CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001700190001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 15, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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15 October 1954
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Copy No,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
AUTH: HR 0.2
DALE: "1 T-;, EQ REVIEWER:
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE: IN CLASS
C] DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _(d
Office of Current Intelligence
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Japanese reject Soviet approach on peace treaty (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Indonesia asserts Afro-Asian conference will be held in February
or March (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Over 1, 000 additional Iranian officers alleged to be Communist
. sympathizers (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Soviet-Yugoslav relations greatly improved (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on resignation of Toerngren cabinet in Finland (page 7).
6,. Comment on prospects for a Saar settlement (page 7)..
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FAR EAST
Japanese reject Soviet approach on peace treaty:
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Japanese vice minister of foreign affairs
Okumura has rejected an informal Soviet
overture for a peace treaty along the
lines of Japan's treaty with India, accord-
ing to Ambassador Allison. The approach was made on 13 October
by a Soviet delegate to the ECAFE subcommittee, who Okumura
suspects is a member of the USSR foreign service.,
Okumura told the Soviet delegate that the
USSR must do "several things" before peace treaties can be dis-
cussed and that Moscow made a "great mistake" in trying to work
through the Japanese Communist Party:
Allison believes the rejection is especially
significant since it was made shortly after the Sino-Soviet commu-
niqud of 11.October which contained an offer to establish normal
relations with Japan. Okumura also said that Acting Prime Minis-
ter Ogata's recent statement throwing cold water on the Sino-Soviet
proposals was made "off the cuff" at a press conference and that
it expressed Ogata's strong personal feelings as well as his under-
standing of general cabinet opinion,:
Comment: Okumura's rejection of the
Soviet approach emphasizes Tokyo's position that only a bona fide
Soviet proposal for a treaty will provide an acceptable basis for
negotiations, Soviet seizures of Japanese fishing boats and occu-
pation of the Habomai and Shikotan Islands are also sensitive
issues on which Japan desires an indication of Soviet recognition
of Japanese rights,
Japan's treaty with India does not con-
flict with the San Francisco peace treaty, but, unlike the latter,
renounces reparations and contains no territorial and military pro-
visions
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
Indonesia asserts Afro-Asian conference will be held in February
of March:
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The Indonesian acting foreign minister
has informed a British representative in
Djakarta that the Afro-Asian conference
definitely will be held in February or
arch , accor ng o the British Foreign Office., The agenda
calls for a discussion of colonialism- -including the New Guinea
question- -economic co-operation, and means of reducing world ten-
sion.
Nehru is definitely opposed to the confer-
ence but is supporting Indonesia's Prime Minister Ali Sastroamid-
j of o who, in view of the elections to take place sometime in 1955,
feels he must come up with something "new" to lend prestige to
his government.
The British Foreign Office feels no
"possible good" will come of the conference, but that it will be
held "even if it consists only of Nehru and Sastroamidjojo ""
Comment: At Nehru's suggestion,
Indonesia is to be host to a Colombo powers conference in Decem-
ber as*a preliminary to the Afro-Asian meeting. This gathering
may partially satisfy Indonesia"s desire for regional and interna-
tional prestige, and the other countries- -particularly India--may
take the opportunity to press the Indonesians to postpone or cancel
their larger plans.
The prospects of an early Afro-Asian
conference on the scale desired by the Indonesians are further
dimmed by the general lack of enthusiasm among the countries
which might be expected to attend such a gathering,
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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3. Over 1,000 additional Iranian officers alleged to be Communist
sympathizers:
According to the American army attache
the military governor of Tehran and
Iran's intelligence chief estimate that
there are 1,000 to 1,500 more officers.
in the security forces with Communist
connections or sympathies in addition to those recently arrested.
The Shah, when informed of this, directed
that no action be taken to arrest these officers or reveal publicly at
this time their alleged affiliations because such action would de-
moralize the armed forces and cause them to lose the confidence
of the public,
Comment: This is the first estimate of
the number of potentially disloyal officers still remaining in the
Iranian security forces--about three times the number of officers
already arrested. There is insufficient information to judge
whether they all are genuine Tudeh members or sympathizers
and therefore constitute a Communist danger to the army. Many
of them are probably members of, or sympathetic to, opposition
groups which security officials claim are Tudeh front organiza-
tions.
