CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003700110001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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13 May 1958
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13 MAY 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's 6 May speech on Soviet
chemical industry is his most positive
statement to date claiming Soviet eco-
nomic superiority over US.
Polish-Hungarian communique avoids
mention of Soviet dispute with Belgrade.
Lebanon - Disorders continue, with
growing indications of UAR support
for President Chamoun's Opponents.
Husayn of Jordan and Faysal of Iraq
scheduled to meet shortly to set up
framework of Arab Union government.
Greece - Karamanlis should be able to
form one-party government; Communist-
front party shows gains.
New Moroccan cabinet reflects Istiglal
party's political dominance.
Indonesia - Mass demonstrations
planned on Java to protest foreign
intervention,
? Communist and leftist gains in Laotian
elections portend further inroads, takin?
advantage of conservative disunity.
India - Forced resignation of two state
governments may be start of Congress
party house cleaning.
France - Politicians' willingness to
risk long crisis increases chances of
a De Gaulle solution or Communist
support for leftist premier.
Iceland may shortly announce unilateral
extension of territorial limits to 12
miles.
@ Leftist trend in Chile furthered by
congressional action to make Com-
munist party legal.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
corn programs.
13 May 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. TIM COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet economic planning: Khrushchev's lengthy speech
on the expansion of the chemical industry delivered to the
Soviet party central committee on 6 May is his most positive
and detailed claim to date that the superiority of the Soviet
economic system now has been demonstrated. The speech,
containing extensive comparisons of current US and Soviet
economic data, will be a basic document for Soviet propa-
gandists. Khrushchev asserts that the successful estab-
lishment of the Soviet heavy industrial base will--in the
shortly-to-be-announced Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965)--
begin to compensate the Soviet consumer for his 40 years
of self-sacrifice. Khrushchev is now beating the drums
for chemical synthetics in textile production with the same
enthusiasm that marked his support of the virgin lands and
divided Hungarian party.
position of Kadar and the centrist faction in the badly
Poland-Hungary: The joint Polish-Hungarian declara-
tion signed in Budapest- -unlike the Polish-Bulgarian com-
muniqu6 in Sofia- -emphasizes "complete agreement on all
questions discussed," and the omission of any reference to
Yugoslavia reflects the desire of both parties to remain
uninvolved in the bloc dispute with Belgrade. The com-
muniqu6 shows clear signs of an attempt to shore up the
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Army troops are patrolling the larger cities,
but sporadic disorders and acts of sabotage are likely to con-
tinue. In the countryside, especially in areas near the
Syrian border, the presence of armed Syrian tbesmen sug-
gests that the UAR authorities may have revived the idea of
a tribal revolt, originally planned for April. Acts of sabo-
tage, such as the damaging of an oil pipeline from Syria to
northern Lebanon, may well have been the work of UAR or
Communist agents. The political impact of the disorders on
President Chamoun's re-election plans is not yet clear.
Moderate opposition elements are urging that Chamoun
postpone his plans and install a "national" cabinet. The
attitude of army chief $hihab, whom opposition leaders
are urging as a stopgap prime minister, is likely to be
Iraq-Jordan: King Husayn of Jordan and King Faysal
of -Iraq- are _ ;expectdd to meet in Baghdad very. soon.
to determine the composition; of the Arab Union government
and parliament. The meeting follows ratification of the
Arab Union constitution by the Iraqi Parliament on 10 May,
which completed the legal measures required to set up the
new government. Unless the Arab Union begins to display
more dynamism than it has thus far, it is unlikely to be ef-
fective in blocking Nasir's growing influence among the Arabs
\ reece: Kara
man is will be able to form a one-party,
7r pro-Western, right center government, although his Na-
tional Radical Union has failed to receive as large a per-
centage of the vote in the 11 May election as it did in the
elections of 1956. The strong showing made by the Commu-
nist-front United Democratic Left is probably due more to
a large protest vote against the policies of the major non-
Communist parties than to any substantial increase in hard-
core Communist strength in Greece.
13 May 58
DAILY BRIEF
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Morocco: A new Moroccan cabinet headed by moderate
pro-Western Istiqlal leader Ahmed Balafrej was invested on
12 May, ending a four-week-long government crisis. The
new cabinet contains nine members of Istiqlal and one inde-
pendent, and represents a compromise between the party,
which had demanded an all-Istiglal government, and the
King, who desired to maintain some non-Istiglal representa-
tion.
*Indonesia: Mass demonstrations, apparently Communist-
instigate&, against foreign intervention in the Indonesian
fighting are scheduled for 16 May in Djakarta and 20 May in
Surabaya. Protests will be directed specifically against the
United States, Nationalist China, and SEATO.
Laos: Partial election returns indicate victories for
Communists and their allies in as many as 14 of the races
for 21 seats at stake in the::supplementary assembly elections.
Unless conservative elements cooperate more closely than
they have in the past, Communist and leftist forces stand
a good chance of exploiting their present gains for an even
more significant victory in the 1959 national elections. Lack-
ing such cooperation, conservative influence in the assembly
apparently has been reduced to the point where the present
administration may have difficulty forming an effective gov-
ernment.
