CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004200260001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 3, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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DAILY BRIEF ii
USSR-Geneva talks,; First Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov will head the Soviet delegation to the nuclear-test.
talks which resume on 5 January. Kuznetsov, second only to
Gromyko in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, is of considerably
greater stature than former chief delegate Tsarapkin, who
remains a member of the delegation. The Soviet leaders
probably feel that the negotiations will soon reach the show-
down stage, in which a diplomat of Kuznetsov's experience
would be needed to defend the USSR's position. The present
Soviet line, as Gromyko warned on 25 December, is that no
agreement will,pe,,possl.ble unless the U
a.in abandon their "invalid acoi _ititin +`'
'bino-tioviet trade. a s,;: ov a reign-
tradee e has "tacitly admitted" to Ambassador Thompson in Mos-
cow that the. Soviet Union is having trouble with Chinese trade
negotiations. These negotiations occur annually and, since a
large part of the foreign trade of each country is involved, have
frequently become hard bargaining sessions stretching over
several months. The nature of the current talks, which ap-
parently began in early November, has not been revealed but
they may include more than an agreement -for; the. year' 1959.
The Chinese indicated last year that a long-term trade a ree-
ment would be concluded with the Soviet Union.
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Czechoslovakia: Wage reforms and tightened political
controls are producing more discontent than~the Czech re-
gime has faced in recent years, Several minor iejaents
between workers and security police have been reported.
The regime, however, appears confident of its ability to
maintain control.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
BaLyhdad.
cratic forces" in
UAR: Nasir's? roundup of Communists in Egypt is re-
ported to have been planned several weeks ago, 'when Nasir
was aroused by a periodic report on Communist activity in
the Egyptian region. Previous large-scale police raids
against the faction-ridden Egyptian Communists have not
effectively curtailed continued Communist propaganda by
sympathizers in the press and radio fields. A similar
roundup is under way in Syria. Meanwhile, the first overt
Soviet reaction to Nasir's anti-Communist moves has appeared
in the 1 January issue of Izvestia,..: Izvestia severely
criticized a Cairo newspaper, which had attacked Communist
activity, for its "fantastic fabrications about progressive demo-
iraq,-Esagnaaa as an,nouncect the appointment'of d.
al- a Fab Mahmud,p es cie..iit'. of the leftist-oriented Iraqi L
Lawyers' Association, as ambassador to the USSR. Mahmud
was arrested for alleged "Communist activities" in 1952, but
"released by the old regime within two months. His appointment
would appear to be an attempt by the Qasim government to send
to Moscow a man particularly acceptable to the Soviet Union.,
Iran-USSR: Iranian officials say Soviet approaches aimed
at blocking the pending security agreement with the United States
appear to be couched in conciliatory terms, but contain "menacing
undertones." They have "urgently" requested that everything pos-
sible be done to expedite the bilateral US security agreements with
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Eqbal, Soviet Ambassador Pegov now has proposed
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. According to Prime Minister
five larger powers" guarantee Iranian neutrality.
I I
ment will be signed, his remarks suggest that the pur ose of
the trip is to seek Soviet support on Pu h'toonistan"
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Afghanistan-USSR: Prime Minister Daud informed the
Turkish ambassador in Kabul on 31 December that Foreign
Minister Naim would sign no agreements while on his current
visit to Moscow, and added that the. purpose of the visit was
to d"is.euss Afghan-Pakistani': relations While Daud may
be attempting to counter reports that a ,new military aid agree
ypru . The actual negotiators in the Greek-Turkish talks
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ON
appear close to agreement on all basic issues except the ques-
tion of separate electorates, Despite the improved atmosphere
in which the negotiations are being held, pressures are mount-
ing in Turkey which will make compromise more difficult.
