CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004200300001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 8, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

W Z Z
Approved FQr Release T"04 RET0097~ -004200300001-1
6/1
s
/25X1
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
25X1
8 January 1959
25X1
Copy No. C
DIA AND DOS review(s)
completed.
Approved For Release IMU04 W0975A004200300001-1 S
0 1 /~~,
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200300001-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200300001-1
 Approved Releas 2/09/04 0 - A02vb300001-1 j
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
0
%%
25X1
Watch Committee conclusion- -Taiwan Strait: There were
no deve op-ments noted during the past week which reflect a
change in Chinese Communist intentions regarding the Taiwan
Strait situation. The intensified shelling on 7 January appears
to be another Chinese Communist effort to maintain tensio .
in the area, F
25X1
II. ASIA-AFRICA
8 January 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Watch Com nc us --Berlin: The Berlin situa-
tion remains potentially dangerous but will obably not devel-
op into a crisis during Miko ai?s visit.
25X1
NO
O/
Approved For Releas
5A0114200300001-1
Approved For Releas
50200300001-1
Lb7C~
PRO
Watch Committee conclusion- -Middle East: A deliberate
initiation of arge-scale hostilities in the Middle East is unlikely
in the immediate future. The situation, however, remains pre-
carious throughout the area. In Iraq, Communist influence and ac,
tivity continue to pose the threat of eventual Communist control of
 R4&
Approved f Releas A(
03000011
--
j
go
25X1
Watch Committee conclusion- -Southeast Asia: Political 25X1
plotting in Cambodia against Premier Sihanouk, abetted by
Thailand and South Vietnam, and Viet Minh military pressures
on the borders of Laos may provide further opportunities for
increased Communist penetration in Southeast Asian
Afghanistan- USSR: Afghanistan apparently intends to ex-
25X1 pand further its relatidns with the USSR. The communique is-
sued on 5 January at the end of Foreign Minister Naim's visit
to Moscow indicates a new Soviet economic assistance agree-
ment may be reached in the near future. While the communique
itself contains no reference to any new military agreement, its
wording does not exclude such an agreement. Naim's visit< em-
phasizes Kabul's increasing concern about a possible threat from
Pakistan and its desire to find a counter to this threat. 1 ::1
25X1
2 5X_1
III. THE WEST
Finland: Parliament has been ordered to reconvene on
8 January, four days early, in order to form a government to 25
C3 replace the five-party Fagerholm coalition, which resigned on
December lar el because of Soviet pressure.
25X1
Belgium: [In reaction to the rioting in Leopoldville,..Belgia
opinion generally is concerned but is not calling for repressive
measures or drastic changes in policy. The prime minister had
25X1
called an emergency session of Parliament for 8 January inj I
8 Jan 59
DAILY BRIE F
W00001-1
AN
Approved For Relea %///%
 j .-~ 25X1
Approved # Releas
1.
0
pany, a subsidiary of a US firm. The PSP is acting openly to 25X1
25X1
rise to the disturbances have not changed .
(Page 5) 25X1
Cuba: The Cuban Communist party (PSP) has succeeded
in obtaining a minority voice in the organized labor movement
and is represented on an employee committee which is attempt-
ing to take over the management of the Cuban Electric Com-
a out the situation. The government is considering reinforce
ment of army units in the Congo. The basic factors ivin
response to the King, who is reported extremely disturbed
create an impression of legality. However the urrutia gov-
ernment has not recognized the party.
