CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003300470001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 26, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

Z/ TOP SECRET f//Z!
r
26 October 1957
I
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
D =CLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
Pd_ s rE.
AUTH': tir 70-E
DATE/ i flEVIE VER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOS
review(s)
completed.
DIA review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET P
e 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP7
Copy No. 138
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CONTENTS
C) e 1. MARSHAL ZHUKOV REITERATES USSR"S READINESS TO
ACT IF TURKEY INVADES SYRIA
2. SAUDI-TURKISH TALKS
3. EGYPTIAN REINFORCEMENT OF SINAI REPORTED
n- 0 4. THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
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6. NORTH SUMATRAN SITUATION POTENTIALLY
EXPLOSIVE
oW_ 7. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET TRADE TALKS COMMENCING IN
BELGRADE
ok 8. POLISH PARTY CONGRESS POSTPONED
9. USSR APPLIES ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO FINLAND
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10. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
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No 13. NORSTAD STATEMENTS IMPROVE OUTLOOK FOR NATO
MINISTERIAL MEETING
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1. MARSHAL ZHUKOV REITERATES USSR'S READINESS TO
ACT IF TURKEY INVADES SYRIA
Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov declared
in a speech in Tirana on 24 October: "We
are ready to strike with determination at
any military adventures near our southern
borders. In regard to this we have reso-
lutely warned the Turkish government. " He added that the
USSR "has made appropriate and authoritative declarations
that if war is declared on Syria, the Soviet Union will not re-
main with its hands folded, "
Zhukov's allusion to "appropriate and au-
thoritative declarations" apparently refers to Gromyko's 16
October offer of Soviet forces to take part in UN action against
Turkey should that country invade.Syria, and a similar declara-
tion by TASS on 18 October.
Zhukov told another Albanian audience,on 21
October, "The imperialists are trying to unleash another war
but, if necessary, we can strike an even stronger blow and
ac-
cording to an even wider plan. "
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The talks between King Saud and Turkish
Minister of State Zorlu appear to have
established cordial contact between the
two governments. Saud probably now
feels somewhat closer to his objective
of parrying intervention in Syria. How-
ever, the Turkish assurance, expressed
in the joint Saudi-Turkish communique,
that Ankara harbors "a firm desire to
safeguard the independence, territorial
security, and national sovereignty of Syria, " could be read
as a justification of Turkish intervention to keep Syria out
of the status of a dependent Soviet satellite.
King Saud told Ambassador Wadsworth
on 25 October that he believed the United States should leave
to Turkey the task of exposing the Soviet role in Syria. He
suggested Ankara could say it has massed troops on the
frontier for this "very cogent" reason.
2. SAUDI-TURKISH TALKS
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3. EGYPTIAN REINFORCEMENT OF SINAI REPORTED
Egyptian forces in unspecified numbers, but
described as "large, " are reported to have
moved into the Sinai area approximately one
week o
sev-
eral units of armor, artillery, y pre-
viously stationed in the Suez Canal zone were
not observed during a reconnaissance of the
area by the attache on 19 October. These units have not been
noted in other areas of Egypt, and it seems unlikely that they
have gone to Syria.
Last spring Egypt moved about 8, 450 men
into the .Sinai Peninsula where they were deployed defensively
near key communication- centers, and also served to control
the population. Deployment and supply of a larger force in
Sinai now is possible as a result of the virtual completion of
major repairs to the roads, most of which were destroyed by
the Israelis during the 1956 hostilities. Repair of the coastal
and central routes restores highway access to the Egyptian-
Israeli border and eliminates the buffer zone that existed while
the roads were in disrepair. Egypt had about 25,000, troops in
Sinai at the time of the Israeli attack in late October 1956.
Reintroduction of major Egyptian forces into
Sinai would be facilitated by international preoccupation with de-
velopments in Syria. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has indicated
in connection with other Arab-Israeli problems that his govern-
ment does not wish to complicate further the present situation.