Moreover, the Greek foreign minister apparently fears that
indecisiveness in his own government and unacceptable British
demands will forestall an early agreement. He seems unaware
of Britain's desire to inter ose no conditions other than the re-
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Laos, The Laotian Government suspects that North
Vietnamese violations of the Laotian frontier and trumped-
up charges of Laotian military encroachments are designed
to forestall an attempt by anti-~Communist elements to take
over the Laotian Government, or repression of the Commu-
nist Neo Lao Hak Zat party. The North. Vietnamese may also
be making a case for the reactivation of the International Con-
trol Commission in Laos. Laotian officials, although apprehen-
sive over North Vietnam's military strength, are planning to
reply. firmly to Hanoi's charges and to inforin. the United Nations.
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III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: De Gaulle apparently is determined
not to negotiate with the Algerian rebels and intends to post-
pone new efforts for a political solution in Algeria for "one
to three years" until after the effects of his economic develop-
ment program can be felt. Meanwhile, however, De Gaulle
will have to fend off the pressures of continuing rebel military
action, strained relations with Morocco and Tunisia, and pro-
integration forces in France and Algeria, including the army.
Paraguay: Another revolutionary attack from. Argentina
by le -wing opposition elements, aided by some junior army of-
ficers inside Paraguay, may be imminent. While President
Stroessner has in the past been strong enough to quell such
sorties several weak spots have appeared in his military sup=
port,
*Cuba: The Castro rebel movement, which proclaimed a
provisional government in Cuba on 2 January, has little govern-
ment or administrative experience: Many experienced men are
available for government posts, however, but there is no indica-
tion as yet whether or not Fidel Castro will use them. Conditions
are still too unsettled to determine what influence irresponsible
elements in the rebel movement--including Castro's brother
Raul--will wield in the government. The armed forces are con-
trolled by Colonel Ramon Barquin, a capable and widely respected
army officer--for almost two years a prisoner of Batista--who
has pledged support for Castro. The Communists can be expected
to make a strong bid for control of organized labor.
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Czech Labor Tension High
Isolated instances of violence by Czech miners and factory
workers have occurred in Prague and Ostrava, according to
reports received by the US Embassy in Prague. Brawls be-
tween militia and workers armed with pistols and knives have
resulted in the death of one militiaman and the serious injury
of two others. The embassy believes discontent with the. re-
gime now is more widespread than at any time in recent years.
Despite strenuous regime efforts to convince the workers
to the contrary, they believe that the wage revision announced
on 20 November will force them to work harder for the same,
or in some cases lower, wages. This belief has further lowered
morale by adding to what one Czech engineer described as "gen-
eral fatigue" caused by overcrowded housing, uncertainties
over future production norms, worry about continued political
screenings which have already resulted in mass dismissals and
transfers, and the general tightening of political controls over
the population.
The embassy reports, however, that there has been no
noticeable increase in the activity of internal security and
militia forces, and there is no organized resistance among
the workers; nor is there any evidence that other segments
of the population- -such as intellecttlals, journalists, or stu-
dents--are either prepared or willing to exploit widespread
popular resentment.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir and the Communists
Nasir's roundup of Communists on 31 December as, ap-
parently the result of a decision made in late November
ports indicate that more than 100 party members have been
picked up in Egypt. Eleven Aleppo party leaders are said to
have been sent to Damascus for imprisonment, and there is an
unconfirmed report of similar arrests in Damascus on 21 De-
cember.
I e action o owe extensive UAR pr ss
and radio criticism of Arm ommunists and Nasir's own
strong statements in his 23 December speech. Press re-
Additional information on the caliber of individuals ar-
rested is not yet available. Similar moves in the past were
usually directed against low-level Communists and had little
or no effect on press and radio outlets sympathetic to the
Communists. This time, however, three prominent Commu-
nist or pro-Communist publishing houses are also reported
closed.
Izvestia on 1 January carried Moscow's first public re-
action To-Na-sir's recent anti-Communist statements and to
attacks on Communism by the UAR press. Izvestia attacked
the Cairo newspaper Akhbar Al-Yawm, owned by Mustafa
Amin, a Nasir Confidant, for alleging that Communists in
Iraq oppose friendly Iraqi-UAR relations, and accused the
.paper of attempting to split the Arab anti-imperialist front.