Honduras: L imminent movement by Honduran rebels
now conncenntrating along the border in Nicaragua is feared by 25X1
the Honduran foreign minister. He complained in a 6 January
talk with the US ambassador that Nicaragua is assisting the
rebel force and. said Honduras may as a last resort take the
case to the OAS. The Nicaraguan armed forces chief, General
25X1
300 to 400 Honduran civilians at the border:]
25X1
8 Jan 59 DAILY BRIEF
iii
I'MR,
'17 ~'DP79TOO97
AQbRIP0300001-1
j Approved For Releas
 25X1
Approved F, Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0Q-975A004200300001-1
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
25X1
oviet leaders may be exierting behind-the-scenes pressure
on Nasir to limit his anti-Communist moves by bringing to his
attention the importance of continued bloc military and economic
assistance, but they apparently hope to avoid an open clash with
Cairo
Soviet Reaction to UAR Anti- Communis oves
25X1
he Soviet Government has halted trainin
25X1
Egyptian jet pilots now in the USSR.. 25X1
ing. Nasir, described as"astonished," is said to feel that the sus-
pension has political motivations, inasmuch as several classes
have completed training without any language problems`.]
The Soviet Union has apparently also exerted. pressure in
its economic relations with the UAR since the initial signs of
Nasir's recent concern over Communist activities in the area.
The Soviet delegation negotiating the final details of the agree-
ment to aid the UAR in building the first stage of the Aswan Dam
reportedly prolonged the negotiations and imposed conditions
which were reluctantly accepted by Cairo on 27 December. Nasir
has also complained recently that the USSR is lagging on imple-
menting the aid program to Syria
The ovi. Union used the argument that
the pilots must learn Russian before undergoing further train-
Bloc propaganda media have reported the arrests of Commu-
nists in the UAR, but are ignoring Nasir's role in ordering the
crackdown and his criticism of Communist activities in the Arab
world. Soviet commentators have adopted the view that Western
"imperialist" agents are responsible for planting the Arab press
stories of the Communist danger to the Arab unity movement.
The Soviet ambassador to the UAR is reported by an extreme left-
ist newspaper in Cairo on 7 January to have stated. that the crack-
down on Communi the UAR is "strictly an internal affair.'
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004200300001-1
8 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
 Approved F Velease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00 A004200300001-1
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir's Anti-Communist Campaign
i
(Nasir's campaign against Communists throughout the UAR
has reached major proportions. This campaign, unlike pre-
vious ones, has included arrests of prominent party members,
and it would appear that Communist leadership has been se=
25X1
verely crippled, about 550 members 25X1
have been arreste in Syria, including Mustafa Amin, one of
the highest in the party. Also reportedly picked up was Abd
al-Majid Jamal al- Din, a leader of the Syrian-Lebanese Com-
munist party and head of the Syrian passports and immigration
department. Khalid Bakdash, the Arab world's number-one
Communist, reportedly has fled from Damascus to Baghdad
In Egypt, where Cairo newspapers are keeping up a con-
stantTaarrage of criticism of Iraqi Communist activity, the num-
ber of arrests has exceeded 200, including several central com-
mittee members of Egypt's three Communist factions,as well as
Communist members of the staff of the extreme leftist Cairo
daily Al Misaa.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200300001-1
8 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
 25X1
25X6
25X1
Approved Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00:97 A004200300001-1
Fear of Pakistan May Cause Afghanistan to Expand
Soviet Relations
25X1
The Afghan Government apparently intends to expand. its
rela'ioons with the Soviet Union. The com.muniqud issued on
5 January at the end of Foreign Minister Naim's visit to Mos-
cow indicates that a new Soviet economic assistance agreement
will be concluded in the near future. Although no mention is
made of any new military agreement, the wording of the coma
muniqud allows for such an agreement
.i addition, the Afghans probably view the establishment
of a new regional administration for Pakistan's northwest
frontier region as confirmation of Pakistan's determination
to ignore Afghanistan in the handling of Pushtoonistane
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200300001-1
8 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
25X6
 Approved FRelease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00U7 A004200300001-15X1
III. THE WEST
25X1
Finnish Parliament Convened to Settle Government Crisis
The speaker of the Finnish Diet has ordered parliament
to reconvene on 8 January, four days before the scheduled end.
of the Christmas recess, in order to deal with the problem of
forming a government. He acted in response to appeals from
the parliamentary leaders of three non-Communist parties,
following fruitless talks over the week end. Since 4 December,
when the five-party Fagerholm coalition resigned largely be-
cause of Soviet pressure, Finland has had only a caretaker
government.
