CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004300020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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12 March 1959
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DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Watch Committee conclusion: No Sino-Soviet bloc country
intends deliberately to initiate irect military action against US
forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the
immediate future.
Khrushchev continues to reiterate his intention to conclude
a peace treaty with East Germany and to turn over Berlin access
controls to the East Germans. Although the Soviets are making
preparations necessary to the turnover, which could be done with
little or no warning, available evidence does not indicate that they
intend to do so in the immediate future. The eventual possibility
of armed conflict between Western forces and Soviet-East Ger-
man forces is inherent in the Berlin problem because of miscal-
culations which could arise.
Poland: In his seven-hour speech opening the Third Polish
party congress Gomulka backed Soviet policy on Germany and Ber-
his relatively moderate policies on such matters as the church, in-
lin and accused the Western powers of endangering the peace by
their refusal to agree to Soviet proposals. He expressed the hope
implicitly that the Yugoslav party might return "to our movement:'
His remarks on internal affairs indicated his intention to continue
accord with an agreement reached. between Chinese and .American
reduce the size of their armed. forces on the Chinmen Islands in
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Taiwan Strait: IThe Chinese Nationalists appear reluctant to r 25X1
tellectual1. freedom and agricultural collectivization.
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military officials last November and, despite prodding, have failed 25X1
to produce any plan for the reduction. The agreement calls for the
removal of .15,000 men from a total of approximately 86,000 by the
end of June, but official figures disclose a reduction to date of only
530 men. Some American military officials believe that this figure
is suspect and that the size of the garrison has actually increased.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
--Middle East Situations
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susceptible o direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc hostile
action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle
East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situations in the area
remain precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale
hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.
Iraq: The apparent failure of the revolt in Mosul further
removes checks to the drift of Iraq toward. Communist control.
Jordan: The absence of King I-Iussyn from Jordan and the
scheduled departure of Prime Minister Rifai on 17 March pro-
vide opportunity for political competition among members of
the government remaining in Amman and, for coups by opposi-
tion elements. F_ 7
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UAR-USSR: Nasir's Damascus speech on 11 March, in re-
action to events in Iraq, contained the strongest charges to date
against Arab Communists. He termed them "agents" who "work
for the foreigners" and expressed determination to continue his 25X1
anti-Communist posture "regardless of the harm which may be-
fall us." His renewal of attacks on the Communists may brin
a sharp reaction from Moscow.
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DAILY BRIEF
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Sudan: he immediate danger of a clash between Ansar 25X1
almost inevitable. These chanaes might include the retire-
ment of Abboud himself.
tribesmen and Sudanese m units has been reduced. On
the morning of 10 March,
the leader of the Ansar sect told the 1,000 tribesmen who had
gathered in Khartoum to go home. The new Abboud govern-
ment remains divided on several scores. Pressures from
army, political, and. religious factions make further changes
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III. THE WEST
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Cyprus: Communist spokesmen on Cyprus, representing
a sma ut well-organized party with proved vote-getting
ability and controlling the island's largest labor organization,
have decided to cooperate with Archbishop Makarios for the
present.t In return, Makarios reportedly has agreed to the
election of a given number of Communist-backed candidates in
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Cyprus' first legislature, possibly as many as a quarter of the
jip/
Greek seats. Communist leaders, however, have recently fol-
7.........]
'
li
b
d
i
th
C
rus settlemen+
MEN
Moscow
s
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y
eno nc
ng
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yp
absence from official functions could encourage a move
absence from official functions could encoura e a move to oust
discontent his prolonged
and that in view of the continuing ,
he will not regain the public confidence he formerly enjoyed
left his home, made any public statement, or seen any for-
eigners for nearly two months. Many observers believe that
and is carrying a normal work load. However, he has no
ij
Portugal: [Premier Salazar's close associates have stated 25X1 3
that he has recovered from his attack of pneumonia six weeks
.
him
him.
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Fund for granting further aid. This tension could erupt in red
newed anti-American rioting stimulated by an article in the
ing tin miners and gradually unfreeze commissary prices in
order to satisfy a requirement of the International Monetary
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Bolivia: New tension is being created in La Paz by the
Bolivian vernment's efforts to impose wage terms on strik-
16 March issue of Time which states that a US official "in
rueful jest" suggested Bolivia's partition.
