CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001600270001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 25, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 4T-
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T5 S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 2,11%8a REVIEWER:
so
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
STATE review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
AGENCY AitC 1V i;a,
7 LO
2004"P:SJN43WZWO097 W//!
25 June 1954
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. USSR protests to US against seizure of Soviet tanker (page 3).
2. New Delhi reported surprised by Chou visit (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Yoshida terminates efforts to merge Japanese conservatives (page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Ely alarmed over deterioration of Vietnamese army (page 6).
5. Early commitment of Viet Minh battle corps elements in Tonkin
delta indicated (page 7).
6. Viet Minh bids for coalition government in Laos (page 7).
7, Indonesian Communists infiltrating government party (page 8).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
8. Iraq prepares ground for adherence to Turkish-Pakistani pact
(nave 9)
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WESTERN EUROPE
10. Italian government moderates Triestine resolution on partition
(page 10).
LATIN AMERICA
ii. Comment on the situation in Guatemala (page 11).
12. Uruguay opposes further planning for OAS meeting on Guatemala
(page 12).
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USSR protests to US against seizure of Soviet tanker:
American personnel" be severely punished and that measures be taken to
prevent such incidents in future.
The Soviet government concludes that "it will
be forced to take appropriate measures to guarantee the safety of navi-
gation of Soviet merchant vessels in this region. "
The Soviet government charges, in a note handed
Ambassador Bohlen on 24 June, that the seizure
of the Soviet tanker Tuapse south of Formosa
"could be carried out only by naval forces of the
United States" (see map, p. 4)0
In the note, the USSR further states that it
"expects" the United States to take measures for
the"immediate ' retu n of the vessel and "insists" that the "responsible
New Delhi reported surprised by Chou visit:
The Indian government apparently was taken
by surprise by Chou En-lai? s "sudden ac-
ceptance" of its five-week-old invitation to
visit New Delhi, according to British acting
high commissioner Middleton. N. R. Pillat, secretary general of the
Indian Foreign Ministry, told Middleton on 22 June that he had no idea
what Chou and Nehru would discuss.
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Middleton and Ambassador Allen believe
that Chou's main objective may be to charm Nehru and to convince him
that "everyone except the Vnited States is ab le to get along with Red
China." In addition to the major topics of Korea and Indochina, Allen
sees Nepalese-Chinese relations as a possible subject for the talks.
Comment: Chou was scheduled to arrive
in New Delhi late 24 June and depart on 26 or 27 June. Nehru can be
expected to try to get wider assurances of Peiping"s peaceful intentions
than those embodied in the 29 April. Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet,
and the talks may include discussion of a general Asian nonaggression
pact. The two men have never met.
In his dealings with foreigners, Chou for
years has exploited his reputation for "reasonableness" and "sincerity,"
and he is likely to impress Nehru even more strop 1 than he apparently
has British foreign secretary Eden.
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FAR EAST
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3. Yoshida terminates efforts to merge Japanese conservatives:
Prime Minister Yoshida told Ambassador
Allison on 23 June there is no point in
continuing efforts to bring about a merger
of the conservative Progressive and Liberal
parties. While Yoshida was willing to accept the risk of a possible
defeat in an election for the presidency of the new party, he and his
followers could not agree to Progressive demands that the prime minis-
ter not. be. a candidate.
Foreign Minister Okazaki the same day
told Allison he anticipates that as a result of Yoshida"s decte'iott, -about
18 Progressives will withdraw from the party and form a ""political
club" in. the Diet. While not officially allied with the Liberal Party,
this group will vote with it, thus giving the government a "definite,
but not comfortable" majority.
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Yoshida intends. to reorganize his cabinet
in July and, according to Allison, is completely confident he will then
have the political situation under control.
