CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004200110001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 15, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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15 December 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
211
USSR: The Soviet statement of 13 December about the
forthcoming NATO council meeting, like similar messages
prior to the NATO heads of government meeting last Decem-
ber, is aimed at impeding Western defense plans and disrupt-
ing Western unity. Moscow. is seeking to undermine public
support for NATO in all member countries by repeating long-
standing proposals for easing tension and renewing warnings
of Soviet retaliation against American missile bases in NATO
countries. The statement malp no new proposals 6n Berlin
25X1 or on East-Wes negotiations.
USSR-Iraq: A vie sip, elieved to be the Pskov,
arrive at the Iraqi port of Basra on the night of 11 Decem-
ber with the second consignment of arms to be delivered un-
der the Iraqi arms deal with the Soviet Union. Materiel
already unloaded from the Pskov includes antiaircraft and
field artillery pieces and vehicles. The first shipload of
Rnviet arms arrived at Basra on-19 November.
I
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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Jordan: Prime Minister Rifai has prepared a bill which
would. place full control of the armed forces in the hands of the
defense minister, a post also held by Rifai. This proposed ac-
tion is aimed at curtailing the power of the potent Bani Sakhir
Bedouin faction and other anti-Rifai elements. Rifai expects
that Jordan's tractable legislature will approve the bill this
week. His proposal may set off another round of bitter inter-
nal maneuvering and increase factionalism in the army.
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Algeria: Algerian rebel leaders, having failed to gain UN
General Assembly support in their effort to induce France to
negotiate with them, now are threatening to procure large amounts
of arms from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas
told an off-the-record news conference that he had exhausted his
patience with "moderate"approaches and indicated he would try to
begin recruiting fighters from other parts of Africa.
All-African Peoples' Conference: The conference in Accra
which en a on 13 December passed three relatively moderate
resolutions despite vigorous UAR and pro- Communist efforts to
control it. However, UAR-led extremists succeeded in having
a statement included which endorsed use of violence to free "sub-
jected and exploited" territories where "democratic principles
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DAILY BRIEF ii
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do not prevail:' Although location of the conference's perma-
nent organization in Accra is a victory for moderate African
elements led by Ghana's Prime Minister Nkrumah, he says
that he is disappointed with the outcome of the meeting.
Finland` President Kekkonen, in his 10 December radio
11
Soviet pressure.
speec 1T reviewing the current strained relations between Finland
and the USSR, appears to have gone dangerously far toward giv-
ing Moscow a free hand in influencing developments in Finland.
This increases the possibility of ultimate Communist participa-
tion in the government. Finnish independence may be further
undermined over the next few months as a result of continuing
The Netherlands. The Netherlands will probably be with-
out an effective government for at least several months as a
result of the 12 December resignation of the Labor party from
the governing coalition. Although all parties are generally
agreed on basic pro-Western foreign policy, the resignation
will end a 1956 agreement among political parties to maintain
a high level of defense spending.
15 Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF
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Jordanian Premier Seeking to Gain Control of Army
Premier Rifai has prepared a bill to reorganize the Jor-
danian Army which he expects will be passed by Jordan's
tractable legislature during the coming week. The bill would
place virtually absolute control over the armed forces in the
hands of the defense minister, a post concurrently held by
Rifai, and place Rifai's protege', Deputy Chief of Staff Sadiq
Shara, in direct operational control of army units as the new
chief of staff. With this measure, together with the recent
"abolition" of martial law, Rifai seeks to curtail the power of
the potent Bani Sakhir Bedouin faction in the army which has
supported the prime-ministerial ambitions of his rival, Court
Minister Hazza Majalli. Under the proposed reorganization,
the present army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Habis Majalli, a mem-
ber of the Bani Sakhir tribe, would be elevated to a figurehead
position.
The Bani Sakhir faction has formed the main source of
King Husayn's support in the army; it controls the army's ar-
mored brigade, several infantry units, and tribal auxiliaries
which it has trained and armed. The group's key role has in-
creased the ambitions of its leaders, who are reported dis-
pleased that their power is destined to be reduced by the pro-
posed reforms and by the recent lifting of martial law.
Rifai apparently feels confident that the King has no choice
but to support him in attempts to curb the group which has been
the chief prop of the monarchy. Implementation of the reforms
is certain to increase factional rivalry in the army, thereby
adding to instability in Jordan.
