CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003600060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 7, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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7 March 1958
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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 March 1958
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DAILY BRIEF
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Summit talks--Soviet view: Soviet officials are
hinting that the USSR will compromise on the question
of who should attend a foreign ministers' conference.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
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Watch Committee conclusion- -Indonesia: There is
no evidence of Sino?-Soviet intention to become militarily
involved in the Indonesian situation. The Djakarta gov-
ernment is proceeding with measures to subdue the dis-
sidents, but an early resolution of the issue, either mil-
itarily or by negotiation, is unlikely. The general situa-
tion continues to favor the Communist position on Java
and exploitation by the Sino-Soviet bloc.
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NMI
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United Arab Republic cabinet- The appointments to the
81-miem er UAR caA:,a ?c it clear that Nasir intends
to keep Syria under hi-,`, co ird.)i9 most. of Ka, ir's top ad-
visers have been nan ef.;: to .w9 aorta ost:.? Four vice
presidents and nun12ero .o ,.epar atu , xt; ate for the ESyp.-
tian and Syrian " ectcr ," -:ere named. However, Syria;..
G-2 chief Sarraj, in becoming minister of interior for the
Syrian sector, is in position to emerge more strongly as
the dominant force there if he retains control of the intel-
ligence and internal security organization he has built up.
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7 Mar 58
DAILY BRIEF
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a,M
Est
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Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Tensions
in the Middle East continue to create possibilities for
serious incidents; however, a deliberate initiation of hos-
tilities in the Middle East is considered unlikely in the
near future.
I
Tunisia: President Bourguiba's public denunciation
of Egyptian support for Tunisian plotters alleged to be
planning his assassination, while timed primarily to bol-
ster his popular support at home, does, nevertheless,
create another fissure in the Arab world. 25X1 A
I
Morocco: King Mohamed V, together with the govern-
ing Istigl l party, supports the future creation of a North
African federation which could be a potential rival to the
United Arab Republic.
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The Ifni enclave, where fight-
ing between Spanish troops and Moroccan-led guerrillas
apparently died down after a limited Spanish operation
there last month, may soon become the focal point of re-
newed military action. The Moroccan Government has
recently dispatched additional troops to the environs of
the enclave. Neither Spain nor Morocco is believed to
have any intention of attacking the territory of the other,
but the danger exists that movements in an area where bor-
ders are ill-defined could lead to engagements between -
forces of the two countries.
(Map)
q~2
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New Afghan-Soviet project agreement: Afghanistan
has apparently committed another large portion of the
Soviet $100,000,000 credit by signing a contract for con-
struction of the Salang Pass tunnel and road, which will
materially shorten the road distance from Kabul to
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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, $20,000,000, is the :largest yet undertaken under the
MR,
credit. The agreement is in line with Kabul's previ-
\ ously stated intention to use all of the $100,000,000.
(Map)
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III. THE WEST
* Church-State issue in Italy: The Vatican's vio-
lent reaction tote convict f the Bishop of Prato
may divide the Christian Democratic party and rein-
forces the probability that the Christian Democrats
will not win a working majority in this spring's elec-
tions.
;
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\
INUMM"
p
g
Possible Soviet Long Range Bomber Development,
1958-1962. Special National Intelligence Estimate A
No. 11-58, 4 March 1958.
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7 Mar 58 DAILY BRIEF iv
InEEMEN
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sam
N. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the
recedin
week)
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Hinting at Compromise on Foreign
Ministers' Meeting
Kremlin leaders apparently believe that a compro-
mise on the composition of a foreign ministers' meeting
would increase pressure on Western governments to
agree to a summit conference before its membership and
agenda have been determined..
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the USSR is prepared to agree to a
four-power foreign ministers' meeting, instead of a broader
meeting with neutralist participation, provided the West does
not insist on discussing German reunification. A Soviet For-
eign Ministry official informed the Italian Embassy in Mos-
cow on 3 March that the Soviet Union wants neutralist states
to be represented at summit talks, but believes their par-
ticipation in a foreign ministers' meeting is not essential.
Soviet Ambassador Malik in London reminded Ambassador
Whitney on 4 March that the USSR does not require the same
composition for both a foreign ministers' and a summit con-
ference.
