CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001500120001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

4 004/0270P. C 1tJM975
0
25 March 1954
25X1 oj 25X~
opy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 00 1
DOCUMENTNO. /~ -y~.....,._.._.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
OI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: )g73 AUTH: HR 70-2
DATEZI W -t-9- VI W R: 25
25~~
/ Office of Current Intelligence
o
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25
DOS review(s) completed
DIA review(s) completed.
004/0'3/'1 IP AAF~'17MT0097~'
 25X1A
Approved For Rel a 2004/03/11 :CIA-RDP79T00975A001 0120001-1
SUMMARY
GENERAL
25X1
1. Soviet officials sound, out West on widening Geneva discussions
(page 3).
4).
2. Second Soviet diplomat suggests partition of Indochina age
FAR EAST
4. Japanese "irresponsibility" in radiation incident may jeopardize
future cooperation (page 5).
5. Border guard.asserts "no Americans allowed to leave" China
(page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. Viet Minh victory at ]Dien Bien Phu could lead to peace offer (page 6).
7. Indonesia planning to lay New Guinea issue before UN (page 6).
8. Indonesian Communist Party being purged to give it nationalist 25X1
character (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
11. French-German relations imperiled by Bonn defense amendment
issue (page 9).
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001500120001-1
 25X1A
Approved For ReI se 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001 0120001-1
GENERAL
1. Soviet officials sound out West on widening Geneva discussions:
25X1A
During a discussion of the prospects for
the Geneva conference at the British
Foreign Office on 19 March, the first
secretary of the Soviet embassy in London
remarked that it would be difficult to confine
the Geneva discussions strictly to Korea and
Indochina, as those problems were closely
related to a number of others, for example
trade restrictions.
The chief of protocol of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry asked Ambassador Bohlen on 22 March whether it would be
possible to discuss at Geneva "other questions apart from the two sub-
jects agreed on at Berlin." He added that he was not thinking of "Euro-
pean questions" or any additional formal agenda items, but merely the
possibility afforded by the conference for private discussions of general
questions.
Comment: Moscow probably will make
strong efforts to arrange private five-power meetings at Geneva to
discuss the three major topics outlined by Molotov at Berlin: reduction
of armaments, "normalization" of relations among the great powers,
and conditions for the development of international trade.
The Soviet delegation's main efforts are
likely to be aimed more at securing for Communist China a permanent
voice in international affairs than at moving toward settlement of either
the Korean or Indochina, questions.
The timing of these approaches also suggests
that Moscow is seeking possible areas of disagreement between Britain
and the United States on China's role and on widening the agenda at Geneva.
25X1A
Approved For Releas :
0120001p Mar 54
 Approved For Rel se 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001 0120001-1
2. Second Soviet diplomat suggests partition of Indochina:
25X1A
25X1
peated several times that the Chinese Communists are "definitely sensi-
tive" regarding their southern frontier.
and Indochina problems and observed that if partition is to be the solu-
tion for Korea, then the same solution might apply in Indochina. He re- 25X1
25X1
In a conversation with British Foreign
Office officials on 19 March, the first
secretary of the Soviet embassy in London
spoke of the "similarity" between the Korean
Comment: These views closely follow 25X1
those expressed by a Soviet embassy counselor in London to American
diplomats on 4 March regarding the continued division of Korea and the
partition of Indochina along the 16th parallel. They provide no evidence
of a Soviet desire for an early settlement and suggest that Moscow's pri-
mary aim in the Indochina discussions at Geneva will be to secure wider
international recognition for Ho Chi Minh's government.
AA-X11 For Relea r- 9004103111 - - 12000129 Mar 54
 Approve A For Rel
4. Japanese `'irresponsibility" in radiation incident may jeopardize
future cooperation:
FAR EAST
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
A situation inimical to the persons injured
in the radiation incident and intolerable to
American interests has resulted from the
Japanese government's inability to control
personal rivalries of scientists and a competition for publicity among
bureaucrats, according to Ambassador Allison. He says the govern-
ment is delaying acceptance of American offers of aid and is permitting
the sensational press campaign on the incident to continue.
Allison argues that Japanese-American
cooperation may be jeopardized if the government continues the "irre-
sponsibility toward security" shown in allowing uncontrolled exploitation
of the classified scientific aspects of this incident.
5. Border guard asserts "no Americans allowed to leave" China:
border guard said that "no Americans are allowed to leave" China and
that this order had been in effect for some time.
An American woman with an exit permit
from Communist China was prevented from
crossing the border to Hong Kong on 23 March,
according to her German husband who was
allowed to leave. The Chinese Communist
The American consul general at Hong Kong
comments that this is the first intimation of the issuance of a blanket
regulation against all Americans. The most recent departure from China
by an American citizen was on 3 January.
