CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004300180001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 February 1959
State Dept. review completed
/ TOP SECRET
Copy No.
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DOCUMENT NO.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 February 1959
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DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
1%%
1
IN
USSR - Communist China: ~Khrushchev stated explicitly
at a recent reception that the "Chinese
have conceded" to the USSR on the commune issue. They now
realize that the communes are a step in the building of social-
ism, not Communism as originally claimed. Reaffirming the
Soviet doctrine that material abundance is a prerequisite to
full Communism, Khrushchev remarked that the Chinese have
"nothing but rice and blue cotton cloth,~]F
II, S -AF CA
Japan - Communist China: Japanese Foreign Ministry of-
finin c nnn0ir1,M_ onner,+ rti,tiNr,r,n lti 4 4a. ~L Jr_ - _
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five rejection of Tokyo's overtures for ambassadorial talks.
Chou En-tai's offer on 17 February to trade with small and
medium-sized Japanese enterprises through Japan's leftist
r
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labor federation has been denounced by Foreign Minister
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the cabinet.
old-line politicians", in. donflict..w ith 'young reformers .,in'.
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ously with strong bloc pressure arising from Laos' repudiation 25X1
of the Geneva accords. Prime Minister Phoui is supporting
Ceylon., CA one-day general strike is being planned for 23
February by the major leftist opposition party, a Trotskyite
group which controls most of Ceylon's urban labor. Some
21 Feb 59 DAILY BRIEF
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Indonesia: A major reorganization of the Indonesian
Government may be near. The proposed new structure would
dimin h the importance of political parties while greatly
strengthening the roles of President Sukarno and the army.
he Indonesian Communist party, which cannot afford o op-
pose either Sukarno or the army, would suffer most
Laos., (A political crisis is developing in Laos simultane-
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A
d F R
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pprove
e
Cleaders of this party apparently intend. to instigate violence
in the hope of forcing out the Bandaranaike government in
the near future:?
ally
Iran-Oil: The Shah may soon attempt to force the con-
sortium. of Western companies operating the country's "na-
tionalized" oil industry to sell. Iran a 25-percent interest.
The Shah's bargaining position has been strengthened by
breaches of the 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement in both
Venezuela and the Middle East, and by the recent cut of 18
cents per barrel in the price of Iranian crude, which will
reduce Iranian revenue by $25,000,000 to $35,000,000 annu-
Caribbean: Meetings planned in Cuba for later this
month among leaders of several Latin American Commu-
nist parties may concern Communist efforts. to control the
several "liberation" movements being formed with Cuban
Government encouragement to oust "dictators" in the Car
uan ex
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group formed in Venezuela, and are also reported to have
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ean area.
infiltrated a Dominican revolutionary group there.
(Page 10)
21 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
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Indonesian Government Reorganization Apparently Near
A major Indonesian Government reorganization may be
near which would advance President Sukarno's concept of
"guided democracy" by decreasing the powers of parliament
and of the political parties, and strengthen the role of the
president and the army. The two major non-Communist par-
ties, the National party and the Nahdlatul Ulama, are reported
to have "surrendered" to President Sukarno's demandfor a return to
the 194.8 Constitution,, This document, which governed Indonesia
until 1949, is a highly flexible document under which Sukarno
could introduce his plan for a new legislature which would be
50 percent appointive and 50 percent elective.
Although implementation procedure is uncertain, Indo-
nesian sources have speculated that the Constituent Assem-
bly--which has the task of writing a new Constitution- -will
adopt the 1945 document, parliament will then be disbanded,
and a new cabinet formed.
The Communist party, which now is probably the largest
in Indonesia and has a good chance of winning a substantial
plurality in the next elections, stands to lose most by the re-
organization. Since it apparently cannot afford to antagonize
either Sukarno or the army, however, it will encourage as much
non-Communist opposition as possible; if this fails, it will then
go along with the change.
must have military assistance to achieve both technical strength
~F or months the army has pressed the argument that it
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Approved For
NEW,
Land. prestige, and. that to combat Communist influence in Indo-
nesia, this assistance should come from the West, preferably
the United States. The Indonesian Government has recently
completed arrangements for the receipt of $15,000,000 of
American military aid in 1959, most of which will go to the
army. This is in addition to approximate $7,000,000 received
in 1958:
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Growing Dissension in Laotian Government
The struggle of old line politicians to check the growing
political ascendancy of young reform leaders is jeopardiz-
ing the government at a time when Laos is under strong Com-
munist pressure because of its repudiation of the 1954 Geneva
accords. Prime Minister Phoui Sanaikone appears to have
committed his prestige to the cause of the politicians, and
is attempting to split the alliance between the reformist Com-
mittee for the Defense of the National Interest (CDNI) and the
army.3
(Phoui told the American ambassador on 19 February that
the army now considered the CDNT the "military party" and
that such an attitude could lead to the virtual elimination of
all other parties. He also implied that both Army Chief of
Staff Ouan and the Crown Prince wished to see the military
take over the government.
