CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A001100320001-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 23, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 5, 1953
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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5 May 1953 4
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Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NQ.
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'Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
i
/ DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Communists reportedly approach India and Indonesia as POW
custodian (page 3).
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FAR EAST
3. Japan expected to prohibit future purchases of Iranian oil (page 4),
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. French headquarters sees Viet Minh offensive in Laos near end
(page 5).
5. French fear Soviet reaction to proposed Laotian UN appeal (page 5).
6. Laos may seek UN support in spite of French (page 6).
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GENERAL
1. Communists reportedly approach India and Indonesia as POW custodian:
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that the Indians are unprepared for the task if the prisoners are to be
removed to India and added that the Communist delay in naming an Asian
neutral is due to failure to find one willing to assume the responsibility.
The Chinese Communists have approached India
on the question of becoming the custodian for
Korean war prisoners, according to the Indo-
nesian ambassador in London. He said, however,
The ambassador also said that a member of the
Soviet Embassy staff in London had sounded him out on the possibility of
Indonesia serving as the neutral trustee.
Comment: Press reports quote Prime Minister
Nehru as saying India would "consider" a request to take custody of unwill-
ing Korean war prisoners "when it comes before us:'
A high official source in Djakarta told the press
that Indonesia could not accept the request if it were offered because of
the country's unsettled internal situations
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FAR EAST
3. Japan expected to prohibit future purchases of Iranian oil
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Ministry points out, however, that the Japanese firm involved in the
recent purchase still has sufficient exchange to finance from two to four
additional shiploads of oil, and states that it is impossible to withdraw
these funds.
The Japanese Government is likely to deny
any future allocations of foreign exchange for
the purchase of Iranian oil, according to the
American Embassy in Tokyo. The Foreign
The Japanese Government has taken the position
that it had no prior knowledge of the recent transaction, although it is
probable that key officials of the Ministries of Finance and of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry were aware of it,
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. French headquarters sees Viet Minh offensive in Laos near end-
The major Viet Minh effort in Laos may be
near an end for this season, according to
French headquarters in Saigon. Two enemy
divisions are withdrawing to the north and it
e eve that the Viet Minh, lacking a preponderance of force, will
not attack Luang Prabang.
Forces amounting to about a division are
expected to stay in the Xieng Khouang area. There the Communists can
engage in propaganda activities, organize regional military units, and
contain the French defensive force.
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The US Army attache observes that the Viet
Minh probably planned originally to occupy only a portion of north-
eastern Laos, but decided to capitalize on the French retreat from Sam
Neua to make a deeper penetration. The Communists may thus, at very
little cost, have already accomplished far more than they expected.
Comment: The Viet Minh has won an impor-
tant strategic victory regardless of further advances. It is now estab-
lished on several important tributaries of the Mekong River and can
build up large supplies for future drives into French-held territory.
5. French fear Soviet reaction to proposed Laotian UN appeal'.
France has decided not to take the Laotian
case to the UN for a number of reasons, one
of which is fear that such an appeal would
force the Soviet Union to harden its present
policy toward Indochina. Foreign Minister Bidault told Ambassador
Dillon that Premier Mayer and President Auriol now agree that a
declaration condemning the aggression by the 16 powers fighting in
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Korea or by the 35 states recognizing Laos would achieve the same
results as a UN appeal without the attendant difficulties.
Comment. On 30 April Bidault told. Dillon
that Mayer and Auriol favored an appeal to the UN.
6. Laos may seek UN support in spite of French:
Minh in real battle and the feeling that the French are an obstacle to
obtaining more effective American aid are both affecting official opinion
in Laos.
charge in Vientiane. He believes this might be done whether Luang
Prabang, falls or not. He pointed out that the failure to meet the Viet
The Laotian Government might decide to
ask the United States or some other friendly
nation, other than France., to bring its case
to the United Nations, according to the American
Comment: The French decision to refuse the
Laotian request for a UN appeal will further strain the relations between
the two countries.
The Thai prime minister has expressed his
disappointment at the French decision and suggested the possibility that
his country might present the Laotian case to the United Nations.
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