CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001200350001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 August 1953
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Copy No- 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
NO
TS J
REVIEWER:T
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
f.UiH: I'r' r
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SUMMARY
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SOVIET UNION
Comment on Soviet actions following shooting down of US plane
(page 3).
FAR EAST
IRhee capable of ordering "suicide attack"
3. Swiss representative emphasizes anti-Communist attitude of Korean
prisoners (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
French officials in Tonkin feel Viet Minh can overrun delta page 5).
Comment on new Indonesian cabinet (page 6).
7. Rebellion in East Indonesia may be scheduled for late August (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Comment on Soviet note to Western powers on an Austrian treaty
(page 7).
10. French may reduce military establishment in Austria (page 8).
11. Disorders feared if West Berlin food facilities overtaxed (page 8).
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SOVIET UNION
1. Comment on Soviet actions following shooting down of US plane :
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area immediately after 'the shooting down of the US reconnaissance plane
on 29 July may reflect attempts to recover survivors and it is likely that
some are now in Soviet hands.
Soviet air and naval activity in the Vladivostok
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the crew of one of the US rescue air-
craft reported seeing nine Soviet PT-type boats operating in the area
where the US crew later sighted four to seven survivors 11 hours after
the incident. The US destroyer which picked up the copilot reported
encountering a Soviet trawler in the area.
The wording of the Soviet protest, similar to
notes in the past when the USSR has shot down foreign planes, reflects
a desire neither to magnify nor to minimize the gravity of the present
affair as compared with previous ones.
FAR EAST
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Rhee capable of ordering "suicide attack":
is better to to as an "example" to the free world than to suffer slow
death by strangulation.
I old
Ambassador Briggs on 30 July that ee is
entirely capable of ordering a "suicide attack"
on the Communists in the conviction that it
While Rhee admits there is no written guar-
antee of American moral and material support if South Korea should
renew the war after 90 days of political discussions, he believes such
support is "inherent" in the developing Communist-free world conflict
in which the "United States has no place to go except along with Rhee."
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Comment: Rhee assumes that the United States
and South Korea will walk out automatically if Korean unification has not
been achieved after 90 days of political discussions and he refuses to
recognize the conditions which the United States has placed on such a
withdrawal.
The uncertain attitude of the South Korean mil-
itary might limit Rhee:actibns. ,
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3. Swiss representative emphasizes anti-Communist attitude of Korean
prisoners:
A Swiss Red Cross representative en route
home from Korea believes that the Communist
"persuaders" will have a "rough time" at the
hands of the prisoners in Korea unwilling to
be repatriated. He informed the Swiss minister in New Delhi that the
bitterness of the prisoners against the Communists and their emotional
fervor against forcible repatriation "must be seen to be believed."
Ambassador Allen comments that many Indians
accept the Communist line that the prisoners will return willingly to
Communist terrority once given a free opportunity to choose. He pre-
dicts that the Indians are in for a rude awakening.
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5. French officials in Tonkin feel Viet Minh can overrun delta:
High French officials in Tonkin believe that
Viet Minh forces, unscathed during their
last campaign and recently strengthened by
additional Chinese supplies, are capable of
overrunning the delta without Chinese Communist aid. They. may,
however, be deterred by the prospect of heavy casualties.
The Viet Minh, through.. coercion and an
attractive land reform policy, has now gained effective control over
more than half the Tonkin population. In addition, bny Viet Minh
campaign in this area will be aided by the unreliability and low mo-
rale of the Indophinese troops under French command and the lack
of sufficient mobile reserves. General Cogny, French commander
in Tonkin, says he has six fewer battalions than were available a
year ago, and fears he may be forced further to deplete his reserves
to meet a Viet Minh diversion in Laos or elsewhere.
Comment: There are as yet no indications of
the Viet Minh's strategy next fad
This report high-lights the steadily increasing
adherence of the Tonkin population to the Viet Minh which is abetted
by antipathy to the lethargic, French-sponsored government of Bao
Dai and Tam.
