CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002100160001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET
19 July 1955
Copy Noa
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
$Q REVIEWER:
[)ATE:.///
AUTH: HR 70-2
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I ; DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
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SUMMARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Comment on Sukarno''3 departure for Mecca (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. pressure expected in Morocco (page 3).
EASTERN EUROPE
3. Hungary may cite "NATO danger" as pretext for Soviet troop
reinforcements (page 4).
5. Comment on Bulganin's opening statement at Geneva (page 6).
* *
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Comment on Sukarno's departure for Mecca
try temporarily lest he lose further prestige in unsuccessful ef-
forts to resolve the situation.
pilgrimage, which e p anned more than a year ago, because he
expects no major change in Indonesia's army-cabinet crisis. He
may, however, be making use of the opportunity to leave the coun-
President Sukarno left on 18 July on a
three-week pilgrimage to Mecca. He
may have decided not to postpone his
Should the Ali cabinet fall during the
president's absence, Vice President Hatta would probably order
it to remain in office as a caretaker government until Sukarno re-
turns on 8 August. The army and the political opposition would
like as a successor government a cabinet appointed by the presi-
dent, instead of one selected by parliamentary procedure.
The army is reported to have rejected
the government's offer for solving the army-cabinet impasse. Al-
though Prime Minister Ali is said to have wished to resign in this
event, Sukarno's serious obi ections may cause Ali to attempt some
other solution.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1 2.
pressure expected in Morocco:
riots there, according.to the American charge in Tangier.
Military measures taken in Casablanca
may avert a massacre, but the troop
transfers leave other areas of Morocco
unprotected and increase the danger of
sultan Mohamed ben Youssef or agree to a dynastic solution ac-
ceptable to him.
pressure is To e expec a until a French either re rn former
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ME LLAH
JEWISH AREA)
F RE NCFr
ADMICA
The charge comments that the unprece-
dented savagery of these racial riots will not soon be forgotten s
and the ability of the French and Moroccans to live together in
Casablanca has been impaired.
EASTERN EUROPE
3. Hungary may cite "NATO danger" as pretext for Soviet troop
.reinforcements:
19 July 55
The American charge in Vienna suggests
that plans to deploy American troops
from Austria to northern Italy may be
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
JULY 1955
CASABLANCA
150,000 EUROPEANS
550,000 MOROCCANS
NATIVE AREAS
RIOT AREAS
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used as. a pretext for a Hungarian request to the USSR to add
troops evacuated from Austria to the forces now in Hungary.
The charge believes that Hungary's in-
tent is indicated by reports from escapees who tell of petitions
being prepared for a spontaneous invitation to Soviet troops to
remain. He also cites a Hungarian press report of 7 June that
Soviet troops could remain under the Warsaw agreement and
Soviet reinforcements from Austria are justified to defend
Hungary's frontiers "as long as American troops remain in the
vicinity of Hungary."
There is evidence to suggest that some
elements of Soviet occupation forces in Austria will return to the
USSR, while unsubstantiated reports suggest that the remainder
will be reassigned elsewhere within the Soviet bloc. Fragmentary
indications have been reported of preparations in Hungary to re-
ceive Soviet troops and additional Soviet civilian personnel.
Premier Bulganin announced at Geneva
on 18 July that the Soviet Union plans to demobilize the troops it
withdraws from Austria after the state treaty comes into force.
He urged that the Western powers do the same.
19 July 55
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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T!)P CG'!'RI'T 17rrbrD
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5. Comment on Bulganin's opening statement at Geneva:
to the interrelated issues of ' European security and disarmament,
on which Bulganin made a number of new proposals. The premier
obviously would not reveal his hand completely at the first meet-
ing, and his genel-ally worded proposals leave many basic ques-
tions unanswered.
Premier Bulganin s opening statement at
the Geneva conference indicates that the
USSR intends to give primary emphasis
Bulganin's proposals for the first stage
of a European security plan--mutual pledges by the countries
involved not to use force and a freezing of armed forces in foreign
territories at their present strength-involved an acceptance of
NATO but would cost the USSR no more than the West.
Bulganin did not make it clear whether
the second stage- -establishment of a European security system,
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Europe and abolition of NATO,
WEU, and the Warsaw pact--should be achieved by predetermined
degrees or at any fixed time, or whether agreement on- Win prin-
ciple was a prerequisite to the first stage. Troop withdrawal would
apparently be a prerequisite to the European and general arms lim-
itations he envisions.
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The most striking omission from the secu-
rity plan is the role of Germany. Bulganin did not mention any lim-
itation on German troops and the USSR has not yet asked for a voice
in controlling Bonn's rearmament. -Bulganin made German unifica-
tion clearly subordinate to European security and did not spell out
how unity could be achieved "step by step'
Bulganin proposed that the conference en-
dorse an agreement setting force limits for all countries presum-
ably without waiting for agreement on the prohibition of atomic
weapons. For the first time he suggested specific force limits of
150,000 to 200,000 men for smaller countries.
The demobilization of Soviet forces to be
withdrawn from Austria. and the "corresponding" reduction of Soviet
ground forces, announced by Bulganin, would represent only a token
reduction in Soviet military strength. Soviet forces in Austria are
estimated at only 31,00() army troops and an authorized air strength
of 232 aircraft. Bulganin's proclamation, however, would well-nigh
preclude the retention of major units from Austria in the Satellites
where they would almost certainly be detected by the West. There
have been indications in recent weeks of small advance elements
from Austria being transferred to western Hungary.
Bulganin's acceptance of President Eisen-
hower renewed invitation to join the UN atomic pool suggests an
attempt to display a conciliatory negotiating position.
Later in the conference the Soviet Union
will probably make specific proposals for conferences on trade and
Far Eastern problems, only briefly mentioned by Bulganin. His
endorsement of direct talks between the United States and Commu-
nist China does not exclude the possibility of a larger conference.
The USSR continues to exclude flatly discussion of international
Communism and the Satellites.
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