Comment: There are still about 95 American
civilians in Communist China, of whom 32 are believed to be in prison.
Peiping is not expected to cultivate good will by releasing the detained
Americans before the Geneva conference, and the Chinese may even
intend to use them for baragining urposes at the conference.
ApprU Jl for ReleaO
e 2004/03/11 : - 001200012'15 Mar 54
 Appro4SW ReI
25X1
SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu could lead to peace offer:
25X1
in
the event of a Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien
Phu, the enemy will immediately make a direct
and official offer to the French government for a negotiated peace on terms
that would be difficult to refuse. 25X1
a Viet Minh victory would
have a profoundly depressing effect on both the Vietnamese people and
the rank and file of the Vietnam army.
Comment., The deteriorating military situa-
tion in the delta, the uncertain outcome of the Geneva conference, and
the apparent deadlock in French-Vietnamese negotiations in Paris have
already seriously impaired the morale of the Vietnamese people and
government. This effect would be compounded by the fall of Dien Bien
Phu.
Recent Communist propaganda, has suggested
that a pre-Geneva truce would enhance the prospects for a successful
conference. The Viet Minh will probably continue to encourage the
French to make a truce offer, or make an official one itself, primarily
for the purpose of promoting French-Vietnamese and French-American
friction.
7. Indonesia planning to lay New Guinea issue before UN-,
25X1A
Indonesia intends to lay its claim to Dutch
New Guinea before the United Nations,
according to an official of the Indonesian
Foreign Ministry who is close to President
Sukarno. He asked that the United States at least remain neutral on
the issue, since he intended to seek support from American republics
for the Indonesian position.
25X1A
Approved For Rele
D12000105 Mar 54
 25X1A
Approved For Rel - se 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP79T00975AO01 0120001-1
The official introduced the subject with
the American ambassador in Djakarta on 20 March by stating that
some members of the cabinet, including Prime Minister Ali and the
foreign minister, were trying to lessen the government's association
with the Communists and bring about a "turn" in Indonesian foreign
policy.
Comment: The Dutch have flatly rejected
Indonesia's claim to Western New Guinea and would strongly oppose
discussion of the issue in the United Nations. Australia is also firmly
opposed to Indonesian control of the area.
It should be noted that the suggested about-
face in Indonesian foreign policy coincides with a request for American
sympathy on the New Guinea issue. A break between the government
and. the Communists is not believed to be imminent.
25X1A
25X1A
8. Indonesian Communist Party being purged to give it nationalist
c racter:
party.
of Indonesian national interests. He surmises that Moscow and Peiping
may have agreed on the need to enhance the nationalist appeal of the local
Ambassador Cumming in Djakarta reports
that the Indonesian Communist Party is
apparently being purged of Overseas Chinese
elements to enable it to appear as a champion
The ambassador believes that Communist
influence on Overseas Chinese will now probably be exerted through
channels other than the party and notes that an "Indonesian Citizenship
Consultative Committee" was formed on 13 March from a number of
left-wing Overseas Chinese parties previously outlawed.
Comment: The separation of Chinese and
Indonesian Communists would involve no loss in the influence the Com-
munists already command. 25X1
Approved For Releo
001200012 Mar 54
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01500120001-1
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01500120001-1
 App l ,~or Rel se 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A0015 0120001-1
25X1
WESTERN EUROPE
25X1A
Unless France gives immediate approval to
the West German constitutional amendment
authorizing rearmament, there will be an
outburst of public indignation in the Federal
Republic which will seriously damage French-
German relations, according to Ambassador
Conant. He states that the "strange" actions
of the French on the amendment suggest that
anti-EDC forces in France wish to use this issue "to destroy any possi-
bility of French-German cooperation during the immediate future."
Ambassador Dillon reports that Paris is
again making its approval of the amendment conditional upon Adenauer's
signing "in the name of the chief of state" the EDC protocols proposed
by France. The French had previously given assurances they would not
make this condition for their approval of the amendment.
Comment: The West German populace has
anticipated prompt approva oft ~e-defense amendment by the Allied High
Commission. The amendment, adopted by Bonn on 19 March, was de-
signed to clear the way for final approval of the EDC treaty in West
Germany.
If Adenauer meets the French demands on the
EDC protocols, the Bundestag may be required to vote on them, a devel-
opment Adenauer insists on avoiding.
11. French-German relations imperiled by Bonn defense amendment issue:
Approved For Releas
25X1A
0120001-A5 Mar 54