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4e THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
The military junta which took over in
Guatemala early on 24 October may not
be able to retain power long. Strikes
and demonstrations by followers of
presidential aspirant Ydigoras Fuentes
continue, and the junta, which seeks to
appear politically neutral, is weakened
by factionalism in the army. Violence
may ensue
The junta, supported by many anti-
Ydi oras officers
s angered by what it interprete as an u i-
matum from Ydigoras after both sides had tentatively
agreed on a political compromise proposed by congres-
sional mediators. Guillermo Flores Avendano, consti-
tutional successor to ousted interim president Gonzalez,
was to be named interim president until new elections
could be held on 24 November.
Ydigoras seems to feel that things are
going his way and, that by continued pressure he can become
president. He would probably win any new elections, but
apparently prefers to have the 20 October votes recounted
to show that he has already been elected. He feels confident
that important army leaders are on his side, and his supporters
are demanding the resignation of Colonel Oscar Mendoza, presi-
dent of the junta, whom they regard as a remnant of the ousted
regime o
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EXPLOSIVE
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A potentially explosive situation has de-
veloped in North Sumatra as the result
of recent shake-ups in the local army
command. The tension has its origins
in the arrest of several pro-Communist
officers on 28 September and the disarming
of several hundred Communist-led civil-
ians, on orders of Lt. Col. Gintings, the
government's commander in North.Sumatra. The pro-Com-
munists, in an effort to recoup their lost influence, report-
edly sent troops on 19 October to kidnap Gintings, who fled.
The pro-Communists subsequently relieved several of Gint-
ings' staff officers, and replaced them with officers of their'
own choosing.
Army Chief of Staff Nasution has compli-
cated the situation by announcing that Gintings, despite his
flight, remains in command of the area. Nasution, has, how-
ever, confirmed pro-Communist officers of Javanese origin
as replacements for the deposed subordinates on Gintings'
staff. The officers who were removed are believed to have
sympathized with the Sumatran autonomy movement.
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Nasution, apparently to bolster his own
position and that of the central government in the last Su-
matran area loyal to Djakarta, dispatched several hundred
Javanese troops to the.Medan area who arrived on 22 Octo-
ber.
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7. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET TRADE TALKS COMMENCING IN
BELGRADE
Soviet representatives left Moscow for
Belgrade on 25 October to open negotia-
tions for a 1958 trade agreement. For
political reasons the USSR probably will
seek to increase trade above the $110,000,
000 level scheduled for 1957. Despite a Yugoslav denial, re-
ports from Belgrade hold that the new Soviet ambassador--as
a prelude to the trade talks--informed the Yugoslavs that the
USSR is prepared to compensate for any suspension or reduc-
tion of US economic.and..military aid as a result of Belgrade's
recognition; of East Germany.
The Yugoslavs have in the past attempted
to influence US aid policies by alluding to increased assistance
from the East. Belgrade does not wish, however, to become
entirely dependent on bloc economic assistance. The USSR
temporarily postponed a $250,000,000 development credit be-
cause of political differences between Moscow and Belgrade
which followed the Hungarian revolt last year.
The Yugoslavs and the East Germans have
recently agreed upon a total trade exchange of $49,800,000 for
1958, an approximate $30,000,000 increase over 1957. Al-
though it is unlikely that trade will reach this high level, the
agreement was concluded in part to assure Yugoslavia that
the bloc was ready to take up any slack that might develop in
Yugoslav trade with the West as a result of Belgrade's reco ni-
tion of East Germany.
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8. POLISH PARTY CONGRESS POSTPONED
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and unify the party. He indicated that the delay resulted pri-
marily from continuing factionalism and apathy which had made
it impossible for the party to establish full control of the country.
Gomulka indicated that as a remedy the party
membership should perhaps be cut in half, and defined three
groups which must be removed. Without specific reference to
Stalinists, he said "dogmatists" furnished a breeding ground
which had favored the growth of extreme liberalists Both of
these groups must be removed, he said, because they sabotage
the decisions of party authorities. A third group "of considera-
ble size" to be eliminated comprises those members who joined
only in self-interest and are indifferent to communism.
Gomulka confirmed the "broad democratic
liberties" and !'national and individual freedoms" granted since
his rise to power, promising no return to the restraints of the
previous period. He specifically assured the press of its con-
tinued privilege of criticism as long as it was constructive. He
warned, however, that the party would tolerate neither criticism
aimed against socialism nor expression of anti-Soviet attitudes.
