CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 8, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

lei , 200q"j2W.9Vjj9W79 A
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the espio-
nage laws, U. S. Code title 18, Sections 793, 794,and 798,
the transmission or the revelation of the contents of which
in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information. The security of this document must be main-
tained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be
gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
00 k,
TOP SECRET j
8 Jy1956
S.C No. 02541/56
Copy No. 10 j
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
I 1 DECLASSIFIED
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
t)ATE ! 1n REVIEWER: 37?.044
AUTH R 7
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02600340001-5
 Approved For Rel a 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TOO AO02600340001-5
Cononents and interpretations in this publication
are based on all sources, including COMINT, and
represent the immediate views of the Office of
Current Intelligence. The Office of Research
and Reports and the Office of Scientific Intel-
ligence contribute or are consulted on subjects
within their spheres of responsibility.
The classification of a convnent is noted sepa-
rately only when it is higher than that of the
report commented on.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0026003 0001-
 Approved For Re. else 2000/08 P79T0U75A002600340001-5
25X1A
CONTENTS
25X611
1. ANTILEFTISTS FORCE RESIGNATION OF SYRIAN CHIEF
OF STAFF (page 3).
25X1A 25X1A
2.. SOVIET AID AGREEMENT WITH CAMBODIA
(page 4).
3. FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN ADJUSTING TO
DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN (page 5). 25X1 A
4,.
5. NORWEGIAN MINISTERS CONCERNED BY IMPACT ON
SCANDINAVIA OF NEW SOVIET LINE - (page 7).
25X1A
6. YUGOSLAVS DISCLAIM ANY IMMEDIATE INTENTION TO
RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY (page 8). 25X1A
7. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES GERMAN REUNIFICATION
WITH WEST GERMAN SOCIALISTS (page 9).
25X1A
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(page 10)
25X1A
8 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5
 Approved For Release 2000/0 79T0Q 5A002600340001-5
25X1A
1. ANTILEFTISTS.FORCE RESIGNATION OF SYRIAN CHIEF
OF STAFF
25X1A
The resignation on 7 July of General
Shawqat Shuqayr, Syrian chief of staff,
appears to be the initial result of a move
by rightist army and civilian elements to
eliminate leftist influence in the Syrian
army. Shugayr's resignation was forced
by a group of antileftist senior officers,
the minister of defense, and apparently
a faction split off from the "little RCC"
junior officer group. The leaders of the
action, Brigadier General Tawfiq Nizam
al-Din, Shugayr's deputy, and Colonel Omar
-Kabbani, a high staff officer, have become chief and deputy
chief of staff respectively. Brigadier General Aziz Abd al-Karim,
chief of the Syrian air force, is reported to have been appointed
assistant chief of staff.
Although the antileftist group has assumed at
least temporary control in an action which has been bloodless up
to now, its strength and staying power have not yet been deter--
mined. The group may not continue to retain the support of the
"little RCC" faction led by Colonel Nufouri, Syrian G-1. More-
over, the antileftists have not yet moved against Colonel Sarraj,
Syrian G-2 and top leader of the "little RCC,' but they plan to do
so. The antileftist action may precipitate a countermove by army
supporters of the Communist Party and the leftist Arab. Socialist
Resurrection Party (ASRP) before the rightists can consolidate
their position. Moreover, Egypt, which has backed the ASRP and
Shuqayr, and which probably suspects an Iraqi-Turkish maneuver,
may directly encourage an. ASRP- led countermove
Shuqayr, chief of staff since July' 1953, had
little personal following and remained in power principally be-
cause of his professional ability and political agility. Since
February 1954, he has associated with and supported the ASRP
and has been marked as a t r et for removal by both rightists
and "little RCC" elements.
8 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5
 Approved For ReJse 2000/' DP79T00, 5A002600340001-5
25X1A
2. SOVIET AID AGREEMENT WITH CAMBODIA
Comment .on:
25X1A
The Soviet Union's pledge of economic
and.technical assistance to Cambodia
highlights the increasing success of the
Sino-Soviet bloc in exploiting Cambodia's
neutralism and its desire for economic
expansion. The agreement follows closely the conclusion of
negotiations for a $229400,000 Communist Chinese economic
aid program in Cambodia.
The USSR, according to a joint commu-
niqud, has expressed its readiness to send technicians to
train Cambodian personnel, to provide industrial equipment,
and, as a gift, to build and equip a hospital in Phnom Penh.
Prince Sihanouk, leader of the Cambodian delegation, is said
to be fully satisfied with the results of the Moscow talks--
suggesting that the aid will be on favorable long-range terms
and will dovetail with other Cambodian foreign aid arrange-
ments
Although Sihanouk's concept of neutralism
in playing both sides-to advance his country's economic devel-
opment has occasioned some criticism in Cambodia, his polit-
ical influence has thus far effectively overcome such objections.
The prospect of increased Soviet and Chinese ties with Cam-
bodia may prove disturbing to India, in view of Nehru's hopes
to expand his own influence there.
25X1A
8 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5
 Approved For ReIse 2 00,,,,7-5AO02600340001-5
25X1A
3. FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN ADJUSTING TO
DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN
25X1A
The American embassy in Paris is in-
clined to believe that the French Com-
munist Party leadership is successfully
orienting the party in .the new situation
rouglit'abOUt by de-Stalinization. Maurice Thorez is said
to "continue to believe" that the best chance for the future
success of the party lies in close, although better-disguised,
ties with .Moscow.
