CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001700280001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 26, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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26 October 1954
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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ALiH;. HR 70-2
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Yoshida's prospects for retaining power worsen (page 3)
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Polish truce delegates delay departure from Cambodia (page 3)0
3. French premier broaches plan for Vietnam viceroy (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on death of Indian food minister Kidwai (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Iraq and Turkey map program for building Middle East defense
(page 6).
6. Egyptian foreign minister indicates new era of good will (page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
7. Guatemalan president fears growing opposition (page 7).
8. Honduran Liberal Party may react with violence against alleged
electoral fraud (page 8).
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FAR EAST
1. Yoshida's prospects for retaining power worsen:
The chances of Shigeru Yoshida's re-
maining as Japan's prime minister
beyond the first of next year are growing
smaller every day, according to Ambas-
sador Allison.
An influential spokesman has indicated
that business and financial interests will exert themselves to
bring about a new government without a dissolution of the Diet
and a subsequent election. Allison believes that the refusal of
these interests to contribute campaign funds could be decisive in
preventing Yoshida from dissolving the Diet.
Comment: Opposition to Yoshida is a
surface indication of a deeper power struggle for control of
Japan's conservative forces. Yoshida's opponents fear that
his leadership of a new conservative party would assure the
dominance of his Liberal Party followers in the unified organ-
ization.
This apprehension undoubtedly also
applies to the question of permitting Yoshida to name his succes-
sor. The anti-Yoshida groups have been unable to agree on a
successor, thus emphasizing that a new prime minister probably
will face continued conservative factionalism.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Polish truce delegates delay departure from Cambodia:
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Although the evacuation of Viet Minh troops
from Cambodia has been completed, the
truce commission's task "has just begun, "
the chief of the Polish truce delegation
told the French adviser to the Cambodian government. According
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to the American embassy in Phnom Penh, the Pole argued
that the commission must now exercise "its really important"
function- -supervising the integration of former dissidents into
the national community.
The American ambassador comments
that the Polish delegation obviously intends to remain as a long-
term propaganda mission. The Cambodian prime minister told
the ambassador that he had no illusions on this score. The prime
minister said, however, that until Nehru's visit is over, the
Cambodian government would probably refrain from taking open
issue with the commission's activities.
Comment: The cease-fire agreement
provides for the reintegra fH on o former dissidents, who number
only 1, 000 to 2, 000, but does not specifically provide that the truce
commission will supervise this process.
In taking a broad view of the truce com-
mission's responsibilities, the Poles will probably have the sup-
port of the Indians, who have also shown a marked tendency to
inject themselves into Cambodia's internal politics. Such activity
seems to reflect New Delhi's concept that Laos and Cambodia are
within the Indian "sphere of influence" as opposed to Vietnam, which
New Delhi considers in the Chinese cultural sphere.
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3. French premier broaches plan for Vietnam viceroy:
Premier Mendes-France assured Sec-
retary Dulles on 23 October that France
is willing to continue its support of the
Vietnamese government of Premier Diem
,
but added that, allowing for Diem's possible failure, the French are
studying a plan whereby Bao Dai would send to Vietnam "a sort of
viceroy. " This person would have "no power to interfere in the
government, " but would merely "retain the prestige of legitimacy
which came from Bao Dai. "
Comment: Bao Dai already has had his
imperial representatives iii ie nam, and there would be little
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point in creating the office of viceroy except to provide further
means to interfere in the government. This job would almost
certainly fall to either Prince Buu Hoi or Prince Buu Loc, both
of whom have been actively intriguing against Diem.
SOUTH ASIA
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4. Comment on death of Indian food minister Kidwai :
The death of Indian food minister Rafi
Ahmed Kidwai on 24 October may change
.the balance of power in Prime Minister
Nehru's cabinet from liberal to conserv-
ative and have repercussions on India's domestic and foreign policy.
Kidwai, a liberal with reported leftist
leanings, was widely considered the strongest man in the cabinet
next to Nehru. With Kidwai's death, Nehru will stand alone against
the powerful conservative cabinet group consisting of Finance Min-
ister Deshmukh, Home Minister Katju, and Commerce Minister
Krishnamachari. These men may now be able to prevent the adop-
tion of certain policies inimical to American interests, such as
that sponsored by Kidwai for the construction of a Soviet steel mill
in India.