Gomulka's frank public admissions may gain
him precisely the active popular support he needs. His statements
may be considered by the non-Communist Polish populAtion as a
promise to get rid of the party hacks they regard as symbols of
,the evil of .communism.. Inside the party, this speech may serve
as a shock treatment,, stimulating more active efforts on behalf
of the regime's policies, particularly those designed to i rove
the sagging economy.
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Gomulka's statement before the Polish party
central committee on 24 October that the
party congress he had expected to call in De-
cember must be postponed indefinitely indi-
cates that he has not been able to stabilize
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9. USSR APPLIES ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO FINLAND
The USSR has postponed until further
notice commercial talks with Finland
scheduled to begin in Helsinki on 28 Octo-
ber. The purpose of Soviet-- Finnish nego-
tiations is to draw up the 1958 trade agree-
ment, which will constitute about 15 percent of Finland's total
trade, Any delay in its implementation would be a severe blow
to the country's unstable economy.
The postponement is regarded by the Finns
as a Soviet reaction to the 23 October announcement that So-
cial Democratic chairman Vaino Tanner had accepted a bid to
form a government to replace Premier Sukselainen's minority
government which resigned last week. Tannery a long-standing
target of Soviet attacks, was minister of foreign affairs during
the 1939-40 war against the USSR and, on Soviet insistence,
was tried by the Finnish government after World War II as a
"war responsible. " Prior to the April :Social Democratic con-
gress, Soviet Ambassador to Finland Lebedev had warned of
a less "friendly and frank" policy toward Finland should Tanner
be chosen party chairman. Moscow Radio on 24 October called
Tanner a "war criminal" seeking to achieve power in Finland.
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10. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
Although Popular Republican leaders
have agreed to participate in a Mollet
government, the decision was taken
by a narrow majority and they may not
be able to control their backbenchers
in the investiture vote expected on 28
October. Many are fearful of alienat-
ing the Independents, who will not an-
nounce their position until after_:Mol-.,
let's investiture speech.
Independent sources estimate that from
40 to 66 of the 98 Independent deputies will vote against
the Socialist leader. Mollet's reported decision to base
his economic policy on the findings of government experts
rather than on the Socialist program, however, may mol -
lify conservative fears and help Independent leaders to
prevail on their more hostile deputies to abstain.
In addition to his 100 Socialists, Mollet
has reportedly lined up about 65 sure votes from the center
and right, not counting either the Independents or the Popular
Republicans. In view of scattered center opposition, he will
need some Independent support to avoid dependence on the
Communists. A last-minute decision by the Communists to
back him, as they did in January 1956, would apparently
make little difference in his future prospects, however,
since Popular Republican leader Robert Schuman is believed
to have demanded that Mollet ignore Communist support on
certain programs as part of the price for his party's sup-
port.
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Prospects for a productive NATO ministe-
rial meeting in December were improved
by the favorable initial reaction to General
Norstad's discussion on defense planning
with the North Atlantic Council on 22 October. The questions
asked Norstad reflected the two great concerns of the Western
European countries--the balance between conventional and
modern weapons and forces, and the possession of nuclear weap-
ons by all NATO members.
General gratification was expressed over a
recent NATO military study which related the Soviet ICBM an-
nouncement to the necessity for a NATO capability to deal with
"less-than-ultimate situations" by "less- than-ultimate means. "
This acceptance of the possibility of limited war marks a sig-
nificant change in NATO planning assumptions.
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11 NORSTAD STATEMENTS IMPROVE OUTLOOK FOR NATO
MINISTERIAL MEETING
Norstad stated that adequate shield forces
are, according to preliminary cost estimates, now considered
within country capabilities. He expressed the personal opinion
that the atomic weapons requirement might be met by a NATO
stockpile arrangement. This approach appeared to have practi-
cal appeal to the council representatives. Since a major part of
December ministerial meetings are devoted to defense matters,
a new and acceptable strategic concept for NATO may figure
prominently in the discussions.
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