CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003400250001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 December 1957
Copy No. 3
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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C
WH: hl G "
OAY REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET /
12003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T
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CONTENTS
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3. TIGHTENING OF CONTROLS IN EAST GERMANY
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4. ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT SUKARNO
&1z. 5. INDONESIA RETALIATES QUICKLY AGAINST DUTCH FOLLOW-
ING UN VOTE
6. STRIKE TALKS FAIL IN CEYLON
7. JAPAN INITIATES PLANS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
8. VIOLENCE INCREASING ON CYPRUS
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I-/C_ 9. NEW ZEALAND ELECTIONS
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3. TIGHTENING OF CONTROLS IN EAST GERMANY
Various recent reports indicate that the
East German Communist regime is about
to launch a strong campaign against oppo-
sition elements to be accompanied by a
tightening of security controls in East
Germany and Berlin. The presence in
East Berlin on 25-28 November of Sovi'
Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin, ostensi-
bly to conclude agreements concerning
legal aid and emigration, could have been
related to these developments.
11 s periph-
eral benefits, a ast ermans probably oto restrict
greatly the refugee flow to the West and control currency
smuggling.
U ric t s attacks on liberal elements at the central com-
mittee plenum of the Socialist Unity Party in October, had
convinced some people that a witch hunt within the party was
imminent. Such a purge would be in line with the new repres-
sive policies believed to have been established at the 34th
plenum on 27-29 November. Under these policies travel be-
tween East Germany and East and West Berlin is to be strictly
controlled. The purge of the editorial staff of one of Berlin's
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principal party papers on the eve.. of.,. the 34th plenum is a
further indication that a harder course is being adopted.
The paper, the Berliner Zeitun , had been vigorously at-
tacked by Ulbricht at the 33rd plenum.
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These steps could presage often-threatened
Communist actions to restrict Western access to West Berlin.
An imposition of such restrictions at this time might become
the basis for a Communist propaganda campaign--to coincide
with the upcoming NATO meeting--to have the German problem
discussed at a summit conference at some time in the future.
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4. ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT SUKARNO
The attempt on Indonesian President
Sukarno's life on 30 November may
have been carried out by any one of sev-
eral disgruntled elements, including the
Darul Islam--a fanatic Moslem group
fighting the government for the past eight
years--supporters of the disaffected re-
gional leaders, and some Javanese factions
who oppose Sukarno's political and economic
policies.
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Coming on the heels of Indonesia's setback
in the UN on'the West Irian issue, the attack will almost cer-
tainly widen tAe breach--perhaps irrevocably- -between Sukarno
and those who are, opposed to his policies. In any event, the
prospects for success of the current national reconstruction
conference, never bright, now appear almost nil.
The Communists can be expected to exploit
the incident to improve further their relations with the Presi-
dent. In this effort they will undoubtedly charge that the assas-
sination attempt was instigated by the Dutch, or by disaffected
Indonesian elements working at the behest of the "imperialists."
Finally, the Communists will play to the hilt the fact that most
of the victims of the attack,,were small children, women and
other innocent bystanders.
While extensive security precautions have
been taken inDjaka eta, the possibility of further violence can-
not be ruled out, either as a result of fresh attacks on Sukarno
and other government officials or retaliatory action. In this
connection, former Vice President Matta may be in some dan-
ger. Sukarno's partisans, particularly the Communists\twhc
consider Latta one of their chief antagonists, may take physi-
cal action against Latta on the ground :that he,,as a rallying
point for opposition to Sukarno's policies, may have been in-
volved.
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5. INDONESIA RETALIATES QUICKLY AGAINST DUTCF_
FOLLOWING UN VOTE
Indonesia was quick in taking discrimina-
tory measures against i..e. Data: . following
the UN's rejection of the West Irian resolu-
tion. A 24-hour general strike against all
Dutch firms is set for 2 December, and all
KLM flights into Indonesia have been banned.
The secretary general of the Indonesian For-
eign Ministry stated, following Friday's ad-
verse vote,' fiat the government had "prepared meas.,-fires and
steps," and fa: her retaliation probably is planned. The govern-
ment-sponsored West Irian Liberation Committee has recently
been enlarged by the addition of the ministers of justice, labor
affairs, veterans affairs, and manpower mobilization.
The most likely possibilities are additional
economic sanctions against Dutch firms, including tne__pr?ogres-
sive nationalization of Dutch enterprises which have a value of
$1.5 billion. Djakarta may also follow through oa`.ics threat to
sever diplomatic relations with the Netherlands ai1d~ i3 accept bloc
arms. Any of these courses would have the enthusiastic support
of the local Communists and would serve to identify President
Sukarno even more closely with their aims.
