CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003400420001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 21, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

25X
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
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BULLETIN 1)A(~- 1!V,-J^EV1EWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
% TOP SECRET
2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79
State De
d
21 December 1957 254
Copy No. 13
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2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T
pt. review complete
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CONTENTS
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1. MOS OW9S REACTION TO THE NATO CONFERENCE
00
0h 2. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
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~b 5. SPAIN REQUESTS EMERGENCY US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
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SINO-SOVIET BLOC CONTINUE TO INCREASE
(page 10).
~08. CEYLON'S TRADE AND CULTURAL CONTACTS WITH
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409. ARGENTINE STRIKE THREATENED ON 23 AND 24 DECEMBER
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MOSCOW'S REACTION TO THE NATO CONFERENCE
The Soviet government has announced
that it will make a full statement on the
NATO conference communique during
the current Supreme Soviet session. In
its initial reaction, Moscow has con-
tinued to employ the general themes
used in its massive propaganda cam-
paign before and during the meeting,
TASS describes the NATO communique
as reflecting the deep "contradictions" existing in the alli-
ance, and claims that the meeting held up the specter of a
Soviet threat in order to continue. the American arms drive
and the cold war. US policy is portrayed as contrasting
sharply with Western European desires to work for peace.
The "most conspicuous" element in the communique, ac-
cording to one widely broadcast Soviet comment, is the "dis-
crepancy" between the decision to set up missile bases in
Europe and the call for further disarmament talks with the
Soviet Union.
Comment The Soviet government can be expected
to maintain its adamant attitude that it
will not participate in further sessions of the UN Disarma-
ment Commission unless that body is "balanced" between
the Western states and the Communist and neutralist powers.
Moscow almost certainly hopes to avoid becoming involved
in further detailed discussions of such facets of disarmament
as control and inspection.
The Kremlin might accept a foreign min-
isters' conference, mainly to set the stage for a heads-of-
governments meeting.
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2. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
An Indonesian government decree of
16 December, transfering the manage-
ment of former Dutch estates to senior
Indonesian employees, will undoubtedly
work to the advantage of the Communists
who led the drive in seizing these prop-
erties. Communist leadership of the ma-
jor estate labor union,-the domination of
Indonesia's leading peasant organization,
and the party's victories in the.1957 Javanese elections guaran-
tee the Communists a dominating position in the management
of these estates. They will also exert a major influence in
the national and provincial councils which have been set up
by the government to administer the estates. From an eco-
nomic standpoint, the transfer of management to inexperi-
enced personnel can be expected to disrupt production and
marketing and probably to cause considerable unemployment,
thus further favoring Communist exploitation,
In Djakarta, a non-Communist labor
leader has stated that the local Djakarta army command is
allied with. SOBSI, the Communist-dominated labor federa-
tion, and is ignoring efforts of Army Chief of Staff General
Nasution to stall SOBSI's campaign to win control. over Dutch
enterprises.
The minister of shipping told parliament
on 20 December that the government would use funds under the
pending $100,000,000 Soviet economic development loan to buy
ships--especially Russian ones--to make up shipping shortages
which are seriously aggravating Indonesia's current food scarci-
ties. The USSR, however, would find it difficult to make ships
available, and would be unlikely to permit the use of these funds
for purchase of shipping outside the bloc.
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5. SPAIN REQUESTS EMERGENCY US
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
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Spanish Minist
requested on 1
States consider
er of Commerce Ullastres
9 December that the United
an immediate allocation
to Spain of $30,000,000 from President
Eisenhower's contingency fund. Ullastres claimed that Spain's
gold, dollar, and European currency reserves were virtually
exhausted. He also asked the United States to expedite Export-
Import Bank loans for Spain.
Although Ullastres may have exaggerated
Spain's economic predicament somewhat to dramatize the situa-
tion prior to Franco's talks with Secretary Dulles on 20 Decem-
ber, the burden of costly operations against Moroccan irregu-
lars in Spanish West Africa poses a serious problem. Living
costs in Spain have risen some 25 percent over the past year,
and further inflationary pressures would probably result in
widespread labor unrest.
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8. CEYLON'S TRADE AND CULTURAL CONTACTS WITH
SINO-SOVIET BLOC CONTINUE TO INCREASE
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Trade between Ceylon and the Soviet
Union may soon be facilitated under
prospective trade and payments and
economic cooperation agreements. A
16-man Soviet trade mission, headed
by the deputy chairman of the State
Committee for External Relations, is
due in Colombo on 24 December. A17
though the Ceylonese are reported to be impressed by the
relatively high level of the members of the Soviet mission,
the chairman is of a rank normally sent to negotiate such
agreements.
The USSR in the past two years has made
a number of informal offers to expand trade and assist in
Ceylon's economic development program. The only results
have been the visit to Ceylon of four Soviet agricultural ex-
perts and recent Soviet purchases of substantial quantities of
Ceylonese tea. A trade agreement would provide the frame-
work for broader Ceylonese-Soviet economic ties and possibly
additional offers of Soviet aid to Ceylon.
Orbit cultural contacts with Ceylon are
also expected to continue, A 75-m,n opera troupe from Com-
munist China and a 40-man Rumanian "cultural show" are ex-
pected to arrive in early January.
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9. ARGENTINE STRIKE THREATENED ON
23 AND 24 DECEMBER
The threatened strike of progovernment
Buenos Aires commercial workers on
23 and 24 December could be exploited
by Peronista and Communist labor ele-
ments seeking to create unrest during
the period preceding the general elec-
tions on 23 February. The commercial
federation, the largest single union in
Argentina, has given the labor minister
until 21 December to consider its demand for an emergency
wage increase. The government had to suppress attempted
Peronista-Communist general strikes in September and Oc-
tober by stern measures, including imposition of a temporary
state of siege.
The commercial workers are demanding
a continuation of special $9.00 monthly wage supplements due
to expire on 31 December, and an additional $9.00 to meet
increased living costs. The government's policy, while stress-
ing more work for more pay, also emphasizes that wages should
be privately negotiated and not officially decreed. The govern-
ment May covertly condone the strike, not only to avoid decree-
ing admittedly necessary wage increases, but also to bolster
the prestige of the commercial employees' leader in the face
of intensified Peronista-Communist efforts to take over lead-
ership.
There recently has been a revival of ter-
rorism attributed to the followers of Peron. Pre-electoral
strategy is reportedly being discussed by Peron and his chief
cohorts at a meetin which commenced in Caracas on 20 De-
cember.
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