Comment: Formation of the "political
club" would mean little more than confirmation of the present Progres-
sive Party split, which has in fact existed since April. Its independent
status leaves it outside Yoshida's control, and foreshadows continued
conservative factionalism and a weak government.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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Ely alarmed over deterioration of Vietnamese army:
General Ely has indicated his deep concern
over the present status of the Vietnamese
army. In a special note to the American
ambassador in Paris, the French commander
in Indochina stated that Vietnamese army
and that some so-called battalions were at less than half strength and
had only one officer. In Ely's view, the. army's over-all effectiveness
may soon be "negligible."
moral was "zero," defections were occurring in increasing numbers,
Ambassador Dillon believes this information
will result in French pressures to implement the O'Daniel training
mission at once.
Comment: Although individual units of the
Vietnamese army have at times performed creditably in combat,
numerous reports substantiate- Ely's pessimistic assessment. One
reliable French official in Saigon said two days ago that this army not
only was of no value to the defense of Vietnam but was in fact a
"danger" to the country.
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5. Early commitment of Viet Minh battle corps elements in Tonkin
delta indicated:
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One regiment of the Viet Minh 304th Division 25X1
i s believed to be moving into a southern
province of the Tonkin delta, _
in
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addition, another regimen of this division
is apparently in the process of relieving a regiment of the 325th Divi-
sion now operating in the southern delta.
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about 70 75mm ,recoilless rifles were recently received by the Viet
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Comment.- The movement of these regiments
of the 304th Division would constitute the first commitment in the Tonkin
delta of divisional elements which participated in the fighting at Dien
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Minh from China, and six multibarreled rocket launchers were received
on 22 June.
Bien Phu.
6. Viet Minh bids for coalition government in Laos:
The Viet Minh delegate to the Geneva
conference, in a very "amiable" conver-
sation with the Laotian delegation on
23 June, suggested a settlement for Laos
which would apparently involve Laotian recognition of both the
Communist-sponsored "Free Lao movement" and its military forces
and lead to a coalition government.
Viet Minh
delegate Dong "seemed to agree" that Viet in forces should be
withdrawn and the French allowed, to keep treaty military bases, al-
though French military personnel would be reduced to "tn.inimum
figures.' He was persistent in questions about military ties with the
United States.
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Dong suggested that the Laotian govern-
ment might give some government jobs to members of the "Free Lao
movement," thus creating a government of "national union." He then
mentioned that some "temporary arrangement" might be made for
administering those regions of Laos where Communist military forces
are located. The Laotian delegation, although "worried," agreed to
ask their premier to meet in the immediate future with his half-
brother, who is head of the "Free Lao movement."
Comment. For several days the Commu-
nists at Geneva have been implying the possibility of a Viet Minh
withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia in exchange for neutralization
of those states. They have continued to insist, however, that there
are native "resistance movements" in both states which must be
recognized.
As regards.the relative value of.the two
"resistance movements." the Communists have indicated on three
occasions recently that they might be willing to sacrifice the one in
Cambodia for recognition of the one in Laos. In fact the Commu-
nist position in Laos is much stronger, as approximately 15,000 Viet
Minh troops control much of northern Laos, while 7,000 in Cambodia
control only small areas.
25X1A 7. Indonesian Communists infiltrating government party.,
A newly announced parliamentary roster
of the Indonesian National Party, which
controls the government, includes one
person formerly listed as a member
representing the Communist Party and another who had been a mem-
ber of SOBSI, the Communist labor federation. Ambassador Cumming
points out that these changes in the parliamentary line-up add weight
to his suspicion that the Communists are carrying on a program of
infiltration into other parties.
Comment,. This is the first firm evidence
of Communist infiltration of the National Party. The government
depends on Communist votes for its parliamentary majority. No
known Communist is, however, a member of the government.
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In addition to their possible planting of
undercover members in parliament, the Communists have recently
assigned overt high-ranking party leaders to two of their allotted
seats, apparently in order to give these individuals the prestige
and immunity that parliamentary membership provides.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Iraq prepares ground for adherence to Turkish-Pakistani pact:
In a conversation with Chargd Ireland,
Iraqi foreign minister Jamali said that
he will set the stage for the adherence of
Iraq and Iran to the Turkish- Pakistani
pact by visiting Tehran late in August in order to settle outstanding
Iraqi-Iranian differences.
