CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003700240001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 28, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 May 1958
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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28 May 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
front government.
*USSR-France: The Soviet.Union has been taking a cau-
tious attitude toward De Gaulle against the possibility that
he may assume power. Moscow appears anxious to avoid
actions which might prejudice its chances of taking advan-
tage of those nationalistic De Gaulle policies which Moscow
believes would serve Soviet interests. The Soviet leaders
probably hope De Gaulle's assumption of power would f a-
cilitate French Communist efforts to establish unity of ac-
tion with the Socialists and eventually lead to a popular-
Soviet summit tactics: The draft nonaggression treaty
offere y the Warsaw Pact nations to the NATO powers is
intended. to give added impact to a proposal which the USSR
has been consistently proposing for consideration at the
summit. The text is basically similar to a pact proposed
by the USSR at the Geneva summit conference in July 1955.
The proposed signatories on behalf of the Warsaw Pact are
the same countries that the bloc has urged be included at
a summit meeting: the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Rumania.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
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following for the 1959 general elections.
army action, and to work toward improving its electoral
Indonesia: The Indonesian Communist party, with an
estimated membership of as many as 750,000 and the sup-
port of one fifth of the electorate, has attained more in-
fluence than ever before. Any effective anti-Communist
action in the foreseeable future would depend on army ac-
tion and on President Sukarno's support of such an under-
taking. The party's current strategy, however, appears to
be to avoid giving any provocation which might precipitate
Ceylon: As a result of widespread disorders, the
Bandaranaike government declared a state of emergency
on 27 May, accompanied, by a ban on Singhalese and. Tamil
extremist groups responsible for the disturbances. The
government's action probably will be supported by most of
the public and should bring the communal conflict under
control for the time being. Coming at a time when pro-
longed strikes are severely straining the economy, how-
ever, this development will lead to stronger political
pressures against the government.
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28 May 58
DAILY BRIEF
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* France. Pflimlin's offer to resign in spite of the vote
of confidence given him by the National Assembly further
weakens the forces opposed to the return of De Gaulle to
power. President Coty may turn to De Gaulle in an effort
to avoid widespread. disorders and a possible move against
Paris by the Algerian junta.
Reports of
new public restlessness over the crisis may increase the
prospect of violence during leftist demonstrations sched-
III. THE WEST
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uled for today.
28 May 58
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Taking Cautious Attitude Toward De Gaulle
The USSR has been taking a cautious public line to-
ward General de Gaulle in order to gain the best possible
relations with him and to take advantage of those of his
policies that Moscow feels would serve its interests. Am-
bassador Thompson believes that Moscow is uncertain
whether De Gaulle would seek to establish a dictatorship
and suppress the Communists and consequently is playing
the situation by ear. While Moscow presumably hopes
that the situation will eventually lead to a popular-front
government, its immediate concern is merely to encourage
Communist-Socialist, cooperation.
There have been signs that the USSR expects that De
Gaulle would damage NATO unity and seek closer relations
with Moscow, but it probably is also concerned about the
possibility that De Gaulle might be able to adjust the Al-
gerian situation in such a way as to undercut the National
Liberation Front and thereby reduce the chances for Com-
munist influence in North Africa.
Soviet propaganda, while critical of De Gaulle, has
centered its fire on the military leaders in Algeria and
other right-wing groups, and specific criticisms of De
Gaulle have been attributed to the French Communists or
have been made only by Soviet correspondents in Paris.
The French Communist propaganda attack on De Gaulle
has intensified, however, and now includes the claim
thatlfe USSR opposes him.
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The Indonesian Communist Party
The Indonesian Communist party (PKI) is the largest
political party in Java and the second largest in the coun-
try. Of Indonesia's numerous parties, the PKI is the best
disciplined. and hardest working, and its leadership is able
and dedicated. It is in a position to influence government
policy through four cabinet members who are at least fel-
low travelers, and through 18 Communists and. sympathiz-
ers among the 45 members of the National Council estab-
lished. as part of President Sukarno's "guided. democracy"
concept. The Communists also wield. great economic power
through SOBSI, Indonesia's largest labor federation, whose
claimed. membership is 2,000,000 and whose affiliates con-
trol vital oil, plantation, and. transportation workers' un-
ions. These unions form the nucleus of PKI strength out-
side Java. The PKI has been steadily developing grass-roots
support through a variety of front organizations.