Although apparently prepared to concede on the question
of the composition of a "strictly procedural" foreign minis-
ters' conference, the Soviet Government still attaches great
importance both to the agenda and to equal East-West repre-
sentation at a summit meeting. Moscow hopes to use "parity
at the summit" to illustrate Western recognition of the sta-
tus quo in Eastern Europe and Soviet claims that the "balance
of world forces" has shifted away from the West,
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Nasir Appoints United Arab Republic Cabinet
.In appointing a 31-man cabinet for the United Arab
Republic, Nasir has side-stepped the selection of sep-
arate "sector" executive councils for Egypt and Syria as
previously planned, apparently because of inability to
find suitable or generally acceptable chairmen. By ap-
pointing both an Egyptian and Syrian minister for nearly
every cabinet position, and by placing Egyptians at the
head of four important combined ministries--war, for-
eign affairs, national guidance (propaganda), and educa-
tion--Nasir has created at least a temporary balance which
should minimize conflicts and disappointments and main-
tain his own absolute authority.
Appointed at the same time were four vice-presidents
former chairmen of the Egyptian National Assembly Abd al-
Latif al-Baghdadi and Marshal Abd Al-Hakim Amir, along
with Syria's former Premier Sabri al-Asali, and former
speaker of the Syrian chamber of deputies Akram al-Hawrani.
In the Syrian sector,, "strong man" Col. Abd al-Hamid Sarraj
received the key Interior Ministry slot, while other members
of the Syrian general staff have been relegated to such appar-
ently innocuous sinecures as communications and social and
village affairs. The pro-Soviet former Syrian Vice Premier
Ehalid al-Azm is conspicuously absent.
The capable director of Egyptian propaganda, Fathi
Radwan, will serve as the single minister of national guid-
ance. The unified Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be under
Egypt's Mahmud Fawzi,. probably seconded by Syria's for-
mer head of foreign affairs, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, as min-
ister of state. Egypt's red-tinged former Minister of Com-
merce Muhammad Abu Nusayr has been assigned to what
appears to be a less significant post as minister of munic--
ipal and village affairs for the Egyptian sector. The more
conservative former Finance Minister Abd al-Munim al-
Qaysuni will be the minister of economy and trade for Egypt.
Ali Sabry, one of Nasir's closest advisers, remains as min-
isor of state for presidential affairs.
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Tunisia Threatens to Break Relations With Egypt
President Bourguiba, following his official. protest
against Egyptian assistance to his exiled rival, Salah ben
Youssef, has publicly threatened to break off diplomatic
relations unless Cairo supplies an acceptable explanation
of the facilities provided Ben Youssef and his few followers
in the past two years. Ben Youssef is said to have plotted
Bourguiba?s assassination. While Ben Youssef, who has
been sentenced to death in absentia by Tunisian courts, may
have planned for Bou.rguiba's liquidation, he.Y is as likely to
have been encouraged by French extremists as by Cairo.
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The present publicity is probably an effort by the Tuni-
sian Government to shore up Bourguiba's declining prestige
and to besmirch Nasir in the eyes of the Tunisians, among
whom there has been a marked growth recently in pro-Egyp-
tian sentiment. It may also be designed to gain additional
credit for BQurguiba in Western eyes.
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Moroccan King Endorses North African Federation
The King of Morocco on 6 March publicly endorsed
creation of a North African federation as suggested by the
.Moroccan Istiglal party on 2 March. The Tunisian Neo-
Destour party had already responded to the Istigla:l initia-
tive and had proposed a meeting in Tunis or Rabat to con-
sider not only such a federation but also joint action to
bring about Algerian independence and the evacuation of
foreign troops from all North Africa. The latter objec-
tives are also endorsed by Moroccan politicians.
:: Some North Africans,, among them Tunisian Presi
dent Bourguiba9 envisage a union including Libya and an
independent Algeria as well as Tunisia and Morocco
which could serve as a Western counterbalance to the
United Arab Republic.
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Renewed Hostilities Possible Soon in Ifni Area
A large-scale Spanish offensive against guerrillas
in Ifni is to be launched in the second week of March, 0
Ithe Spanish general staff was drawing up
plans for the operation and that these envisaged support
by the French Air Force and the coordination of a 7,000-
man parachute drop with an attack by ground. elements
from Spain's present coastal defense perimeter in Ifni.
The American army attachd doubts that the 7,000-man
Spanish force now in. Ifni can reoccupy the entire enclave
and hold its frontier posts. France, which carefully
avoided any involvement in Ifni while cooperating mil-
itarily with Spain in Spanish Sahara last month, is un-
likely to participate overtly now that its relations with
Morocco are already deteriorating.