Most reliable observers appear to agree
that major changes in party leadership in the near future are
probably unlikely. Thorez has re-established party disci-
pline among the rank and file.
Comment The Stalin issue does not seem to have
weakened the Communist party in France.
In a .1 July assembly by-election the Communists ran second
and maintained the same percentage of votes as in the national
elections in January. On 6 July the party's central committee
unanimously approved the 30 June resolution of the Soviet cen-
tral committee which "shows how the cult of the personality of
- Stalin has been surmounted in the USSR:'
8 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02600340001-5
 25X6
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02600340001-5
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02600340001-5
 Approved For Reese 2000/0 - DP79TO0 5A002600340001-5
25X1A
5. NORWEGIAN MINISTERS CONCERNED BY IMPACT ON
SCANDINAVIA OF NEW SOVIET LINE
25X1A
On 4 July, Norway proposed that a NATO
ministerial meeting be held in September to discuss "prima-
rily defense problems."
Comment Both the Norwegian and Danish governments
are certain to face increased parliamentary
pressure for a general reduction in defense spending when the
parliaments reconvene this fall. It appears likely that Denmark
will reduce its defense expenditures by some five percent,. and
would follow Norway's lead if Oslo sought a larger reduction.
8 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
25X1A
25X6
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5
 Approved For Rese ~~~~WOW5AO02600340001-5
25X1A
6. YUGOSLAVS DISCLAIM ANY IMMEDIATE INTENTION
TO RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY
25X1A
Yugoslav foreign secretary Popovic on 25X6
5 July told
that his government a no im-
mediate intention of recognizing East 25X6
ermany in view of the attitude of Yugoslavia's "Western
friends." He said he looked forward to the day when circum-
stances would permit his government to do so.
Comment
This is the frankest statement of Yugoslav
intentions toward East Germany since
Tito's Moscow visit, during which he formally acknowledged
the existence of two "sovereign" German states.
Yugoslavia is undoubtedly fearful that to
extend diplomatic recognition to East Germany now would
seriously jeopardize West German ratification of the favor-
able financial settlement recently concluded with Bonn. Also,
Belgrade is probably concerned that the move would be re-
garded by the West as proof that Yugoslavia had in fact solidly
aligned itself with the Soviet bloc.
8 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5
 Approved For ReI jse 2000/ DP79T009 5A002600340001-5
25X1A
25X1 C
7r SOVIET AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES GERMAN REUNIFICATION
WITH WEST GERMAN SOCIALISTS
25X1A
Comment
sion in June with the leaders' of the op l.
position Social Democratic Party (SPD),
Soviet ambassador Zorin reportedly had
.a long but largely inconclusive discus-
The USSR has been maintaining publicly
that unification is strictly a matter for
discussion between the two German states. Except for a few
left-wingers, the Social Democrats oppose such discussions.
The other views attributed to Zorin seem to echo the SPD's own
line. Since Moscow has never hinted that any of the present
East German leaders might be dropped, it appears that if Zorin
did so, he was attempting to convince the SPD that some prog-
ress toward unification might be made, and thus increase their
criticism of the Bonn government.
8 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5
 Approved For Re%pe 2000/ DP79T0 9Q 75A002600340001-5
25X1A THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 8 July)
25X611
25X6
Refuting reports from Arab capitals of
Israeli troops massing on the Jordanian border, the American
embassy in Tel Aviv reported that, while routine maneuvers were
in progress., there was no unusual disposition of Israeli forces on the
borders as of 7 July, and that usual weekend leaves were granted
army personnel. While the borders could be reinforced in a matter
of hours under -Israel's system of mobilization,, the embassy con-
siders that troops are not deployed in a manner to justifv.Jordan's
charges.
Awareness that Jordan's inadequately
supplied forces could not cope with a determined Israeli attack may
have induced Hussain to publicize Israel's threat in the hope of fore-
stalling any Israeli action. A successful Israeli blow against Jordan
could bring a disastrous popular reaction against both the king and
his young chief. of staff.
Prolongation of the alert, despite reassurances
that Israeli troops were not massed, may also reflect uneasiness in
8 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5
 Approved For Re ,se 2000/ DP79T00WA002600340001-5
25X1A
Jordan over the consequences of current political maneuvering in
Syria. Jordan's principal immediate political question appeared
.temporarily settled with the king's proclamation of a date (21 Octo-
ber) for election of a new lower house of the legislature. There
had been reports from Jordan that the king might attempt to use
the "crisis" with Israel to postpone elections and rule by decree.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
An Israeli Foreign Ministry official has ex-
pressed the view that allegations of Israeli troop concentrations
may have been intended to disguise the reason for movement of
Iraqi troops to the Jordan border, which he considered to be one
phase of an effort to offset the extension of Egyptian influence in
Jordan.
bassies in view of Arab charges of Israeli troop concentrations.
vers in the northern. area.on. 9 and.1Q July:' '- The. attache. believes
that the belated invitation may be intended to reassure foreign em-
Israeli maneuvers of unknown size are being
held in the area of the Northern Command, which borders on Syria
and Jordan, according to the American army attache in Tel Aviv.
A "substantial" northward movement of troops and materiel has
taken place- -including possibly a battalion of tanks and requisi-
tioned civilian vehicles. These maneuvers are further confirmed
by an invitation to foreign military attaches to view "brigade maneu-
8 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
25X1A
25X611
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5