CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003000170001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

20v21'f '010"W U79
-01
12 March 1957
Copy No. 131
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1)CCUMENT NO
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AUTH: HR 70
i7AFE- `77 4REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
v'04wvWAWA& e 2 0 0 2 / 11 / 19: C I A - R D P 7 wo, ~ XOX04
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CONTENTS
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1~.4. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
5. SARIT MOVING TO CONSOLIDATE POSITION IN THAILAND
PAI
;POLES FEAR NEW SOVIET :PRESSURES
(page 9).
8. SOUTH VIETNAM ANTICIPATES ACCELERATION OF VIET
MINH TERRORISM
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)9, OVERSEAS CHINESE-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS
(page 12).
POSALS FOR ASIA
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r.
1
U 10. JAPANESE REACTION TO F.AIRLESS COMMITTEE PRO-
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4.. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
The reported decision of the Ali cabinet
to resign on 13 March may have been pre-
cipitated by South Sumatra's break with
Djakarta. The cabinet's resignation would
immediately follow the scheduled announce-
ment on 1.2 March of President Sukarno's
latest version of his "nation-saving concept."
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Meanwhile, tension in East Indonesia is in-
creasing between the territorial commander, Lt. Col. Samual,
and the commander of a special army unit located in Samual's
territory. The commander of this unit, made up principally
of Javanese troops, is directly responsible to Djakarta. This
commander has refused to recognize Samual's 2 March coup
in the area, and the possibility exists that a countercoup will
be attempted. F_ I
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5. SARIT MOVING TO CONSOLIDATE POSITION
IN THAILAND
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General Sarit, presently the temporary
and police forces, appears to be mak-
commander in chief of all Thai military
ing a strong effort to establish himself
as the strong man of Thailand. Although he has repeatedly
expressed his loyalty to Premier Phibun,
he now has let it be known that
he would back another man for the premiership unless he
was satisfied by Phibun on a number of demands. Chief
among these is a desire to assume permanent command of
the armed forces, inclusion of more of his supporters in the
new cabinet, and the complete elimination of police director
general Phao's faction from public positions.
Phibun probably hopes to work out a
new balance between the Phao and Sarit factions, in order
to maintain his own position. For the moment, however,
he appears to be acceding to Sarit's demands, and is re-
ported to have stated that he would agree to Phao's removal.
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6. POLES FEAR NEW SOVIET PRESSURES
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Polish foreign minister Rapaeki`s re-
cent visit to Moscow, ostensibly to sign
a treaty concerning the Baltic Sea fron-
tier, has aroused popular fears of re-
newed Soviet pressures on Poland. Gen-
eral opinion in Warsaw is that the actual
purpose of his trip is a "more important
and dangerous" matter,
The Soviet ambassador to Poland has
been in Moscow for more than a month, possibly to partici-
pate in the preparation of a. n.ew Polish policy,
Comment While so far Gomul.ka?s concessions to the
pro-Soviet faction of his party are in ac-
cord with his own views and his efforts to restore party unity,
he would probably resist further Soviet demands, particularly
any interference in Polish economic affairs.
12 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
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8. SOUTH VIETNAM ANTICIPATES ACCELERATION OF
VIE T MINH TERRORISM
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The South Vietnamese government has
issued an alert against possible Viet Minh
sabotage in the Saigon area, the American
army attache reports, According to a
4 March memorandum from chief of staff
General Ty, the government :has been informed that the Viet
Minh is considering a plan to destroy Saigon's electric power
plant to facilitate other acts of sabotage and uprisings in the
ensuing darkness. Government agencies were requested to
take immediate steps to provide the facilities for generating
emergency electrical power. F77 I
Comment The assassination attempt against Presi-
dent Diem last month, a suspected coup
plot in the armed forces, and the recent increase in dissident
activities have raised fears in Saigon that an organized terror-
ist campaign by the Viet Minh aimed at overthrowing the Diem
government is developing.
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9. OVERSEAS CHINESE-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS
Saigon's last-minute extension by one
month of the deadline for implementing
a decree requiring all Chinese born in
Vietnam to accept Vietnamese citizen-
ship appears to have only temporarily averted a serious
crisis in South Vietnamese-Chinese Nationalist relations.
Noncompliance with the nationality requirement, announced
last August, has become a rallying point for passive resist=
ance by the Overseas Chinese to various government decrees
aimed at subordinating their economic and political independ-
ence to the Saigon government. Taipei, fearful that its failure
to intervene would only benefit Peiping, has vigorously inter-
ceded on behalf of the Overseas Chinese in a vain effort to
work out a compromise solution with Diem.
Diem, however, has shown no disposition
to back down on his goal of "Vietnamization" of the local
Chinese. Unless some "face-saving" solution is achieved
before the new deadline of 8 April, rising agitation among
the nearly 1,000,000 Chinese in South Vietnam could lead to
communal violence.
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10, JAPANESE REACTION TO FAIRLESS COMMITTEE
PROPOSALS FOR ASIA
Japanese press and trade circles are
skeptical of the Fairless Committee pro-
posals for an Asian common market, the
American embassy in Tokyo reports.
The Asian common market proposal is
felt to be premature because of Southeast Asia`s lack of
economic capacity and its political instability. Furthermore,
there is some fear that regionalization of trade through var-
ious common markets would create economic blocs which
would be detrimental to world and Japanese trade.
The Japanese favor co-ordination of
economic aid programs, interpreting this to mean US-
Japanese co-operation in Southeast Asian development.
They cite the "long history of past Japanese failures" to
evoke American interest in such a scheme, however, as
evidence that no concrete developments are likely.
Comment The Japanese are giving priority to re-
establishing their economic position in
Southeast Asia but are concerned lest an aggressive approach
on their part be interpreted in Southeast Asia, as an effort at
economic domination.
The Japanese feel that the European Com-
mon Market will inevitably work to their disadvantage, and
apparently have decided to oppose any restrictive pects
which develop.
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