CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003400390001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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2004/01/20: CIA-RDP79
18 December 1957
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
EVIEWER:
!J . ' r
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOS and DIA review(s) completed.
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1. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
2. THAI ELECTION RESULTS
3. INDIAN REACTION TO EISENHOWER'S REPLY TO NEHRU
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4. HANOI'S MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE MISSING
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6. RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP BE SPLIT OVER POLICY
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1. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
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President Sukarno is very despondent
and his staff believes he is in a "serious
mental state," according to information
received by the American naval attache.
Sartono, the speaker of Parliament, has
announced that he is to take the oath of
office as acting president on 20 Decem-
ber, although the President is not sched-
uled to depart on "sick leave" until early
January.
Mohammed Hatta has publicly refused to
reassume the vice-presidency on the grounds that he would
have no executive power to prevent implementation of policies
with which he disagrees. He has agreed, however, to meet
with Sukarno, the cabinet, and the parliamentary committee
which is trying to re-establish the Sukarno-Hatta partnership.
The results of this meeting may reveal whether or not Sukarno's
influence has been, or is about to be, limited. The pattern of
government during Sukarno's absence may also become appar-
ent.
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In- East Indonesia, rebel activity has flared
in South Celebes and on the island of Ambon, apparently stimu-
lated both by food shortages and by the opportunity presented by
confusion in Djakarta. Both rebel movements are of long stand-
ing. Although the Indonesian army is capable of containing this
revived activity, it is an additional strain on the army's strength.
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2. THAI ELECTION RESULTS
The extremely poor showing of leftist
candidates in the 15 December par-
liamentary elections in Thailand should
convince Marshal Sarit and the ruling
military group that continuation of Thai-
land's pro-Western foreign policy poses no threat to their
political interests. With final results available for 133 out
of the 160 contested seats, the left-wing Economist party has
won only six seats. The Economists and an assortment of
other leftist parties may not win even as many as the 22 seats
they held in the last assembly.
The lack of popular appeal of the leftists'
anti-SEATO, neutralist platform was especially apparent in
the Bangkok area, where the strongly pro-Western Democratic
party swept 11 out of 12 seats, despite the strong support given
the leftist candidates by Bangkok's predominately leftist press.
Elsewhere in the country, personalities and local problems
weighed more heavily than national issues, as is shown by the
fact that independents have so far won 49 seats. Most of these
independents had been members of the former government party
that was headed by former Police Director General Phao.
Sarit should have no difficulty forming a
workable and pro-Western government based on the 123 ap-
pointed members whom he controls. The prospect is that he can
count on the support of most of the 49 independents, the 35 mod-
erate Unionists, and perhaps even some of the 31 Democrats.
thus .far. elected. His biggest problem will be to find a reputable
and well-known prime minister. If he fails in his efforts to in-
duce 'Provisional Prime Minister Pate to continue in office, he
may well assume the job himself. He would probably prefer,
however, to remain in his present capacity as armed forces
commander.
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3. INDIAN REACTION TO EISENHOWER'S REPLY
TO NEHRU
Prime Minister Nehru and the Indian
press received President Eisenhower's
16 December reply to Nehru's appeal for
the cessation of nuclear tests with "cool-
ness" and some "disappointment." Nehru's
noncommittal statement to parliament on
17 December also suggests that his hopes
for peace have not been raised. He noted
that differences still remain between the
United States and the USSR. Nehru agreed, with the President
that cessation of tests alone is not sufficient, but he said, "My
immediate appeal was that one step should be taken, and I sub-
mit the time has come to take that step:' Nehru pointed out
that the flying of hydrogen bombs over Europe created "an at-
mosphere which makes danger more acute."
The Indian press has displayed some skep-
ticism of Soviet motives and, like Nehru, has noted that a ban
on testing should be followed by controls over production of fis-
sionable materials for weapons purposes. The influential
'1'imes.,of India, however, set what may become the general
pattern of Indian reaction when it said, "The impression will
linger, and it is an unfortunate one, that once again Soviet
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cooperation has been nullified by American noncooperation:'
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A leadership reshuffle would probably not
result in a basic change in Hanoi's foreign policy.
HANOI'S MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE MISSING
North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen
Giap, minister of national defense, vice
premier, and party politburo and secre-
tariat member, has not been seen at any
official function nor mentioned in Hanoi broadcasts since Octo-
ber. Giap is one of the three top-ranking officials after Ho
Chi Minh in North Vietnam. His prolonged absence is unprece-
dented and may reflect a struggle within the leadership,
Giap's absence from Army Day celebra-
tions scheduled for 22 December would be a strong indication
that he is the target of the current press campaign against
hero-worship and leaders who "transform each sphere of their
respective activities into an empire." Giap would almost cer-
tainly have aroused the party leadership against him if he had
tried to use his position and popularity with the troops to build
up an independent power center.
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6. RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP MAY BE SPLIT OVER
POLICY TOWARD UNITED STATES
vacillation has been evident during Rumanian Party First
Secretary Gheorghiu-Dejos illness of the past two months.
The chief of protocol, in commenting
on the failure of the government to have a representative
present at the airport on 12 December for the departure of
American Minister Thayer, said that he and the foreign min-
ister had wanted to be present, but gave the impression thatthe
Foreign Ministry had been instructed to send no representa-
tive. The slight occurred on the day Gheorghiu-Dej made
his first public appearance in over two months at the recep-
tion for Yemeni Crown Prince Badr.
Disagreement appears to exist within
the Rumanian leadership over the for-
eign minister's desire to improve rela-
tions with the United States. Policy
Earlier the for-
eign minister had hoped to convince ej that e regime must
snake some political concessions before American-Rumanian
relations can be improved. The legation has noted a marked
increase of emigration visas, particularly to West Germany,
and reported that Premier Chivu Stoica had promised to fa-
cilitate the emigration of dual American- Rumanian citizens.
Rumanian efforts to improve relations with the United States
last year were interrupted by the Hungarian revolution.
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