The possibility of limited military action in
West Irian cannot be ruled out. This would most probably take
the form of guerrilla activities carried out by police and army
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6. STRIKE TALKS FAIL. IN CEYLON
Ceylonese Prime Minister Bandaranaike
departed on 1 December for a Common-
wealth Parlianr.entary Conference in New
Delhi, leaving behind a critical strike
situation which has necessitated the call-
ing out of military forces. In attending
the conference, BandarariaiL a may either
be fleeing from a decision-.which he nor-
J mally should make or be misjudging;;the
importance' to Ceylon's stability and his own position of a strike
settlement.
Talks over ~e .weeL:L. end between the govern-
ment and Ceylonese labor leade~s apparently did not result in
a satisfactory solution of labor's demands for higher wages.
On 1 December, 19 unions were reported on strike-.:and 27
others were threatening to join them. On the advice of Jus-
tice Minister C. P. De Silva, acting head of government in
Bandaranaike's absence, Governor General Sir Oliver Goonetil-
leke called out the army and navy to distribute food, provide
transport, run the sewage, systetmu, and man fire and ambulance
services.
Bandaranaike, a proponent of compromise
and delay, when faced in the past with Tamil and Buddhist agi-
tation, has successfully avoided crises by temporary expedien-
cies. In the present case, however, he and his government
cannot long delay settlement of economic grievances which are
paralyzing Ceylon's capital and may spread to provincial workers.
Ceylon's economy is not sufficiently healthy to permit general
wage increases without producing other complications _possib l
equally difficult to solve.
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7. JAPAN INITIATES PLANS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama is
planning a $15,000,000 budget and the or-
ganization of a special economic co-opera-
tion bureau responsible for all aspects. of
Southeast Asian development beginning with the new fiscal
ycar in April, Ambassador MacArthur. 'reports from Tokyo.
Under this plan, $1,500,000 would be set aside for an Asian
Economic Development Project Consulting Center to draft over-
all plans, and the remainder would be reserved particularly
for developmental projects of small- and medium-sized indus-
tries.
In an effort to overcome the suspicions of
underdeveloped Asian countries, an additional $5,000,000 is
proposed for participation in the Colombo Plan, in the UN's
Economic Cooperation for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and
in other international projects for economic assistance. Mac-
Arthur comments that while these preliminary plans are cer-
tain to encounter stiff Finance Ministry opposition, it is very
likely that the Japanese budget in 1958 will reflect at least
some of these proposals.
Comment Despite a heritage of distrust in Southeast
Asian countries, Japan is becoming in-
creasingly attractive as a source of industrial materials and
a market for raw materials. Japan, on the other hand, is con-
centrating on this area to secure markets and sources of raw
materials. Apparently Japan is willing to undertake regional
development alone if outside assistance is not forthcoming.
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8. VIOLENCE INCREASING ON CYPRUS
Increased violence, including serious
sabotage, is approaching the tempo
prior to the truce last March, accord-
ing to British Acting Governor Sinclair,
who claims that he is only withholding countermeasures
"of the severest nature" in order to salvage something
from current international initiatives. It is the considered
belief of American and British officials on Cyprus that trouble
will continue to grow "in snowball fashion," jeopardizing in-
definitely any possible compromise, unless the Greek govern-
ment exerts its influence to curb the Greek Cypriot leaders.
Recent statements by Greek Cypriot
leaders call for a "fight to the end" if the forthcoming UN
debate on Cyprus fails to satisfy Greek Cypriot claims and
have warned of "total war" against the British if the United
Nations fails to resolve the Cyprus problem. EOKA leader
Grivas has called on all Greeks to unite behind Archbishop
Makarios. Unless the UN General Assembly passes a reso-
lution acceptable to the Greek Cypriots, a resumption of open
warfare between EOKA and the British security forces will
probably follow the UN debate now scheduled for early Decem-
ber.
Meanwhile, the formation of a "Turkish
Defense Organization in Cyprus" has been announced to defend
the interests of the Turkish minority. The Turks apparently
intend to broaden their measures to counter Greek violence.
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9. NEW ZEALAND ELECTIONS
The Labor party's victory by a narrow
margin in New Zealand's general elec-
tions apparently :resulted primarily from
its effective exploition of danger signals
in the national economy and promises of
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more lenient welfare and tax policies. Although New Zealand,
is enjoying general prosperity, the incumbent National party
was heavily criticized for rising prices, the credit squeeze,
difficulties in marketing agricultural exports, and the drain
on exchange reserves caused by heavy private imports.
In the field of foreign policy, the National
and Labor parties have pursued a bipartisan course on most
major aspects. Both have stood for close cooperation with
the United States on defense matters. Labor, however, ad-
vocates recognition of Communist China and its admission to
the United Nations. In this it has demonstrated its closer af-
finity to the UK and can be expected to promote closer ties
with Britain than the National administration.. The Labor party
also advocates a suspension of nuclear weapons tests and a de-
emphasis of the military aspects of SEATO.
The Labor government is likely to be dom-
inated by the party's doctrinaire socialist leader, the active,
75-year-old Walter Nash, who will probably be external af-
fairs or finance minister as well as prime minister.
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