CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A003600500001-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 8, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 28, 1958
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A003600500001-6.pdf | 430.34 KB |
Body:
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28 April 1958
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DATE.
State Dept. review completed
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 April 1958
DAILY BRIEF
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir's trip to the USSR: Plans for Nasir's scheduled
19-day visit to the Soviet Union starting 29 April appear to
call for a considerable amount of negotiation, mostly eco-
nomic, as well as a tour of selected points in the USSR.
The negotiators who will accompany Nasir are competent,
relatively conservative economic e:;perts who are wary of
further commitments to the Soviet bloc. However, for
political reasons, Nasir might feel unable to refuse a
spectacular new Soviet offer.
United Arab Republic: Nasir is seriously concerned
over the poor Syrian grain harvest. The lack of an ex-
portable surplus will put strains on the UAR budget and
embarrass Nasir politically. Egypt, which had expected
to import Syrian wheat, will probably be forced to seek
additional supplies abroad, ossibly from the USSR.
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Algeria - France: The call by European extremist
demonstrators in giers on 26 April for an "army solu-
tion" to the crisis in Paris probably reflects their conviction
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MEMMEMEMMEME
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that the trend in France has turned against them. There
are renewed rumors of an imminent attempt at a coup
d'etat looking to the establishment of Algeria as an inde-
pendent state. A coup attempt would involve~_ French res-
idents, and some elements of the army in Algeria. While
the success of such a move is doubtful, the idea of a coup
would have increased appeal if a government favoring a
negotiated settlement of the Algerian problem came: to
power in Paris. F__ I 25X1 A
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Guatemala - British Honduras: President Ydigoras
is prepared to carry out a strong propaganda campaign
to promote the idea of Guatemalan. sovereignty over
neighboring British Honduras. His primary motive is
to strengthen his domestic political position by taking
a strong stand onan issue with emotional appeal to all
Guatemalans. He threatens a series of dramatic ges-
tures, including an appeal in the United Nations for
Latin American soli against "colonialism."
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
(No back;-up material),
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir's Trip to Moscow
UAR President Nasir has stated that his trip to Mos-
cow, scheduled to begin on 29 April for 18 or 19 days, will
be devoted largely to "reassuring" the USSR, in view of his
recent moves ainst pro-Soviet elements in Syria. How-
ever Nasir 25X1 C
hope to reorganize the separate Egyptian and Syrian
economic and arms deals and perhaps obtain an increase in
"basic economic aid." He may also attempt to secure.Soviet
agreement to provide hard currency for Egyptian cotton, to
reduce the cost of arms already ordered, and to furnish jet
aircraft for his civil airline.
Nasir apparently expects to do some hard bargaining,
and the inclusion of the relatively conservative Egyptian
ministers of finance and economy in his retinue suggests
he may attempt to avoid extensive further commitments.
The.fact that no military personnel will accompany the group
seems to rule out significant new arms purchases.
Nevertheless, the USSR may offer economic assistance
on large-scale new projects which would tempt Nasir. Such
an offer might consist of Soviet underwriting of the develop-
ment plans for the Suez Canal, large-scale agricultural im-
provement schemes, or even financing Nasir's pet project,
the Aswan Dam. A sizable contingent of UAR newspaper
and radio men accompanying Nasir will guarantee propaganda
coverage for home consumption, and any agreement made,
rega ess of its real magnitude, will be publicized as sn-
ot r victory for "positive neutralism."
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Poor Syrian Grain Crop Worries Nasir
The prospective small size of the Syrian grain harvest,
resulting from drought, is worrying UAR President Nasir
and may embarrass him politically by coming so soon after
'the Syrian- Egyptian union. Although it is believed there will
be sufficient wheat for Syrian domestic consumption, the
anticipated absence of normal supplies for export will re-
sult in an important loss of foreign exchange. It will also
force Egypt, which had expected to rely on Syrian wheat for
part of its consumption, to seek additional supplies' abroad,
possibly from the Soviet Union.
A temporary prohibition of grain exports, as well as
statements by officials in the Syrian Ministry of Economy
that there will be no domestic shortage, will probably re-
sult in grain dealers holding supplies off the market in
anticipation of higher prices later in the year. A rise in
grain prices could cause a serious loss of Nasir's prestige
in Syria and nullify the effect of his recent decree cuttin
the price of bread the staple of Syrian diet. 25X1 A
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Sources:
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Guatemalan President to Wage Campaign For Sovereignty
Over British Honduras
Guatemalan President Ydigoras told a group of British
friends on 24 April he will "use all means" to extend Gua-
?temalan sovereignty to British Honduras and is prepared
to "spend millions" to this end. He apparently has in mind
a concerted effort to gain the support of all Latin American
countries and may carry the issue to the United Nations.
An armed invasion of the colony is unlikely, however, as
the President seems to realize that such action would have
disastrous results.
In an attempt to dramatize the issue, Ydigoras made
one unsuccessful attempt to visit the colony on 16 April and
now says he will make a second try, this time by sea. He
will ask permipsion in advance, but if, it is denied, he in-
tends to go anyway-and will also levy a 100-percent duty on
British goods entering Guatemala.
All recent Guatemalan governments have used the claim
to British Honduras--based on old Spanish territorial claims--
to rally domestic support to their regimes. Ydigoras, who
lacks wide and well-organized political support, is probably
similarly motivated. He seems, however, more determined
than his predecessors and his penchant for the dramatic
grandstand play could carry him to a point where it would
be difficult to back down.
The dispute also involves Mexico, which claims the
northern part of the colony if Britiain should accede to Gua-
temalan demands. If oil is discovered in the northern part
of Guatemala, where, explorations are under way, there will
be increased Guatemalan pressure for cession of British
Honduras, which would provide access to the sea. I
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