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Algerian Rebels May Intensify Search for Support in Wake of
UN Defeat
The Algerian rebel leaders, having failed to gain UN Gen-
eral Assembly endorsement of independence for Algeria and.
support for their efforts to induce France to negotiate with
them, now may seek to procure large amounts of Soviet bloc
aid. Rebel leaders have frequently reiterated during the past
four years that if they did not receive support from the West
they would turn to the bloc. The dispatch of a three-man mis-
sion, including the rebels' minister for armament and supply,
to Peiping early this month seems to have been designed to en-
list Western support in the United Nations. Consequently the
delegation may now press more urgently for arms aid. Any
new supplies of arms, however, would still be countered by the
increased effectiveness of French military measures.
Ferhat Abbas, premier of the rebels' provisional govern-
ment in Cairo, told an off-the-record news conference that his
government had reached the limit of its patience and that it now
would seek active bloc support. He added that the Algerian Na-
tional Liberation Front (FLN), which was represented at both
the All-African Peoples' Conference at Accra and the Afro-Asian
Economic Conference in Cairo, intends to mobilize African ter-
ritories in support of Algeria's liberation. Abbas said the FLN
would seek to recruit Mauretanians first and that the West "could
be surprised" if "black Africans" are found fighting in Algeria.
The Algerians, as feared by officials in both Morocco and
Tunisia, are more likely to attempt to embroil those two re-
cently independent North African states in an expanded con-
flict.
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Finnish President Yielding to Soviet Pressure
Finnish President Kekkonen, in his 10 December radio
speech reviewing the current strained relations between Fin-
land and the USSR, appears to have gone dangerously far
toward giving Moscow a free hand in influencing develop-
ments in Finland., according to the American Embassy in
Helsinki. He suggested Finland is in greater difficulties with
the USSR than at any time since the war, but expressed dis-
dain for "promised aid" based on political considerations from
Western countries. Kekkonen maintained that Moscow had not
interfered in Finland's internal affairs and placed the blame for
the present situation almost entirely on the Finns.
The embassy is convinced that Finland's position vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union has worsened and that there is a real possibil-
ity of a serious undermining of Finnish independence over the
next several months. This will depend in large part on the way
in which Moscow will seek to capitalize on the opportunities
open to it and on the moves taken by the numerically predom-
inant but virtually leaderless groups opposed to the President's
course.
Meanwhile, negotiations to form a new government are con-
tinuing under the leadership of the chairman of the Agrarian
party parliamentary group. Disagreement probably exists
among the various parties regarding Communist participation,
but most parties apparently remain opposed to such a move.
The recent statement by a leading Communist party official
that participation in the new government was "not important"
suggests that neither Moscow nor the Finnish Communists in-
tend to press for this as an immediate objective.
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Lengthy Government Crisis Seen in the Netherlands
The 12 December resignation of Prime Minister Willem
Drees and the other Labor party ministers evidently means
that the Netherlands will be without an effective government
for several months. The powerful Catholic party is known to
be opposed to formation of an interim government pending ex-
piration of the parliamentary term in'1960;' hence, a call for
new elections early next year seems likely. Lengthy negotia-
tions on a new government might then ensue--more than four
months elapsed before the present coalition was put together
after the 1956 elections.
The Labor'party evidently deliberately provoked the pres-
ent crisis, believing that its interests would best be served by
risking early elections rather than waiting until 1960 when its
position would perhaps be even weaker. However, friction
within Drees' four-party coalition--Labor, Catholic, and two
smaller Protestant parties--has been apparent for more than
a year. There have been frequent charges from the Labor party
that the other parties were not abiding by the government pro-
gram agreed to in 1956, and friction has increased since last
spring's local elections in which the Labor party lost votes and
the opposition Liberals made gains.
The Netherlands' defense expenditures will probably not
continue at their present high level. Under the 1956 govern-
ment agreement, the present defense budget was to have been
maintained until 1960, but criticism--primarily from the Labor
party--that the Dutch defense effort exceeds'that of other com-
parable NATO countries suggests that maintenance of this agree-
ment will be difficult. Other major aspects of Dutch foreign
policy will probably not be affected.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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