CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 17, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 27, 1951
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2.pdf230.45 KB
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Approved For Relea'+, 2TOP 'IJTA0004Q 310001-2 25X1 27'October 1951 25X1 Copy No. 47 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 0 ~ 33 DOCUMENT NO NO CHARGE 4N CLASS. DECLJ SSlflED. CLA53. CHANGED TO: TS NEXT REVIEW DATE: -_ AUT+ KiR O- 25X1 25X1 Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 State Department review completed TOE' SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 Approved For 25X1A SUMMARY U111clal statements give distorted picture of Burmese situation (page 4) 4. Dalai Lama endorses Communist program for the "liberation" of Tibet (page 5). SOUTH ASIA 25X1 5. Indo-Pakistani relations reportedly have improved (page 5). WESTERN EUROPE 25X1 9. Opportunity seen for non-Communist labor alliance as Communists plan strikes (page 8). 25X1A 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 Approved For 25X1A 3. Official statements give distorted picture of Burmese situation,: 25X1A 25X1 he claimed, 25X1 Prime Minister Thakin Nu of Burma told a press conference in New Delhi, after his two day meeting with Nehru, that conditions in his country were im- proving daily. He stated that there were only 3, 000 to 4, 000 insurgents scattered about the country and that their rebellion was no longer "very serious. " The Burmese also said that the insurgents had not received aid from China, which, had fnaintained a "very correct attitude" towards Burma. Comment- These statements represent a deliber- ate distortion of the facts. It is now estimated that there are about 18, 500 insurgents in Burma and Commander in Chief Ne Win recently admitted that the initiative hadpassed to them. The remarks of the Prime Minister may be 25X1A- Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 Approved Fob 25X1A only an effort to maintain the fiction of Burma's "neutral" foreign policy or to hide the Burmese Government's weakness. The extreme air of casualness, however, which has been assumed by both the Burmese and Indians gives rise to the suspicion that the conference between the two Premiers was of greater significance than described and that important substantive decisions may have been taken regarding Burma's foreign relations, particularly insofar as they relate to Communist China. 4. Dalai Lama endorses Communist program for the "liberation" of Tibet: Peiping radio has broadcast an exchange of tele- grams between Mao Tse-tung in Peiping and the Dalai Lama in Lhasa. Mao thanked the Dalai Lama for his "efforts in implementing the agree- ent for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. 11 The alai Lama a a vile ao on 24 October that the local government, monks and populace of Tibet are giving the May 1951 agreement "unanimous support. " Comment: A delegation from Lhasa concluded an agreement with the Peiping regime in May 1951 providing for Tibetan cooper- ation in the extension of Chinese Communist authority over Tibet. It was widely believed that the Dalai Lama, in refuge on the Indian border, would repudiate this agreement, which deprived him of all significant power in Tibet. However, by September the Dalai Lama had returned to Lhasa, under occupation by Chinese Communist advance forces, and has since been ex- pected to endorse the agreement., The Dalai Lama's adherence will facilitate the consolidation of Communist control of Tibet. SOUTH ASIA 25X1A 5. Indo-Pakistani relations reportedly have improved: According to the US Embassy in New Delhi, the depth and sincerity of India's reaction to the Pakistani Prime Minister's assassination, and 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 Approved Fqr Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000409310001-2 25X1A the conciliatory statement on Indo-Pakistani relations made by Liaquat Ali's successor have lessened tension between the two countries. A member of the British High Commissioner's office has also expressed the view that Indo- Pakistani relations are now better than at any time in the last four years. Comment: Previous experience with Indo- Pakistani crises suggests that Indian reaction to Liaquat Ali's assassination, however sincere, is likely to be brief. Pakistan's almost immediate return to a state of apparent normalcy has demonstrated the ability of the government to control the country; and identification of the assassin as an Afghan national has minimized the possibility of armed anti-Indian outbreaks in Kashmir. Accordingly, the Indians may feel little need to modify their pre- vious policies with regard to Pakistan, and they may be as uncompromising as ever when the UN Security Council meets to discuss the Kashmir case. 25X1 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 Approved For 25X1A WESTERN EUROPE 25X1A 9. Opportunity seen for non-Communist labor alliance as Communists plan of the major non-Communist groups "for the first time. " strikes: Tne Communist- contro a General Labor Confederation. The success of such a conference, which would include the Socialists, would make a strong non- Communist trade union alliance possible. Some of the leaders, with "astonishing" though perhaps "undue" optimism, are even talking of unification 25X1 The US Embassy in Paris believes that present critical wage-price problems may soon result in a national conference of French economic groups from which the government will exclude Meanwhile, there are indications that Moscow has given the French Communists a free hand for organizing an "economic" mass, movement devoid of "political antics. " Strikes will probably be called during the UN Assembly session in Paris. Comment- The General Labor Confederation dominates French labor largely because the non-Communist unions have always failed to cooperate effectively. Virtually every political crisis in recent years has been precipitated by the Socialistswho feared General Labor Confederation gains at the expense of the non-Communist unions. 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 Approved Fq 25X1A The Socialists, in order to prevent a Gaullist accession to power, may now try to strengthen the wobbly Pleven govern- ment by supporting such a national economic conference. French Communists have consistently failed in their strike movements largely because they were ordered to tie in political objectives. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2