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LATE ITEMS
USSR: (In his talk on 9 March with West German Social
Democratic Chairman Ollenhauer, Khrushchev stated that if
there is no progress in a foreign ministers' or summit confer-
ence, the USSR will conclude a separate peace treaty and then
transfer Berlin access controls to the East Germans. He as-
serted that the United States, Britain, France, and "most West
Germans" do not want reunification and said the USSR also pre-
fers to keep "what we have now" because the future actions of
a reunified Germany would be uncertain. Khrushchev endorsed
Ollenhauer's suggestion that a military relaxation in Europe
must precede any progress toward German reunification. r
USSR - East Germany: rus c ev has invited the as
Germans to send a government and party delegation to Moscow
in May, according to the communique issued at the end of his
visit to East Berlin. The announcement now of this visit, which
carries with it the implication that a separate peace treaty will
then be signed, may be intended to exert further pressure on
the West to cei)t Soviet terms for a meeting on a German treaty
and Berlin.
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Gomulka Covers Full Range of Polish Problems in Congress
Speech
Speaking at the opening session of the third Polish party
congress, First Secretary Gomulka covered the full range of
Polish foreign and domestic affairs. He charged the West
with rejecting peaceful means of settling differences, break-
ing the Potsdam agreement, and dividing Germany. Backing
Soviet policy on Germany and Berlin, Gomulka stressed that
a separate peace treaty will be signed with the East German
regime if the Federal Republic and the Western powers per-
sist in their refusal to participate in an all-German agree-
ment. Poland will insist on participating in all conferences
on the German problem.
Poland's western border was settled at Potsdam, Gomulka
declared, and the inclusion of the border question in a peace
treaty would be only a formality. He characterized all efforts
to woo Poland away from the USSR as attempts to undermine
this settlement.
Gomulka stressed the equality and independence of all
Communist parties, claiming that each party adapts its ac-
tivity to the specific conditions in its country and is fully
responsible for setting its own policies. He said that while
the Soviet Union is the mainstay of all socialist countries and
the nerve center of the world socialist system, it guides rather
than directs; it does not impose its will on other parties.
The Yugoslav party was accused of adopting a revision-
ist program, which if followed by other parties would disrupt
the unity of the socialist camp and aid the imperialists.
Gomulka said the Yugoslavs will soon have to choose between
returning to the Communist fold and aligning themselves with
the Western Socialists. F__ I
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Chinese Nationalists ow in a ucing 011shore s nds Garrison
Ehe Chinese Nationalists appear reluctant to reduce the
size of their armed forces on the Chinmen Islands in accord
with an agreement reached last November between General
Wang Shu-ming, the chief of the Nationalist general staff,
and the head of the US- military advisory mission to Taiwan.
According to the terms of the agreement, the Nationalist
forces of at least 86,000 men are to be reduced by 15,000
by the end of June. In return the United States is to improve
Nationalist capabilities on the islands by supplying additional
equipment, including new 10-inch howitzers and more 155-mm.
guns. Thus far, the Nationalists have reported that the gar-
rison has been reduced by 530 men, and some American ob-
servers believe that personnel strength has in fact been in-
crease dl
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir Renews Attack on Communists
Events in Iraq have led UAR President Nasir to attack the
activities of Communists in the Arab world, thus again bring-
ing into question the UAR's relations with the Communist bloc.
In a speech delivered in Damascus on 11 March, Nasir accused
Iraqi Premier Qasim of fostering division within Arab ranks
and denounced Communist "agents" in the strongest terms he
has yet used. He charged Communists with deriving their in-
spiration from outside their native lands and acting on behalf
of "the foreigner." He described his "mission" and that of the
UAR as a continuing struggle on behalf of unity among Arab
states to protect them from "those who covet us." He included
imperialists, Zionists, and the "agents" in this category. The
speech ended on a note of determination to continue on that
course, "regardless of the harm which may befall use'
The earlier threat of a split between Moscow and Cairo
was temporarily averted by Khrushchev's letter to Nasir on 20
February, which Nasir accepted as assurance that the USSR
considered his moves against UAR Communists an internal af-
fair. Nasir's sharply renewed. attack on Arab Communists,
however, is likely to make it increasingly difficult for Moscow
to avoid new disagreements with Cairo, a possibility which
Nasir apparently noted in concluding his Damascus speech.
The speech suggests that hereafter the danger of Communism
may be used to an even greater extent as a major argument to
justify Cairo's efforts to retain or extend its influence in the
Near East.