The Shah is probably justified in believ-
ing that the widespread suspicion and distrust which would result
from arresting about one fifth of the total number of officers would
seriously impair the efficiency of the armed forces and weaken the
command ability of the officer corps,
EASTERN EUROPE
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4, Soviet-Yugoslav relations greatly improved:
Yugoslav acting foreign secretary Bebler
agrees with American charge Wallner
that relations between Yugoslavia and
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the Soviet bloc have improved with astonishing rapidity during the
past few weeks., The latest development was President Tito's con-
sent to send a high-level Yugoslav trade delegation to Moscow to
negotiate a one-year intergovernmental trade agreement. Bebler
anticipates similar requests from the Satellites,
Bebler mentioned as conciliatory Soviet
gestures the closing down of the anti-Tito Radio Free Yugoslavia,
the abolition of various Yugoslav Cominformist emigre press or-
gans, the recent moderate tone of the Soviet press vis-a-vis Yugo-
slavia, and the favorable Soviet reaction to the Trieste settlement.
He disclosed that the Yugoslavs have granted Soviet requests for
permission to make commercial overflights and to open negotia-
tions for reciprocal distribution of Soviet and Yugoslav films.
The acting foreign secretary avoided a
direct answer to the question of whether the Yugoslavs detected
in these gestures any basic change in fundamental Soviet policies,
but stated that his government attached greater significance to
such Soviet actions as the recent dissolution of joint enterprises
in the Satellites.
Comment: Although Bebler's disclosures
reveal that Yugoslav-Soviet re ations are now more nearly normal,
'Yugoslavia apparently neither'.desiresnor expects': to go beyond
achieving a friendly but independent relationship, Although its
leaders profess to view all Soviet moves skeptically and to feel
.that Moscow's basic aims have not changed, they may have some
hope that the USSR will. eventually allow its Satellites to develop
into independent Communist nations.
The immediate purposes of the recent So-.
viet moves presumably are to arrest the growing Yugoslav-
Western co-operation and block plans for Balkan defense, not to
entice Yugoslavia back into the Orbit.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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5. Comment on resignation of Toerngren cabinet in Finland:
The resignation of the Finnish coalition
cabinet on 14 October is not likely to
result in any basic shift in the country's
foreign or domestic policies, The imme-
diate cause of the breakup of the three-party coalition--a dispute
over milk prices--illustrates, however, the precarious basis of
the alliance between the Agrarian and the Social Democratic Par-
ties, These two parties, the largest in Finland, each control
slightly over one quarter of parliament and, despite the opposing
economic interests they represent, it seems likely that both will
participate when a new coalition is formed. All the non-Communist
parties in Finland are in general agreement on foreign policy, and
the Communists, who control more than a fifth of the seats in par-
liament, are not likely to profit :"Mom the current crisis.
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6. Comment on prospects for a Saar settlement:
There are indications that the agreement
of last May between Adenauer and former
French vice premier Teitgen will still be
the basis for the 19 October discussion
of the Saar by Adenauer and French
premier Mendes-France. This is true
even though Chancellor Adenauer told
Ambassador Conant on 12 October that he
had given up all thought of a "European" solution of the Saar issue--
one putting the Saar under control of a supranational European or-
ganization--for the time being, Bonn Foreign Ministry officials
told Conant on 13 October that the May agreement would be accept-
able if -the references to the Saar as a "European" territory were
dropped.
Such a change, adopted in an effort to
appease German politicians opposed to a "European" solution of
the Saar problem, is apparently all-that Adenauer had in mind in
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his conversation with Conant. Mendes-France appears anxious
for an early settlement and would probably accept such a change,
provided other provisions of the Adenauer-Teitgen accord are
retained.
Both Mendes-France and the Bonn offi-
cials plan to make the proposed Saar commissioner responsible
to the Brussels treaty organization.
Ambassador Dillon warned on 13 October
that the French assembly will not accept any Saar solution which
is not in fact a final one, and that if such a solution cannot be
found, the London accords will not be ratified. While the Germans
want any Saar solution reviewable when a peace treaty is nego-
tiated, the Adenauer-Teitgen agreement contains a compromise
formula which could still be satisfactory.
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