Jamali said, that a new Iraqi government,
committed, to the pact, would be formed in the fall on the basis of
a new bloc. It would include followers of Nuri Said, who would
probably be prime minister, and of Saleh Jabr, leader of the Umma
Party, and political independents. Jamalt added that this plan has
been approved by the palace and Jabr, and that he hopes to obtain
Nuri's approval.
Comment. Jamali is preparing the
inflammable Iraqi public for acceptance of the pact. He was suc-
cessful in doing this in the case of the American-Iraqi arms aid
agreement of 21 April. His caution is born of the experience in
1948 when the revised Anglo-Iraqi treaty was violently repudiated
by the unprepared Iraqi politicians and public.
Iran is not prepared either militarily or
psychologically to join the pact at this time. Any effort in the near
future to induce Iran to join the pact is accordingly doomed to
failure.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Italian government moderates Triestine resolution on partition:
Although the Italian political adviser in
Trieste was unsuccessful in his attempts
to block a Communal Council resolution
opposing any partition of the Free Terri-
tory, the measure passed on 22 June was watered down considerably,
as a result of his influence. The resolution was passed with center
and rightist party support, while the leftist parties abstained.
American political adviser Higgs, who notes
there is overwhelming popular opposition to partition, believes that
the parties agreed to the weakened resolution because they now con-
Sider division of the territory inevitable.
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Comment: The actions of the Italian
political adviser give a posit v dication that Rome, which has
been trying to represent council sentiment as favoring temporary
partition, is trying to assist the current London talks by promoting
a favorable atmosphere in Trieste.
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LATIN AMERICA
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11. Comment on the situation in Guatemala:
Only limited and relatively unimportant
territory has thus far been occupied by the
rebel forces of Castillo Armas9 and the
cities of Puerto Barrios and Zacapa remain
under government control
]Local recruiting by the Castillo
forces is slow.
Meanwhile, there appear to have been no
wholesale desertions from the Guatemalan army and key commanders
apparently remain loyal. Rebel air activity has, however, seriously
weakened army morale and the army has yet to prove itself in a
major engagement.
The chief of staff of neighboring El Salvador
informed the American army attache on 22 June that 2,500 trained army
reserves had been called to active service. President Osorio told
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the American ambassador on 23 June that he was "not too confident'
of Castillo Armas' success. He said that if Castillo fails, Guatemala
will probably invade Honduras. "If a general Central American w1,r
develops," he said, "naturally El Salvador will participate"
12. Uruguay opposes further planning for OAS meeting on Guatemala:
In response to a demarche by Ambassador
McIntosh on 22 June, Uruguayan foreign
minister Pittaluga expressed strong opposi-
tion to going ahead with the plans, made
prior to the current Guatemalan crisis, for an Organization of
American States (OAS) meeting on Guatemala pn 7 July. He said
that Uruguay may revoke permission to use Montevideo as a site.
Pittaluga stressed the "impropriety" of
holding such a meeting while the Guatemalan government is "fight-
ing for its life." He also said that the resolution proposed by
Washington might violate the Security Council's resolution of 20 June
asking UN members not to aid either side.
Comment: Since the beginning of hos-
tilities in Guatemala, ten countries have agreed to go through with
the original proposal, and one of these--Panama-- has stated it may
propose modifications. A two-thirds majority, or 14 votes, is
necessary for action in the 21-member OAS.
Anti-American and pro-Guatemalan rioting
and other demonstrations in Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Mexico and
Honduras--none of which countries is included in the ten mentioned
above--may increase pressure for having any full OAS meeting dis-
cuss threats to hemisphere security in general rather than the
particular Communist threat in Guatemala.
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