Furthermore, since Kidwai was said to
be the ablest administrator in the cabinet and was certainly its
wiliest politician, the government and the Congress Party will be
hard put to it to replace him. He is credited with having directed
the operations leading to the revolution which ousted the hereditary
Rana government from Nepal in 1950 and which dismissed former
,premier Sheikh Abdullah of Kashmir in 1953. Since there is no
one in the government equally competent, Nehru will find his task
as prime minister considerably more difficult as a result.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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5. Iraq and Turkey map program for building Middle East defense:
Iraqi prime minister Nuri Said and Turk-
ish prime minister Menderes agreed, at
their recent meeting in Istanbul, to nego-
tiate a series of bilateral treaties in-
volving Iraq, Turkey, . 'Pakistan, Syria and Iran as the foundation
for a Middle East defense system, according to Menderes.
Menderes told Ambassador Warren that
he and Nuri agreed to sign an Iraqi-Turkish agreement, along the
lines of the Turkish-Pakistani pact, next January, Menderes said
they also agreed that Iraq should approach Pakistan, and possibly
Iran,and that Turkey should approach Syria. Turkey will also try
to obtain Egyptian support for these approaches.
Menderes prefaced his report with the
observation that the conversations had been difficult because of
the negative character of Nuri's thinking. Nuri declared that the
Iraqis were preoccupied with finding friends who would help them
meet the threat of Israeli expansion in the area.
Comment: This report confirms earlier
:indications that Nuri is in e~ rest-in negotiating a series of bilat-
eral treaties as a backdoor approach to the Turkish-Pakistani pact.
However, Nuri's references to Israel, as
well as the obvious complications involved in negotiating such bilat-
eral treaties, strongly suggest that there will be considerable bar-
gaining and maneuvering before Iraq takes any meaningful action
on Middle East defense.
6. Egyptian foreign minister indicates new era of good will:
Egyptian foreign minister Fawzi told
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now, with the signing of the Suez
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agreement, is the time for "co-operation" and that Egypt must
move forward constructively.
Fawzi said that he and Prime Minister
Nasr had had a sympathetic and understanding conversation with
British ambassador Stevenson and Under Secretary Nutting on
21 October on general considerations involving the area, Britain
is to send a "high-powered economic mission" to Cairo in Feb-
ruary and Egypt will send one to London. Fawzi also believes
that Britain will expedite the delivery of arms already on order
but never shipped because of the 1951 embargo.
Fawzi stated that he told the British
that in no event would Egypt attack Israel. He added that Egypt
would favor a settlement with Israel along the lines of the United
Nations decisions "interpreted in a practical way:' He indicated
that Egypt would under such a settlement be willing to give up the
Gaza area, the coastal strip occupied by Egypt during the 1.948
Palestine war.
Comment: This is the most forthright
statement by a responsible Egyptian official on co-operation with
the West since the signing of the "Agreement on Principles" three
months ago. It does not, however, indicate that the Nasr regime
is now prepared to move on either regional defense arrangements
or a settlement with Israel.
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LATIN AMERICA
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7. Guatemalan president fears growing opposition:
Guatemalan president Castillo Armas told
Ambassador Armour on 22 October that
he was concerned about the growing opposi-
tion of the extreme right. He referred
particularly to current rumors spread by his opposition that the
United States was withholding aid as a sign of dissatisfaction with
his regime. Castillo Armas said that he also feared the opposition
of the extreme left.
. The president added that the inability
of his government to get an economic program under way was
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Members of. the Honduran Liberal Party
may resort to violence against what they
consider "flagrant and sweeping" abuse
of the electoral machinery in the elec-
tions of 24 October. The Nationalist and
and Reformist Parties combined to defeat Liberal candidates for
all of the congressional seats which remained contested after the
popular elections of 10 October, The Liberals even lost some of
their "sure" seats after opposition-controlled "recounts"
There is increasing speculation in
Honduras that President Galvez, with the probable backing of
Reformist leader Williams, may set up a temporary dictatorship.
The president might make this move if the Liberal congressmen,
who will constitute over a third of the Congress, prevent the form-
ing of the new congress on 5 December by boycotting the session.
Comment: The Liberals, who are be-
lieved to be Communist--in i trated, probably do not have an
armed force capable of a successful coup, but there may be local-
ized violence, especially in the Liberal stronghold in the vital
north coast area. The Liberals, who won about 48 percent of the
vote in the 10 October elections, have a much greater popular fol-
lowing than either the Nationalists or Reformists.
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destroying confidence in his regime. He feels that aid is justified
economically, but is perhaps "even more desperately needed for
psychological and political effects:'
Comment: The government lacks the
resources for a public works program, which is urgently needed
for political reasons.
Rightist opposition to the Castillo regime
appears to be growing. The Communists seem to be no immediate
threat, although five top Communist leaders remain unaccounted
for and are presumably at large. The main threat to the govern-
ment, however, is its own ineptitude.
3. Honduran Liberal Party may react with violence against alleged
electoral fraud:
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