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Sudanese Situation 25X1
di he danger of a c s between the Ansar tribes and the
Sudanese Army has been reduced. One thousand tribesmen
had come to Khartoum to protest the ouster from the govern-
ment of Brigadier General Wahab, the strongest remaining
adherent of the Ansar sect and Umma party. On the morn-
in of 10 March, 25X1
Ansar leader Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi told
ese tribesmen to go home`]
[The new government is handipapped by dissension, how-
ever, and additional changes appear almost inevitable. Pres-
sure continues within the army for a still further reduction of
Ansar and Umma party influence in the government. There is
also strong friction in the Supreme Council between some of
the senior members and the three commanders who forced
their way into membership. A Cairo newspaper on 11 March
carried a report from Khartoum that Prime Minister Abboud
will soon resign
ft he attitude of the government will necessarily be influ-
enced by the leaders of the junior officers who are the real
foundation of its power. Pro-Nasir Arab nationalist senti-
ment is strong in this group, and several of its leaders were
involved in an Egyptian-supported abortive coup effort in May
1957]
C The situation is further complicated by the maneuvering of
both the Communist party and pro-Egyptian political elements
to remove government restrictions on their activities and to
prepare the way for their eventual inclusion in a new coalition-DD
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III. THE WEST
Cyprus Communists Make Deal With Makarios
The Communists on Cyprus appear to have adopted a
policy of temporary collaboration with the conservative,
popular Archbishop Makarios but continue to be critical of
the recent Cyprus agreements, as are Communist press
organs in Greece and the USSR. Andreas Ziartidesy able
Moscow-trained leader of the Communist-dominated Old
Trade Unions and a spokesman for the far left on Cyprus,
reportedly has assured Makarios that the Communists will
not genuinely contest the first elections in the new republic.
Ziartides claims that his action is based solely on his
desire not to disturb the recently created Cypriot unity.
Communist party leaders issued a paper highly critical of
the Cyprus agreements but promising to work to implement
them for "the good of all the people." Makarios agreed to
grant Communist-backed candidates a certain number of seats
in the new legislature, possibly as m n as 25 percent, but
will not give them a ministerial post,
The Communist Reform Party of the Working People
(AKEL) was proscribed in 1955 but is expected to be legal-
ized before the first Cypriot elections. In the most recent
municipal elections, held in 1953, the Communists received
about 4.2 percent of the vote in the towns and cities of Cyprus.
Mayors of three of the six largest towns on the island are
Communists or fellow travelers.
The Communists, aware that the first government of
Cyprus will probably be criticized for its failure to resolve
the many problems it will face, may have concluded that they
have more to gain at this time through a policy of watchful
waiting. They can be expected to concentrate on building up
h
their strength in preparation for the eventual conflict wit
Makarios and other conservative leaders.
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Salazar Regime Seen in Weakened Position
[High government officials and personal friends of Premier
Salazar have assured the American Embassy that the premier
has recovered from pneumonia contracted on 27 January and is
working with his ministers. They made no mention, however, of
heart disease, which had been reported to have developed. The
embassy notes that Salazar has not left his house or made any
public statement or received foreigners in two months]
[The premier's supporters insist that once he is restored to
full health, he will reassume the leadership which has been tem-
porarily lacking. Most observers, however, believe that he will
never regain public confidence, and some think that prolonged ab-
sence from official functions could enable those groups desiring
a change of regime to combine and take action. The conviction
that Salazar has outlived his usefulness is widespread among
large sectors of the population and. is held. even among formerly
fervent supporters of the regime.
[The American Embassy has reported a growing current of
thought by responsible persons that Salazar should. retire and
make possible an orderly transfer of power within the regime.
Otherwise, these persons fear conditions will so deteriorate as
to generate a popular movement, spearheaded by opposition groups,
which will force him out and jeopardize the accomplishments of
the re ime
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New Tension in Bolivia
LNew tension is being created in La Paz by the Bolivian Gov-
ernment's effort to impose wage terms on striking tin miners and
gradually unfreeze commissary prices. This action must be
taken to obtain further financial backing from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The tension could erupt in renewed anti-
American rioting, particularly since the 16 March issue of
Time states that a US official "in rueful jest" suggested Boliv-
i s artition. The foreign minister believes that a new US dis-
avowal of the statement might moderate popular reaction.
[Renewed inflation and a deterioration of the economic situa-
tion despite a sharp rise in the tin price apparently have caused
both the pro- and anti-government miners' factions to unite in
wage demands. Keeping to a minimum the cost of operating the
nationalized mines is important to the US- and IMF-backed eco-
nomic stabilization program; the mines--which are the backbone
of Bolivia's economy- -operated at a loss in 1958. The govern-
ment probably does not have the military strength to impose a
decision on the armed miners.
C the past several days the government has gone out of its
way to publicize the danger of a revolutionary conspiracy by the
perennially plotting rightist opposition party. This tactic, prob-
ably designed to rally dissident government party members be-
hind Presid-e~t Sil s. has been used frequently and may have lost
its efficacy ]
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v
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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