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Rabat's current
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reinforcement and redeployment of royal army forces in
the environs of the enclave was prompted by its anticipa-
tion of the offensive. the Moroccan King and
government do not discount the possibility of a border in-
cident similar to the 8 February French attack on the
Tunisian frontier village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef. Spain,
however, has denied. the existence of any plan for mil-
itary action which might infringe on Moroccan territory.
In any event, the likelihood appears to be increasing that
any significant military flare-up in Ifni would overflow the
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VOW - NOW,
All-weather road
Broad-gauge railroad
o DarYa'
Mazar-i-
Sharif
` Fort Sandema
M I h?b - Shibar Pass
HnRd
Herat ? . AFGHANISTAN KAY
JV ~ ~ ~ ~.Ta~- X855
Peshawar
AND
\PerS ian PAK
1Gulf~_
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Construction Contract on New. Afghan-Soviet Project
Afghan and Soviet representatives on 3 March signed
a construction contract for the Salang Pass tunnel and
road thus com-
mitting another large por ion o e ,000 Soviet
credit. The road and tunnel will shorten the road distance
from Kabul to northern Afghanistan by about 65 miles and
be more usable during the winter than the present Shibar
Pass route.
This contract could utilize as much as $20,000,000 of
the credit, in addition to the approximately $13,000,000
committed to date. Kabul had previously stated that it in-
tended to use all of the $100,000,000, despite its concern
over servicing its increasing foreign debt. Large amounts
of Afghan currency, already in short supply, will also be
required for the project.
the,'Bagram project.
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Afghan Prime Minister Daud
indefinitely postponed Soviet construction on
the Kabul civil airport. The USSR apparently expects to do
some construction work there eventually, however, as 600
tons of materials are said to have been stockpiled at the site.
The USSR is currently using all available construction equip-
ment on the Bagram military airport, 30 miles north of Ka-
bul, probably in an effort to complete that project before
the United States finishes the Kandahar international airport
in southern Afghanistan. Work on the Kabul airport will
probably not be started until equipment can be released from
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A RDP7OT00075 nvl
III. THE WEST
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Church-State Issue in Italy
The Italian Christian Democratic party's prospects of
winning a working majority in this spring's elections have
been reduced by the recent trial of the Bishop of Prato.
The Vatican's violent reaction to the bishop's conviction
for defaming the character of a couple married without
a church service may cause strongly proclerical elements
of the party to withdraw their support from party candidates
not sufficiently sympathetic. toward the church.
al elections. Except: for left-wing papers, the press on
5 March took a fairly restrained attitude, but the Commu.
Premier Zoli's statement that he is "sorry about the
conviction as a Catholic, but nevertheless believes that
justice must take its course" will reduce the extent to
which the issue can be exploited in the forthcoming nation=
nists will probably continue to stress the issue.
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DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the :Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 March 1958
DAILY BRIEF
Watch Committee conclusion- -Indonesia: There is
no evidence of Sino-Soviet intention to become militarily
involved in the Indonesian situation. The Djakarta gov-
ernment is proceeding with measures to subdue the dis-
sidents, but an early resolution of the issue, either mil-
itarily or by negotiation, is unlikely. The general situa-
tion continues to favor the Communist position on Java
and exploitation by the 25X1A
ublic cabinet: The appointments to the
Si-member U AR ca ,ainet { ake it clear that Nasir intends
to keep Syria under hi corAro:; most of lSNaAir's top ad-
visers have been nanieC:, to Ln5portant ost:_;. Four vice
presidents and numerous Separate n inister for the Et yp-
t4an and Syrian "sectors" ti:ere named. However, Syrbx_
G-2 chief Sarraj, in becoming minister of interior for the
Syrian sector, is in position to emerge more strongly as
the dominant force there if he retains control of the intel-
ligence and internal seeurit organization he has built up.
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h.Commit ee conclusion--Middle East=. Tensions
in the Middle East continue Wo ere-ate possibilities for
serious incidents; however, a deliberate initiation of hos-
tilities in the Middle East is considered unlikely in the
near future.
Tunisia: President Bourguiba's public denunciation
of Egyptian support for Tunisian plotters alleged to be
planning his assassination, while timed primarily to bol.
ster his popular support at home, does, nevertheless,
create another fissure in the Arab world.
1 :1
Morocco: King Mohamed V, together with the governr
ing Istiq a party,. supports the future creation of a North
African federation which could be a potential rival to the
United Arab Republic.
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