CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002000300001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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13 May 1955
copy NO. 94
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. ___ - - -
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
T:1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE://,-~Q--REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
7 State Dept. review completed
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SUMMARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Change of Indonesian army chief of staff may affect September
elections (page 3).
SOUTH ASIA
EASTERN EUROPE
4, 'Yugoslavs submit: agenda for proposed "technical talks" with
Western powers (page 5).
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Change of Indonesian army chief of staff may affect September
elections:
It appears likely that Colonel Utoyo, who
is the army commander in South Sumatra,
will be appointed to replace General Sugeng,
Indonesia's army chief of staff, whose res-
ignation'the government has just accepted,
His appointment would mark a further
step in the progressive weakening of anti-
Communist factions in the army and may
have an effect on the September elections.
Sugeng has been opposed to Iwa, the pro-
Communist defense minister, and sympathetic toward the anti-
Communist army factions. Utoyo leans politically toward the Na-
tional Party, which heads the present government. Although he
is termed a neutralist with respect to army factions, he may be ex-
pected to support Iwa so long as Iwa has the backing of the rest of
the cabinet.
Four of Indonesia's seven territorial ccn-
manders are strongly anti-Communist. They have been fairly suc-
cessful in acting independently of Iwa and had been largely counted
on by opposition political groups to ensure honest elections. With-
out a sympathetic army chief of staff in Djakarta, these command-
ers probably will have less influence on .the elections.
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EASTERN EUROPE
Yugoslavs submit agenda for proposed "technical talks" with
Western powers.:
On 10 May Yugoslav foreign minister
Popovic handed Ambassador Riddleberger
a proposed agenda for a technical confer-
ence with American, British, and French
representatives on the Western Military aid program in Yugoslavia.
.The conference would include a. discussion of detailed Yugoslav
proposals to expand aid in the future.
Popovic suggested that this conference
be held in Paris at the end of May or the beginning of June. He
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v4w
added that the Western powers may decide how best to link the
technical conference with the conference of the same powers to
appraise the international situation which was suggested by Tito.
When reminded by Ambassador Riddle-
berger of the importance of over-all military co-ordination between
Yugoslavia and the West, Popovic stated that this matter could be
discussed at the technical conference wherever it might be related
directly to the agenda.
Popovic's attitude in the meeting with
Riddleberger was aggressive, suggesting to the ambassador that
the Yugoslavs have chosen audacity as .the best opening gambit in
the diplomatic maneuvering on the question of talks and planning
with the West.
Comment: Popovic's proposal results
from the suggestion for "technical talks" which Tito made to
Riddleberger on 27 April. Because of their continued opposition
to increased military commitments.to the West, the Yugoslavs will
probably try to prevent discussion of broader planning problems at
either the technical conference or the general appraisal meeting.
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