CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002300550001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 19, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
19 January 1956
SC No. 00148/56
Copy No. 103
NO C14AW-AE IN CLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 0
NExT REVIEW DATE: _
AUTH: HR 70??q~
DATE:.~..1._.i"~"''REVIEWER; ai.T- 9384
t
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the espio-
nage laws, U. S. Code title 18, Sections 793, 794,and 798,
the transmission or the revelation of the contents of which
in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information. The security of this document must be main-
tained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be
gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
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Comments and interpretations in this publication are
based on all sources, including COMINT, and repre-
sent the immediate views of the Office of Current In-
telligence. The classification of a comment is noted
separately only when it is higher than that of the re-
port commented on.
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CONTENTS
1. USSR SUGGESTS GREAT--POWER GUARANTEE OF
IRAN'S NEUTRALITY (page 3).
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2. MOSCOW OFFERS AID IN CAMPAIGN TO INFLUENCE
TURKS _ (page 4).
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3. POPULAR FRONT FORMED FOR GREEK ELECTIONS
(page 5).
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4. THE DEEPENING FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
(page 6)
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5. BRITISH PLANNING TO REDUCE MILITARY FORCES
IN HONG KONG (page 7)
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(page 8)
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1. USSR SUGGESTS GREAT-POWER GUARANTEE OF
IRAN'S NEUTRALITY
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Foreign Minister Molotov told the
Iranian ambassador on 13 January
that if :Iran is not satisfied with the
assurances of nonaggression in the
Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1927, the treaty could be re-
placed by a four-power guarantee of Iranian neutrality.
According to the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, who
reported the conversation to the American embassy in
Tehran, Molotov stated that the. USSR would be happy to
participate in such a guarantee if Iran would withdraw from
the Baghdad pact.
The Shah is concerned over the possi-
bility that the USSR may propagandize the offer which, he
believed, would hearten the neutralists, spread unrest
among the population, and undermine the Iranian govern-
ment. Iran's decision to join the pact was made largely
on the basis of Iran's security, and the man in the street
would say in the light of the Soviet offer, "What more do
you want?" The Shah suggested immediate strong counter-
action from the West, and the foreign minister stated that
US adherence to the Baghdad pact and announcement of
economic assistance to Iran would be "most helpful.'
Comment The USSR on several occasions since
August has held out the possibility of
great-power guarantees of neutrality to several Middle
East states, both singly and collectively. Moscow prob-
ably believes that the offer of guaranteed neutrality as an
alternative to membership in the Baghdad pact will ulti-
mately cause Iran to question the wisdom of maintaining
its close ties with the West.
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2. MOSCOW OFFERS AID IN CAMPAIGN TO INFLUENCE
TURKS
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On the occasion of the presentation of
credentials by the Turkish ambassador
in Moscow, President Voroshilov went
out of his way to emphasize that since
Turkey and the USSR were neighboring
states, they must above all lay the foun-
dations for improved relations, accord-
ing to the American embassy in Moscow.
Voroshilov repeated Khrushchev's remarks to the Supreme
Soviet that blame for the deterioration of relations was not
all -on one side.
Turkish president Bayar, in a long pre-
sentation of Turkish affairs to Admiral Fechteler on 16 Jan-
uary, said that the USSR has approached the Turks both in
Moscow and Ankara with offers of as much as they need in
goods and loans to help them out of their present financial
and economic straits "without any strings attached:"
Bayar also told Fechteler that the USSR
is at the same time distributing leaflets attacking the poli-
cies of the Turkish government and calling on the people to
bring about a change. Boyar said the leaflets had been smug-
gled into Turkey and were being distributed in principal
Turkish cities where there are large numbers of "marginal
workers.'
Comment These Soviet moves are part of Moscow's
intensified campaign to influence the Turks.
Despite Turkey's past rejection of Soviet approaches, the
USSR probably will make it a prime target in the forthcoming
months with the aim of weakening the keystone of Western
defense planning in the area.
The Turks have long regarded the USSR with
deep distrust and suspicion. They probably will exploit friendly
Soviet overtures in their effort to speed an American loan, but
the present Turkish government will move reluctantly and cau-
tiously toward any acceptance of Soviet aid.
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3. POPULAR FRONT FORMED FOR GREEK ELECTIONS
Comment on:
The formation on 18 January of a
Popular Front for the Greek elec-
tions gives a Communist-front party
its first strong voice in Greek politics
for several years. The Front may offer a serious chal-
lenge to Prime Minister Karamanlis' National Radical
Union in next month's elections.
The Popular Front is made up of the
Communist-front EDA and several center parties includ-
ing Papandreou's Liberal Party and Venizelos' Liberal
Democratic Union. Under the agreement forming the
coalition, EDA, which now has no representation in par-
liament, would almost certainly gain 20 seats out of 300
in the new parliament if the Popular Front should win.
The primary objective of the Front, however, is said to
be the dissolution of the new parliament and a call for new
elections under a changed electoral system.
Karamanlis recently expressed serious
concern over the growing polarization of Greek politics,
which he recognizes as dangerous to the Greek national
interest. Formation of a Popular Front government might
immediately result in a move by the ultraconservative se-
cret military society IDEA to overthrow the Front and es-
tablish a rightist military dictatorship.
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4. THE DEEPENING FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
The leaders of the Faure- Pinay
forces agree a
coalition government wi a Re-
publican Front would result in
"do-nothing policies" and would be doomed to failure,
according to the American embassy in Paris. The
Faure-Pinay parties, which include the Popular Re-
publicans, would probably vote against Mendes-France,
but they would be expected to abstain on the investiture
of a Socialist-led government,
25X6
The embassy believes the influence
of the Poujade movement has not reached maximum
strength, and warns that its fascist tendencies may in-
crease as the group's power grows.
Comment The secretary general of the assem-
bly foresees a two-week crisis while
attempts are being made to form a new government. The
Popular Republicans are on record as opposing a govern-
ment which fails to repudiate Communist support, and
leaders of the other elements of the outgoing coalition are
maintaining their public position that a minority govern-
ment is out of the question. The Socialists., however, are
now publicly committed to accept Communist parliamentary
support.
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5. BRITISH PLANNING TO REDUCE MILITARY FORCES
IN HONG KONG
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The British plan to reduce their
15,000-man military force in Hong
Kong to approximately one third of
a division, the number needed to
maintain internal security only,
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The plan
25X1 X calls for one artillery regiment to depart in February 25X1 X
and one battalion probably in August, One major unit
will probably leave every six months thereafter.
Comment The reported plan is probably intended
to alleviate troop deficiencies else-
where, especially in the Strategic Reserve stationed in
the United Kingdom. The British perennially contend with
military manpower shortages arising from their manifold
commitments,
The British withdrawals are not expected
to affect the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward Hong
Kong. Their present aim is to divide the United Kingdom and
the United States on Far Eastern policies and to maintain
their "peaceful" posture,. 25X1A
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 18 January)
An Israeli spokesman announced on
17 January that an Israeli patrol was fired on near the Gaza
strip but suffered no casualties. The American army attache
in Tel Aviv states that daily. skirmishes along the Egyptian
border are now routine, but are carefully recorded by Israel.
25X1A
India's chief UN delegate, V. K. Krishna
Menon, visited Cairo on 17 and 18 January, probably hoping
to play a moderating role in discussions regarding the Baghdad
pact and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Both Prime Minister Nehru
and Menon may feel that Menon's role in handling international
problems may enable him to help lessen tension i
East at this time.
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