CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 17, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 27, 1951
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A000400310001-2.pdf | 230.45 KB |
Body:
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27'October 1951
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Copy No. 47
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 0 ~ 33
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHARGE 4N CLASS.
DECLJ SSlflED.
CLA53. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: -_
AUT+ KiR O-
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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State Department review
completed
TOE' SECRET
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SUMMARY
U111clal statements give distorted picture of Burmese situation (page 4)
4. Dalai Lama endorses Communist program for the "liberation" of Tibet
(page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
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5. Indo-Pakistani relations reportedly have improved (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
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9. Opportunity seen for non-Communist labor alliance as Communists plan
strikes (page 8).
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3. Official statements give distorted picture of Burmese situation,:
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he claimed,
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Prime Minister Thakin Nu of Burma told a press
conference in New Delhi, after his two day meeting
with Nehru, that conditions in his country were im-
proving daily. He stated that there were only
3, 000 to 4, 000 insurgents scattered about the
country and that their rebellion was no longer
"very serious. " The Burmese also said that the
insurgents had not received aid from China, which,
had fnaintained a "very correct attitude" towards Burma.
Comment- These statements represent a deliber-
ate distortion of the facts. It is now estimated that there are about 18, 500
insurgents in Burma and Commander in Chief Ne Win recently admitted that
the initiative hadpassed to them. The remarks of the Prime Minister may be
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only an effort to maintain the fiction of Burma's "neutral" foreign policy or
to hide the Burmese Government's weakness. The extreme air of casualness,
however, which has been assumed by both the Burmese and Indians gives
rise to the suspicion that the conference between the two Premiers was of
greater significance than described and that important substantive decisions
may have been taken regarding Burma's foreign relations, particularly insofar
as they relate to Communist China.
4. Dalai Lama endorses Communist program for the "liberation" of Tibet:
Peiping radio has broadcast an exchange of tele-
grams between Mao Tse-tung in Peiping and the
Dalai Lama in Lhasa. Mao thanked the Dalai
Lama for his "efforts in implementing the agree-
ent for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. 11 The
alai Lama a a vile ao on 24 October that the local government, monks
and populace of Tibet are giving the May 1951 agreement "unanimous support. "
Comment: A delegation from Lhasa concluded an
agreement with the Peiping regime in May 1951 providing for Tibetan cooper-
ation in the extension of Chinese Communist authority over Tibet. It was
widely believed that the Dalai Lama, in refuge on the Indian border, would
repudiate this agreement, which deprived him of all significant power in
Tibet. However, by September the Dalai Lama had returned to Lhasa, under
occupation by Chinese Communist advance forces, and has since been ex-
pected to endorse the agreement., The Dalai Lama's adherence will facilitate
the consolidation of Communist control of Tibet.
SOUTH ASIA
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5. Indo-Pakistani relations reportedly have improved:
According to the US Embassy in New Delhi, the
depth and sincerity of India's reaction to the
Pakistani Prime Minister's assassination, and
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the conciliatory statement on Indo-Pakistani relations made by Liaquat Ali's
successor have lessened tension between the two countries. A member of the
British High Commissioner's office has also expressed the view that Indo-
Pakistani relations are now better than at any time in the last four years.
Comment: Previous experience with Indo-
Pakistani crises suggests that Indian reaction to Liaquat Ali's assassination,
however sincere, is likely to be brief. Pakistan's almost immediate return
to a state of apparent normalcy has demonstrated the ability of the government
to control the country; and identification of the assassin as an Afghan
national has minimized the possibility of armed anti-Indian outbreaks in
Kashmir. Accordingly, the Indians may feel little need to modify their pre-
vious policies with regard to Pakistan, and they may be as uncompromising
as ever when the UN Security Council meets to discuss the Kashmir case. 25X1
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WESTERN EUROPE
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9. Opportunity seen for non-Communist labor alliance as Communists plan
of the major non-Communist groups "for the first time. "
strikes:
Tne Communist- contro a General Labor Confederation. The success of such
a conference, which would include the Socialists, would make a strong non-
Communist trade union alliance possible. Some of the leaders, with
"astonishing" though perhaps "undue" optimism, are even talking of unification
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The US Embassy in Paris believes that present
critical wage-price problems may soon result
in a national conference of French economic
groups from which the government will exclude
Meanwhile, there are indications that Moscow has
given the French Communists a free hand for organizing an "economic" mass,
movement devoid of "political antics. " Strikes will probably be called during
the UN Assembly session in Paris.
Comment- The General Labor Confederation
dominates French labor largely because the non-Communist unions have
always failed to cooperate effectively. Virtually every political crisis in
recent years has been precipitated by the Socialistswho feared General Labor
Confederation gains at the expense of the non-Communist unions.
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The Socialists, in order to prevent a Gaullist
accession to power, may now try to strengthen the wobbly Pleven govern-
ment by supporting such a national economic conference.
French Communists have consistently failed in
their strike movements largely because they were ordered to tie in political
objectives.
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