalty of the navy, however, which was solidly behind Larraza-
bal during his junta presidency and is still headed by his brother,
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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