While Moscow is anxious to avoid a direct clash with Cabo,
it probably sees a need for some public warning to Nasir.
Soviet propaganda media so far have ignored Nasir's personal
role in the recent anti-Communist campaign, but on 31 Decem-
ber the Italian Communist party newspaper Ux tain a front-
page editorial made a guarded attack on Nas is statements.
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Iran Voices Concern Over Soviet Pressure
CT_he Iranian Government, goaded by increasing Soviet
pressures against the conclusion of an Iranian-American
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defense agreement, is requesting that the final drafting ses-
sion be held soon in Ankara and that the agreement be signed
prior to the opening of the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council
meeting in Karachi on 26 January. Tehran is pressing for
early signature of the agreement to demonstrate that it is not
intimidated by Soviet protests and pressures
In a two-and-one-half-hour interview with the Iranian prime
minister on 31 December, Soviet Ambassador Pegov argued
strenuously against the conclusion of the agreement. He pro
posed a conference of unspecified great powers to negotiate an
international guarantee of Iranian neutrality. Moscow may plan
to advance this proposal formally in notes to the Western powers,
and may use this occasion to renew earlier proposals for a great-
power declaration renouncing the use of force and pledging non-
interference in Middle East affairs. The Soviet leaders would
probably believe that rejection of such initiatives would place
them in a stronger position to step up their pressure on Iran in
retaliation for the conclusion of the defense azreemenf.11
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Greek-Turkish Negotiations Concerning Cyprus Enter New
Phase
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Greece and Turkey appear to have moved one step closer
to agreement on outstanding differences over Cyprus, although
the prospects for an early solution are still viewed with little
more than cautious optimism. There has been a formal ex-
change of views through the Greek ambassador to Turkey. The
remaining basic point of disagreement is whether there should
be one electorate as proposed by Greece or two as favored by
Turkey. Greek officials have even agreed that a Turkish
Cypriot vice president would have veto power on matters of
foreign policy and national defense, and the Turks have apparent-
ly agreed to Archbishop Makarios as first prime minister of
Cyprus and EOKA leader Grivas as chief of the combined armed
forces
Ene prospects for an early settlement remain clouded, how-
ever, by lingering suspicions and the difficulty of winning sup-
port in each country for any agreed solution. Greek Foreign
Minister Averoff has bitterly criticized Prime Minister Karaman-
lis for allowing the current negotiations to bog down on details.
Makarios, whose attitude will be crucial, favors the rapproche-
ment but his consent is by no means assured. Grivas would-prob-
ably accept any solution on which Makarios and the Greek Govern-
ment can agree
The Greek Government continues to be suspicious of British
intentions toward Cyprus, and Greek Foreign Minister Averoff
fears that London may either impose excessive conditions or
force Turkey to stiffen its stand. Londoni however, has en-
couraged the Greek-Turkish talks and has indicated it would
probably accept any settlement devised by Athens and Ankara.
Many lower level British officials believe some form of inde-
pendence to be the only feasible solution'
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(Turkish officials are urging a speedy settlement of the
dispute, and voice concern over pressures within Turkey
against accepting any solution short of partition. The ques-
tion of the island's defenses and British bases continues to
play an important part in Turkey's thinking on the Cyprus
issue.
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Laos to Protest Border Incursion by North Vietnam
The Laotian Government is concerned that the recent
Viet Minh penetration of Laos' southeastern frontier and
Hanoi's trumped-up charges of Laotian military encroach-
ments are pressures to restrain anti-Communist elements
,Who are plotting to take control of the government in Laos
Hanoi's moves lend further weight to claims by domestic
Communists--the Neo Lao Hak Zat--that they will return
to armed dissidence in the event of a coup.
In building up border tensions, Hanoi may also be mak-
ing a case for the reactivation of the International Control
Commission (ICC) in Laos. the
Communists believe the presence of the I CC, w ch nc u es Indian
and Polish representatives, is the best long-term safeguard
against government repression of the NLHZ.