~Phoui reportedly plans to force the issue to a showdown
at an early meeting of the Defense Advisory Council by request-
ing that the military withdraw from active participation in pol-
itics. This could include the withdrawal of the three officers
now in the cabinet.)
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Soviet Bloc Leaders Apparently Concerned About Position
Of ommunist Government of Kerala
(Kerala's failure to make significant economic progress is
causing some concern to bloc leaders who fear unfavorable reper-
cussions throughout Asia if the Communists lose control of Kerala
because of failure to improve economic conditions. The Kerala
Government had a good record during its first year in office but
has lost prestige since last summer due to its attempts to repress
opposition elements and its inability to reduce the state's high
level of unemployment
Any bloc aid intended for Kerala must be negotiated with
New Delhi within the framework of general trade and aid agree-
ments. The recent public statement by Namboodiripad, Chief
Minister of Kerala that lie would seek Soviet assistance for
Kerala was widely criticized in India and may have aroused
New Delhi's suspicions about bloc plans. Bloc countries have
already stepped up their purchases of certain Indian goods pro-
duced chiefly in Kerala.)
CA team of Polish experts reportedly will go to Kerala at the
beginning of March to make a survey of business possibilities
which might be exploited by Poland. Aid to support the local
Communist party in an underdeveloped country is contrary to
past practices in the bloc economic offensive.
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Planned General Strike in Ceylon May Cause Violence
he one-day general strike planned for 23 February
by the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja party,' the major left-
ist opposition party in Ceylon, is designed as a protest
against the recent passage of a parliamentary bill facilitating
the government's use of emergency powers in the case of local-
ized unrest. The party, whose members were evicted from the
hall during debate on the bill, fears that its labor wing will be
weakened by the government's action. A mass rally held on 18
February by 12 major unions in Colombo pledged support for any
action that might be taken to have the government's bill repealed.i
[Though leaders of the Lanka Sama Samaja party. reportedly
intend the strike merely to protest passage of the bill, certain
party members are said to plan to instigate, violence between
workers and the police. They expect this to inflame popular
opinion against the government and to pave the way for efforts
to overthrow it in the near future. :j
(Should the strike actually occur, military and police forces
would probably be able to handle it if it is confined to one day.
ere is also a possibility
that conservative elements, including the Governor General,
will take counteraction. Ceylon's security forces might find
it difficult to control the situation if the period of unrest is
prolonged
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I IL THE WEST
Latin American Communists Plan Meetings in Cuba
The Costa Rican and Nicaraguan Communist parties have
been asked by a representative of the Cuban Communist party
to send delegates to Cuba later this month for meetings that
will include several leaders of Latin American Communist
parties The current
"excellent" position of the party in u a an i s past and pres-
ent efforts to support and to influence the government of Prime
Minister Fidel Castro are to be discussed, as well as plans for
the overthrow of the government of Nicaraguan President Somoza.
Communist efforts to exploit Castro's encouragement of the
popular upsurge against dictators have become increasingly ap-
parent in recent weeks. Communists have already formed an
organization of Nicaraguan exiles in Venezuela which they clear-
ly hope will become the instrument of Nicaragua's "liberation."
They are also believed to have considerable influence in a group
of Dominican revolutionaries in Venezuela. The Communists ap-
parently feel they stand to gain new prestige as "liberators of the
people from US-supported.dictators," as well as considerable influ-
ence in post-revolutionary governments in Nicaragua and the Do-
tinican Republica
Plans for meetings in Havana indicate the continuing suc-
cessful effort of Latin American Communists over the past year
to achieve greater liaison--an effort endorsed by Moscow and in-
spired by sharp Soviet criticism in late 1957. In his report to
the Soviet 21st party congress last month, Khrushchev professed
to see a "new stage" in the "national liberation movement" and
noted specifically its intensification in Latin America. Leaders
of the Latin American Communist parties, most of whom were
represented at the Soviet party congress, were scheduled to meet
in special session with Soviet party leaders, possibly to arrange.
continued coordination and receive further guidance from Moscow.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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