CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003800280001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 21, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 July 1958
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21 July 1958
DAILY BRIEF
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet political moves: Khrushchev's call for a summit
meeting on 22 July is part of the continuing Sino-Soviet dip-
lomatic and propaganda effort to contain and ultimately elim-
inate the Anglo-American forces in the Middle East. The
AME
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Qn Kremlin appears confident that the Western intervention can
be effectively exploited to strengthen the forces of Arab na-
tionalism and Arab antagonism to the West and draw the UAR
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pendence on the Sino-Soviet bloc.
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lander have urged acceptance.
British Labor party leaders and Swedish. Prime Minister Er-
* Free-00rld reactions to Middle East crisis: Prime Min-
ister Nehru in "gratefully" accepting Khrushchev's invitation
o a summit meeting stated that India would welcome negotia-
ions "through the United Nations or otherwise." French and
ritish official reaction is chilly, however, and Japanese For-
ign Ministry officials consider the proposal untimely in view
if Japan's draft resolution before the UN security Council.
Cambodia: Cambodian Premier Sihanouk's decision to ac-
cord diplomat ic recognition to Communist China is slated to
be announced within the next few days. This development, which
will enhance Peiping's status throughout Southeast Asia, particu-
larly among the influential Overseas Chinese communities, will
have far-reaching consequences on Cambodia's domestic and
foreign affairs. Despite strong fears among other Cambodian
leaders that this step will aggravate Communist subversion and
endanger American aid, Sihanouk apparentl is confident he can
safely play both ends against the middle.
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21 July 58 DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Proposal for Summit Conference
Khrushchev's proposal for a summit conference on
22 July to take measures to end the "military conflict which
has started in the Middle East" reflects the Soviet convic-
tion that the Anglo-American intervention is highly vulner-
able to diplomatic and propaganda exploitation. While the
letters to the heads of governments of the United States,
Great Britain, France, and India provide further evidence
of Moscow's determination to make the maximum political
capital out of the Western action, they continue to avoid com-
mitting the USSR to any specific action in the event of a West-
ern rejection.
Khrushchev's warning that "the world is on the brink of
catastrophe" and his reference to Soviet possession of "bal-
listic rockets of all types, including intercontinental ones"
are designed. to create the maximum alarm in world opinion
in order to bring heavy pressure on Washington and London to
limit the scope of their intervention and, ultimately, to with-
draw their forces from the Middle East. Probably Khrushchev's
immediate aim is to deter any Anglo-American action against
Iraq or the UAR.
His new notes climax a flurry of Sino-Soviet bloc moves
on a broad front to inhibit any extension of Western operations.
These have included government pronouncements and UN ac-
tion to fan world opinion against the intervention, prompt dip-
lomatic recognition of the Iraqi revolutionary government,
military and naval maneuvers in bloc areas adjacent to the
Middle East, private diplomatic warnings of bloc counteraction
in the event of an attack on Iraq, and statements denying that
continued Western access to Middle East oil has been jeopard-
ized by the coup in Iraq.
Khrushchev's proposal suggests the USSR's strategy will
be to attempt to force the United States and Britain to reject
ostensibly constructive Soviet initiatives for settling the Middle
East crisis. The Kremlin almost certainly expects Washington,
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London, and. Paris to reject the call for a heads-of-government
conference. Khrushchev's proposal to include Nehru and
Secretary General Hammarskjold in the talks suggests, how-
ever, that the USSR hopes to elicit a favorable reaction from
them which will increase the discomfiture of Washington and
London. The proposal that Hammarskjold be included and that
the heads of government submit"concrete recommendations for
the cessation of the military conflict" to the UN Security Coun-
cil are also aimed at undercutting the anticipated Western
response that a summit conference is not required because
the UN is already actively dealing with the problem.
The Soviet leaders probably believe Khrushchev's pro-
posal will lend. additional strength to their long-standing de-
mand for a major voice in any discussion or settlement of
Middle Eastern issues. They probably will follow with de-
tailed proposals for a settlement, based on the Soviet formula
first advanced in February 1957 to counter the Eisenhower
octrine. This included renunciation by the major powers of
the use of force in the Middle East, abstention from interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of the Arab states, an embargo on
arms shipments to the Middle East, and great-power coopera-
tion in extending economic and technical assistance to the
countries in this area.
The tone and content of Khrushchev's letters strengthen
the impression that the main Soviet response to the Anglo-
American intervention will be confined to the diplomatic and
propaganda fields. Despite the obvious attempts to generate
maximum alarm throughout the free world about the threat
of a global war, the USSR does not appear likely to undertake
any commitments which might lead to Soviet military interven-
tion in the Middle East under present circumstances. Moscow
hopes to contain and ultimately eliminate the Anglo-American
forces in the Middle East, while exploiting the Western action
to the full to strengthen the forces of extreme Arab nationalism
and Arab antagonism toward the West, and to draw the UAR
and the new Iraq regime into ever closer alignment with and
dependence on the Soviet bloc.