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6. Comment on new Indonesian cabinet:
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President Sukarno's acceptance of a strongly
leftist cabinet indicates that the political situation in Indonesia has
deteriorated to a state of near (chaos in which the Communistare
making considerable gains. Although' the Communists are not rep-
resented in the Nationalist-led cabinet, they reportedly will indirectly
control the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, labor, economy and
finance and will exert influence in several others. They will also strive
to reduce the moderating influence of the vice president.
The conservative Masjumi, the largest party
in Indonesia, was excluded from the cabinet and will probably try to
upset it by attracting support of the two small moderate parties of
the 10 groups represented. There is,. however, small likelihood of
their early defection. Continued Communist allegations of connections
between the Masjumi and the DRTul Islam, a Moslem dissident group,
may well reduce Masjumi popular support.
Army factionalism promoted by the National
Party Communist bloc in October 1952, will be further intensified as
the result of opposing attitudes over the new government, and threatens
open conflict. Many of the leading army and police officials are anti-
Communist.
7. Rebellion in East Indonesia may be scheduled for late August:
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Anti-Javanese sentiment is reported rising
in East Indonesia and there are persistent
rumors that a general rebellion: against
Djakarta will break out in late August in
t fie Moluccas, the Celebes, and Borneo. Separatist guerrilla bands
reportedly will initiate the rebellion and dissident factions in the
army will support it. It is to be timed to coincide with a renewed
effort by an army group to take over the government in Djakarta.
Comment: Anti-Javanese and separatist
sentiment has long existed in the Moluccas, the Celebes and Borneo,
and reportedly is increasing in the latter.
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WESTERN EUROPE
9. Comment on Soviet note to Western powers on an- Austrian treaty:
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The Soviet note of 30 July to the Western
powers demands,in effect, the formal and public withdrawal of the
abbreviated Austrian treaty as a prerequisite to the "examination
of the unsettled questions related to the conclusion of a treaty."
The Kremlin offers no commitment that
the settlement of these questions will in fact lead to an agreement.
This tactic may serve to create dissension in the West since it is
apparent that the United States has been the most insistent on using
the short treaty as a tactical weapon to limit Soviet economic privi-
leges granted in the long draft. The note may be a part of expected
Soviet diversionary tactics aimed at avoiding discussion of the Ger-
man and Austrian problems on Western terms,
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The Soviet note ignores the Western request
of 12 June for exact terms on which the USSR would be willing to sign
a treaty and the West's assertion that it would accept any treaty guar-
anteeing Austrian independence. ,
10. French may reduce military establishment in Austria-
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Both the French and the British high commissioners are "seriously
perturbed" by the Soviet move, and Thompson feels there is little
doubt that both Britain and France will be forced eventually to follow
suit.
Ambassador Thompson believes that the
French may reduce their military establish-
ment in Austria in consequence of the USSR's
decision to pay its own occupation costs.
The French high commissioner intends to
recommend to Paris that French forcer, be reduced to the token force
now maintained by the British.
Comment: Soviet acceptance of the occupa-
tion costs allocated by quadripartite agreement has enabled the British
and the French to resist strong Austrian pressure for their total elim-
ination. American support of occupational economies and British and
F midi reluctance to increase their own expenditures have resulted in
the gradual reduction of their military establishments in Austria to
forces now estimated at 9,000 and 4,000 respectively. Further reduc-
tion in the French forces has been consistently opposed by the US
government.
11. Disorders feared if West Berlin food facilities overtaxed:
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end of 1-2 August might completely swamp West Berlin facilities and
result in public disorders. The acting mayor of West Berlin and the
Bonn government representative share these fears, and intend to take
precautionary measures.
General Timberman, American commandant
in Berlin, is somewhat concerned over the
possibility that a tremendous influx of East
German applicants for food over the weed
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- Comment: In anticipation of such difficulties,
the East German authorities may do nothing to curb the flow of food
applicants into West Berlin beyond harassing those returning with
parcels.
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