CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001600120001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

8 June 1954
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
) CUMENT NO. _ 12 Z
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
(ri DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: - REVIEWER;
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
0.11
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Molotov proposals for Korean settlement (page 3).
2. New French minister for Associated States favors partition of
Vietnam (page 3).
3. Britain may propose partition of Cambodia and Laos (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Iraqi Communists reported planning election day violence (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Paris observers foresee early fall of Laniel government and new
elections (page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
9. Guatemalan Communists attempt to mobilize mass support for
government (page 8).
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GENERAL
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Comment on Molotov proposals for Korean settlement.
Molotov's five general principles for a
Korean settlement introduced at Geneva
on 5 June appear designed to prolong the
Korean phase of the conference and em-
posals for a neutral commission as well as for proportional repre-
sentation were previously presented by the Communist negotiators in
late May. Molotov's presentation of them continues to gloss over the
fact that the Communists would hold a veto power in the all-Korean
Commission which would set up the election machinery.
arrass the with reasonable" Communist proposals. The pro-
Molotov's proposals are presented in such
a way as to exploit differences among the United States, South Korea,
Britain, and France. During the past week Communist propaganda
has :been following the line that the United States is trying to maneuver
the other UN members into breaking off the conference,
2. New French minister for Associated States favors partition of
25X1 A Vie nt nam:
Edouard Frederic-Dupont,, the new French
minister for the Associated States, indicated
to Ambassador Heath in Geneva on 5 June a
decided preference for partition as a solution
of the French military effort if the "free world should decide it was
necessary to continue the fight against Communism in Indochina," but
that he favored a partition line at Col de Nuages, just north of Tourane
in central Vietnam.
to the war in Vietnam. He said he was ready to envisage continuation
He added, however, he would resist any
effort to partition Cambodia and Laos and claimed that French public
opinion supported his views.
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Comment-. During the past three weeks,
there has been a noticeable increase in French willingness to accept
some form of partition as a solution to the Indochina war. Frederic-
Dupont's support of partition of Vietnam is a further indication that
French policy now is aimed primarily at a cease-fire with controls.
3. Britain may propose partition of Cambodia and Laos-.
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Former French commissioner general Dejean
recently told the American charge at Saigon
he has information that the British "con-
template proposing" at Geneva the occupation
of "certain zones" in Cambodia and Laos by Viet Minh forces in the
event of an Indochina armistice.
. Comment. The Communists have insisted
that both military and political-settlements must include Laos and
Cambodia as well as Vietnam. Their proposals for regrouping are
tantamount to partition of the three states.
This is the first report from a reliable
source that Britain may be prepared to agree with this Communist
position. The report may, however, be a French trial balloon.
So far, Britain has taken a middle course
by maintaining that the situation in Laos and Cambodia differs from
that in Vietnam,' while not calling specifically for a Viet Minh with-
drawal from the two states. Britain might move toward the Communist
position, however, if the Communists resist compromise long enough.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Iraqi Communists reported planning election day yiolence*
Iraqi Communists are planning to stage armed
demonstrations in Baghdad during the election
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The Communist-directed United Front expects
to win about 20 of the 135 seats in parliament and is using the elections
to publicize the party's program and to agitate for a "Government of
National Union."
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Comment- The Communist Party, which is
outlawed, cannot overthrow t. e government and it.:, front group may not
be able to win as many as 10 seats. Nevertheless, the Communists will
probably emerge from the elections as the only effective opposition to
the conservative, pro-Western leaders, whose listlessness in the elec-
toral. campaign has been in marked contrast to the vigor with which the
Communists k-av? electioneered.
WESTERN EUROPE
25X1 A 8. Paris observers foresee early fall of Laniel government and new elections.,
Ambassador Dillon in Paris reports growing be-
lief among qualified observers that the fall of
the Laniel government is imminent and that pros-
pects have increased for new parliamentary
elections. Prospects for the formation of a new government in the present
assembly remain slim.
The ambassador sees reason to hope that, be-
cause of the success of pro-EDC candidates in recent by-elections, a
new assembly would be considerably more favorable to EDC than is the
present alignment.
Comment., Although parliamentary dissatis-
faction with Laniel has been rising since the 13 May vote of confidence,
it will still be difficult for the opposition to muster the 314 votes needed
to overthrow him if a new vote of confidence follows this week's Indochina
debate. The premier is reported to have stated before the 13 May vote
that he would not resign if beaten by a simple majority.
The recent by-election victories were more
the result of anti-Communist solidarity than of pro-EDC sentiment.
There is, a good possibility that if a general election were held now, the
Communists could capitalize on center and right dissension to increase
their parliamentary representation.
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LATIN AMERICA
25A A Guatemalan Communists attempt to mobilize mass support for government:
The Communist-controlled labor and peasant con-
federations in Guatemala began on 4 June to mo-
bilize their followers for possible armed defense
of the Arbenz administration.
Ambassador Peurifoy comments that this move
may be designed primarily to demonstrate mass support for the adminis-
tration, but that another motive may be to provide the government with .an
excuse for arming civilians.
He notes that the Communist and other pro-Arbenz
forces are gaining the initiative in "Guatemala's war of nerves," and that
the administration is "demonstrating it has the sinews for defense and in-
tends to use them."
Comment: Communist efforts to create a
militant following sufficient to neutralize the army have been noted since
last December. As the best-organized progovernment civilian groups, the
Communist-led confederations would be the likely beneficiaries of any de-
cision to arm civilians to defend the government in a crisis. President
Arbenz has favored such a policy in the past.
might weaken the army's position.
are likely to resist providing civilian groups with additional arms which
The Communists are believed already in
possession of some weapons, but not sufficient to provide defense of the
administration against an army revolt at this time. Top military leaders
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