India: Orders from New Delhi which forced the resigna-
tion on-8 and 9 May of the Congress-dominated state govern-
ments of Mysore and Orissa indicate that the Congress party
may have begun intensive house cleaning. Top party leaders
apparently lost patience with the members in Orissa, whose
wavering loyalty had endangered the Congress party govern-
ment's already precarious working majority in the state as-
sembly. In Mysore, where the opposition is weak, New
Delhi probably hopes to end ciontinuous' intraparty bickering.
New Delhi's sense of urgency is probably heightened by the
13 May 58
DAILY BRIEF
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possibility that the Congress party will not be able to cap-
ture a seat from the Communists in a critical by-election in
Kerala State on 16 May.
France: European extremists in Algiers have called for
a general strike and mass demonstrations against Pflimlin,
who will seek National Assembly endorsement on 13 May.
Some party leaders in the center and on the right are be-
lieved willing to "risk a long crisis" in the belief that it
would force the Socialists to reverse their policy of not
participating in the next government. Prolongatioa of the
crisis, however, would probably bring about a stepped-up
compaign for the return of De Gaulle, and would raise the
possibility that, in the interim, a leftist candidate such as
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Mitterrand might receive Communist support for a "liberal"
Algerian Policy.
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a\\\O@ celan The government intends shnrtly to anno nce 7ciX1
\ unilateral extension of its territorial waters to the 12-mile
N limit. The US ambassador to NATO believes it will be
difficult to persuade Iceland to delay an announcement beyond
14 May in the absence of any new proposals. Failure of the
recent Geneva conference on territorial waters to agree on
the 12-mile limit issue aroused almost unanimous indigna-
tion in Iceland and occasioned threats that the US armed
forces at Keflavik would be asked to leave. The presently
projected move would antagonize a number of Western
European countries with important fishing interests, par-
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Chile: Congress's final approval of an act legalizing the
Communist party, though still subject to possible presidential
veto, will further strengthen the recent leftist trend in Chile.
This trend will probably be encouraged by anti-US sentiment
growing out of the copper question and Chile's feeling of
III. THE WEST
13 May 58
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neglect over loans. It will particularly benefit the prospects
of the Communist- supported Socialist candidate, Salvador
Allende, in next September's presidential election. He has
recently proposed heavy increases in the tax burden on the
US-owned copper companies.
13 May 58
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DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's Challenge to the West
Khrushchev's lengthy speech on 6 May to the Soviet
party central committee on the future expansion of the
chemical industry will be a basic document in the Soviet
propaganda campaign against the West. The speech ex-
pands and again renews his challenge to the West, es-
pecially the United. States, to economic competition in
order to demonstrate the superiority of one system over
the other. This is the most positive and optimistic state-
ment to date of the Soviet propaganda theme that the pres-
ent economic situation in the United States clearly demon-
strates the superiority of the Soviet system.
Soviet achievements to date are alleged to be the direct
results of the "heroic self-sacrifice" by the knowledgeable
"Soviet man" in order to establish the heavy industrial base
which now has grown to sufficient size to allow a "better
life for the working people;' This will be achieved by "con-
siderably greater" production of consumer goods. Khru-
shchev stated, "When the Soviet Union reaches the American
production level and leaves the capitalist world behind, then
we shall say, 'our socialist country... assures for all work-
ing people the highest standard of living. II '
Khrushchev said the armaments industries of the bloc
will manufacture some of the equipment required for the ma-
jor expansion of the Soviet chemical industry. This will be
possible, he said, because the reduction in the troop strength
of the "socialist countries" left their armaments plants with
idle capacity. American, West German, and British indus-
tries were also offered the opportunity to contribute to supply-
ing equipment for a'25-billion-dollar expansion of the Soviet
chemical industry. Western technical personnel qualified in
chemical synthesis were offered employment in the Soviet
Union,, and Western governments were told that these offers
could- lead to a partial resolution of their economic difficul-
13 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Gomulka-Kadar Rapprochement
Omission of any reference to Yugoslavia in the joint
Polish-Hungarian communiqud issued on 11 May in Buda-
pest reflects attempts by both countries to remain unin-
volved in the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute. Although both
Gomulka and Kadar will avoid taking a public position on
this issue as long as possible, they may eventually suc-
cumb to Kremlin pressure.
Emphasizing "complete agreement on all questions
discussed" the communiqud contains several references
which are an attempt by Gomulka to shore up Kadar and
the centrist faction in the badly divided Hungarian party.
While the communiqud called revisionism the chief danger,
it condemned dogmatism with almost equal vigor. The
failure to mention Gomulka's concepts of sovereignty and
noninterference in internal affairs as an essential element
of relations among Communist states probably represents
a significant concession to Kadar, who was put in power by
Soviet intervention in Hungary. The two men also found an
acceptable formula on the question of the Hungarian revolu-
tion, condemning the counterrevolution yet avoiding refer-
ence'to aspects which the Poles cannot accept, such as the
"treason" of Imre Nagy.
The communiqud expressed. the need for the Warsaw Pact
and. unity in the "socialist" camp, and a desire for closer
economic cooperation. It supported the Soviet condemnation
of the nuclear armament of West Germany and. the refusal to
discuss the status of Eastern Europe at the proposed summit
7rference.
13 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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