Efforts by local civil and military officials to obtain the
withdrawal of the North Vietnamese company, which recently
occupied positions about three miles inside the Laotian border
in Savannakhet Province, have been sharply rebuffed. LA
Laotian Army unit has been stationed in the area to contain E
any further penetration Laotian officials, although apprehen-
sive over North Vietnam's overwhelming military strength, are
planning a firm protest to Hanoi and will also inform the United
Nations.
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III. THE WEST
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De Gaulle to Postpone Resolution of Algerian Political: Status
Cigh officials in Franc say enera a au a is ter-
mined not to negotiate with the Algerian rebels, and will post-
pone any move toward Algerian political autonomy or even
separate Algerian status in the French Community until the
effects of his economic program in Algeria begin to be felt in
one to three yearn]
Ge Gaulle, during his visit to Algeria in December, stressed
economic and social development and predicted that a political
settlement would follow solution of the "human problem." About
the same time a member of De Gaulle's personal cabinet told an
American Embassy official that De Gaulle was convinced a mili-
tary solution was impossible.
tions. Tunisia and Morocco may exert considerable leverage on
France through negotiations on the important French naval base
at Bizerte, transit rights for Algerian oil through Tunisia, and
pressures on French forces and settler groups in both countries.]
jressures against postponement of a political solution, how-
ever, will probably mount. Prodded by pro-integrationist ele-
ments, particularly Jacques Soustelle, most of the 71 Algerian,
deputies, with whom De Gaulle previously said he:would regulate
the future status of Algeria, can be expected to step up their de-
mands for integration. The European settlers An Algeria have
similar aims and will probably seek a new rapprochement with
the army, much of which is still apparently convinced that inte-
gration is the only solution
French concentration on De Gaulle's economic program for
Algeria will probably prompt the rebels to step up sabotage opera-
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Paraguayan Opposition Elements Plan Revolt
Another attack against the Paraguayan regime may be
launched shortly from Argentina by left-wing opposition ele-
ments, who appear determined to maintain an atmosphere of
unrest in Paraguay until one of their attacks coincides with suf-
ficient military and popular discontent to overthrow President
Stroessner,
1,,The Communists, who have been
trying to effect clandestine coordination of opposition activities,
may also be involved.
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While :Stroessner has been sufficiently strong to quell such
sorties, several soft spots in his military support have appeared?
Moreover, plotting has increased since the successful revolution
against military dictatorship in Venezuela a year ago and prob-
ably has been encouraged by the more recent successes of the
Cuban rebels.
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The Situation in Cuba
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The provisional government proclaimed by Fidel Castro
in Cuba on 2 January currently has wide popular appeal and
support, but there are, nevertheless, obstacles in the way
of forming a stable administration. The rebel movement, in-
cluding Manuel Urrutia, Castro's hand-picked choice for the
presidency, has little government or administrative experience.
Capable and experienced men, some of them members of long-
established political parties which opposed Batista, are avail-
able for government posts, but there is as yet no indication
that Fidel Castro will include them in the government.
So far the rebels have shown an unexpected degree of
responsibility, ..particularly in their quick action to restore
order in Havana on 1 January. It is still too early, however,
to determine what influence irresponsible elements in the
rebel movement- -including Castro's brother Raul--will yield
in the government, or how harsh a punishment will be given
to those who have been loyal to Batista.
At present, the armed forces are apparently in full sup-
port of the Castro movement. Col. Ramon Barquin, who as-
sumed military control on 1 January, is a widely respected
US-trained army officef? who had been in prison since he led
an abortive military plot against Batista in 1956. Unless
Castro attempts to install his own men in high army positions,
Barquin and the armed forces are likely to remain loyal.
The leadership of Cuba's strong labor movement is at
stake. Although the rebels have a labor organization which
became increasingly active during the last months of the Ba-
tista regime, its clandestine status prevented it from becom-
ing strong. The Communists, who have maintained an under-
ground labor organization, can be e ected to make a strop
bid for control of organized labor.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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