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Free World Comments on US Policies and on Khrushchev's
Summit Proposal
South Asia: Prime Minister Nehru, in "gratefully" ac-
cepting Khrushchev's invitation to participate in a summit
meeting, stated that India "would welcome a peaceful approach
by negotiation through the United Nations or its Security Coun-
cil or otherwise:' The reply reiterated India's opposition to
armed intervention by foreign troops, and noted. that "we have
urged the US and Great Britain to withdraw their forces:' Of-
ficial Indian sources are reported to have expressed doubt,
however, that a high-level meeting in the present atmosphere
would produce any quick results, and they indicated regret over
the "words of threat" used by Khrushchev.
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Greek officials privately expressed delight over the US action,
but are being cautious in public comments in order not to lose
Arab support on the Cyprus question.
Far East: According to press reports, the Japanese For-
eign Ministry feels that Khrushchev's proposal for a summit
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conference is untimely in view of Japan's draft proposal in
the UN. Japanese officials regard the move as a propaganda
effort.
The Indonesian Government has announced its decision
to recognize the new Iraqi republic, apparently in the belief
that such action will help forestall Western moves against
Iraq.
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Moroccan press reports indicate that the Iraqi coup is ac-
cepted with approval as a logical step toward freedom of the
Middle East from "colonialist domination:' Moroccans at all
levels are reported hostile to the American intervention and
feel that the use of American troops is further proof that the
US is dedicated to colonial policies.
Western Europe: Khrushchev's notes have brought favor--
able responses from Swedish Prime Minister Erlander and
from the British Labor party. Erlander, expressing pleasure
at the inclusion of Mr. Hammarskjold among those invited,
publicly urged acceptance of the proposal. British Labor, arty
..Leader Gaitskell and his top associates called for quick accept-
ance of the invitation and may believe this aspect of the Middle
East issue offers a safer line for attacking the government than
the intervention itself. British press comment also shows con-
siderable sympathy for the idea of early summit talks.
The French Foreign Ministry, following a special meeting
between Premier de Gaulle and Foreign Minister Couve de
Murville, instructed its missions to state that the Soviet invi-
tation did not appear to be serious, and that the results of the
UN Security Council meeting on 21 July would be reviewed be-
fore a decision is made- on any further initiative.
Latin America: Official reaction to the Middle East crisis
ranges from unconditional backing of the US position by some of
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the smaller countries to, tentative support of the United States
by Mexico. The Communist-infiltrated government of Venezuela
has refused to state its position at this time, and several other
governments have not yet reached. firm positions. Mexican and
Brazilian officials warn that a two-thirds vote for the US in the
General Assembly might not be forthcoming. Communist-inspired
anti-US riots have twice erupted in Buenos Aires, and on 20 July
Communists staged a mass meeting of 10,000 in Santiago, Chile,
to protest the Anglo-American action.
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Cambodia Set to Announce Diplomatic Recognition of
Communist China
Cambodia had accorded. diplo-
matic recognition to Communist China. Public announce-
ment of the step, which will involve an exchange of am-
bassadors, will be made within a few days.
This development, a reversal of Cambodian policy of
restricting ties with Peiping to economic and culturalfeld.s,
follows several weeks of stage-setting by Premier Sihanouk.
TheXrince has been alluding to the need for Cambodia to
seek a "powerful new ally" in the face of alleged Western in-
difference to complaints of South Vietnamese border aggres-
sion. He is also reported to have '.'rigged." the Cambodian
National Assembly in favor of the decision in advance of its
presentation for debate.
Despite strong fears among many influential Cambodians
that the step will intensify Communist subversive activity
and jeopardize continuation of American aid, Sihanouk appar-
ently is confident he can safely play both ends against the
middle. It is possible, however, that open defiance of his
power may develop among anti- Communist political and mil-
itary elements.
Cambodia's recognition of Communist China, which may
be a prelude to a conclusion of a bilateral military pact as
well, will virtually eliminate Nationalist China's dwindling in-
fluence in Cambodia and adversely affect its prestige among Over-
seas Chinese throughout Southeast Asia. It will also intensify
Saigon's hostility toward Sihanouk which is based on the convic-
tion that his accommodation to the Sino-Soviet bloc poses a
serious threat to South Vietnam's security. South Vietnam would
undoubtedly support any scheme aimed at removing Sihanouk
from power.
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