The Communists have exploited the central govern-
ment's preoccupation with the dissidents in the past three
months to increase their influence in the management of
Dutch firms seized during the anti-Dutch campaign late last
year. Their position has also been strengthened by the
strong support they have given to Sukarno's "guided. demo-
cracy" concept and, more recently, to the central govern-
ment's campaign to suppress the dissidents. In addition,
the Communists stand to benefit from the propaganda and
material support the bloc has been extending to Indonesia.
In view of the ineffectiveness of Indonesia's non-Com-
munist political parties, any effective anti- Communist action
in the foreseeable future would have to be taken by the army,
and its success would depend on Sukarno's support. Army
spokesmen have indicated that in the absence of provoca-
tion, there would be no outright suppression of the Commu-
nists;.. however, the army has recently taken a few steps to
curb Communist activity and Chief of Staff Nasution has
claimed he will "take care" of the Communists after the
dissidents are eliminated, provided he is given American
arms. Sukarno has also indicated a desire for closer rela-
tions with the US, but it remains to be seen whether he will
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be willing to sanction effective army action against the Com-
munists, who have been his strongest supporters.
In the meantime, the PKTs strategy is to maintain its
momentum, without resort to violence, in the hope of win-
ning the national elections in 1959.. The Communists' con-
fidence in their ability to come to power through parliamen-
tary means is underscored by Secretary General Aidit's
recent statement in opposition to the dissolution of polit-
ical parties, a cardinal point in Sukarno's program for
r talizing Indonesia.
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State of Emergency Declared in Ceylon
The Ceylonese Government's proclamation of a state
of emergency and the ban it imposed on 27 May on two ex-
t:?emist Tamil and Singhalese communal organizations in
Ceylon probably will bring under control the riots initiated
on 22 May.
The principal issue involved in the disorders is the
demand of the Federal party--the main political organiza-
tion representing the island's 2,000,000 Tamil-speaking mi-
nority--that Tamil be given equal status with the official
Singhalese language and that Tamil-speaking people of In
dian oi'i'_'L~ Yee given wider political and administrative
rights.
The agitation apparently was initiated by a militant
Singhalese group in an effort to exploit the annual conven-
tion of the Federal party held from 23 to 26 May. The riots
and demonstrations which it sparked have resulted in about
20 deaths and the intervention of the armed forces. The ex-
tremist elements probably do not, command the support of
the Singhalese-speaking majority.
The Federal party's reported decision to postpone un-
til sometime before 20 August a civil disobedience campaign
which it had previously announced for 23 May suggests the
Tamil leaders recognize their loss of some popular support.
Furthermore, they have already been assured of parliamentary
consideration of their demands despite the abrogation on 9. N" Y
of an agreement reached last year which made some conces-
sior~ 1:o`thize Ta.x_2I:ils. Any Tamil attempts to create trouble
while serious strikes and labor violence in Colombo continue
would only antagonize the. government and lessen the possi-
bility of securing favorable legislation.
In view of the government's firm action, , , ..-e _.a_
against the Singhalese extremists, further widespread dis-
turbances are unlikely, although minor demonstrations
prob y will continue.
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28 May 18 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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French Crisis
Premier Pflimlin's proffered. resignation despite a
408 to 165 confidence vote in the National Assembly
strengthens the possibility that a call to General de Gaulle
to form a new government may be imminent. President
Coty will probably be reluctant to leave the country with-
out a government for even a short time for fear of a coup
d.' etat.
Prior to Pflimlin's resignation, massive anti- Gaullist
demonstrations in Paris were called for 28 May. The spon-
sorship of the demonstrations includes non-Communist po-
litical organizations and the Catholic and. Socialist labor
organizations, and is much broader than that for the abortive
Communist general strike on 27 May. Growing public rest-
lessn ts in the face of the prolonged crisis increases the
posility of violence which may in turn stimulate army in-
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