The major obstacle to the formation of a government seems
to be the question of forming a viable cabinet enjoying broad sup-
port and able to deal with the USSR without including in some
planner the Communist-front People's Democratic League (SKDL).
(President Kekkonen reportedly feels that only a government in-
for the opposition Social Democrats and some elements within
the Agrarian party, still oppose collaboration with the SKDL.
and the USSR. However, the non-Communist parties, except
USSR and lead to a normalization of relations between Finland
cluding the SKDL or at least supported by it will satisfy the
The Moscow press continues to attack the Finns. Izvestia
on 7 January accused "Finnish right-wing circles" of trying to
hamper trade relations between the two countries and, to under-
mine Finnish neutrality. Moreover, there is no indication as
yet that the suspended Soviet trade payments have been resumed,
and as of 30 December the USSR had still made no moves regard-
ing any intergovernmental negotiations, including the 1959 trade
agreement.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200300001-1
8 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
 Approved Ur Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T09 $A004200300001-1
Belgians Call Emergency Parliament Session to Discuss
Leopoldville Riots
Ll~elgian Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens has called an
emergency session of Parliament for 8 January to discuss
the riots in Leopoldville, possibly in response to pressure
from King Baudouin, who is reported extremely disturbed
about the situation. In Brussels generally, there has been
concern, but no call yet for drastic changes in policy
Despite some evidence of differences in the cabinet on
the seriousness of the situation, the government seems to be
completing preparations for reinforcement of army units in
the Congo in the event that a renewal of the disturbances
makes it necessary. The American air attache has reported
indications of intense joint army - air force staff activity on
the logistical side`j
25X1
ever, have not changed and further disturbances are possible.
25X1
the government?s new program for the Congo, which is
scheduled to be announced on 13 January, is supposed to be
"generous and bold," and will probably involve political as
well as economic, educational, and some judicial reforms.
Ultimate internal political autonomy is foreseen, but ex-
tensive political rights will probably not be granted. to the
Congolese at this time. The Belgian press suggests that pub-
lic opinion does not deem repressive measures necessary in
the Congo, and attributes the riots to the vast number of un-
employed among the African population in Leopoldville. The
basic factors which gave rise to the three-day rioting, how-
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200300001-1
8 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0097975A004200300001-1
/
25X1
25X1
Communist Party Activities in Cuba
The Cuban Communist party (PSP) has come into the open
since Batista's downfall and is attempting to create an impres-
sion of legality. It has not, however, been recognized by the
Urrutia government. Since 1 January, the PSP has opened two
offices in Havana--the first time the party has acted so overtly
since Batista outlawed it in 1953.
As expected, the PSP is making a strong bid. for a dominant
role in the organized labor movement. It has succeeded in ob-
taining a minority voice in the "National United Workers' Front"
(FONU), a labor coalition group which has assumed control
over the Confederation of Cuban Workers. The other four mem-
ber groups of the FONU are anti-Communist and. represent the
major rebel and political organizations which opposed the Batista
regime.
The PSP has maintained a hard core of experienced labor
organizers during its years underground, and probably has more
capable labor leaders available than do the rebel and political
groups which now control the government? Castro's labor organ-
ization, which succeeded in infiltrating organized labor during
the last months of the rebellion, maintained ties with Catholic
labor groups and is believed to have rebuffed Communist offers
of "aid." The new labor minister, Manuel Fernandez, is also
said to have connections with Catholic labor organizations, and
according to the US Embassy in Havana, enjoys a fine reputation
although he is young and inexperienced in the labor field. I
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004200300001-1
8 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
25X1
25X1
 25X1
Approved FFo R
fblpACp 9M91n91nd ? r1A-PnP79Tnna 4 A004200300001-1
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
5
Approved For T lease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0097 004200300001-1 25X1 T
 i ~ i ~ i ~ i ~ i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i o iii i iiii iii i i i //,
Approved For Rel a TOP 4 RE1b0975A0Q 200300001-1
Approved For Releas IN$104 _4 a PPY00975AO04200300001-1