CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A000400050001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 16, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 27, 1951
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A000400050001-1.pdf | 156.67 KB |
Body:
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27. September 1951
Copy No.
i
47
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT N0.
*
NO CHANGE IN CLASS, S.
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AUTH: H.IF, .'
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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State Department review
completed
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
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FAR EAST
1. Burmese to defer UN appeal on Chinese Nationalist troop issue (page 3
WESTERN EUROPE
3. French seek US assurances of Woninterference in North African internal
affairs (page 4)a
Dutch seek to delay tevision of Dutch-Indonesian agreement (page 6).
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FAR EAST
1. Burmese to defer UN appeal on Chinese Nationalist troop issue:
B urma has :agreed to defer an appeal to the UN
regarding Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma,
pending the reaction to its proposals that the US
persuade Taipei to recall Nationalist General
LI M! to Taiwan and to order his troops to leave Burma or surrender for in-
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ternment. Burma also wants the US to ask Thailand to stop arms smuggling
and to prevent the use of Thai airstrips by planes which the Burmese assume
are supplying the Nationalists.
The US Embassy in Rangoon believes that the pos-
sibility still exists that Burma's army commander, General Ne Win, with the
collaboration of the newly-appointed Burmese Ambassador to Peiping, might
attempt a covert arrangement giving the. Chinese Communists a.:free hand to 25X1
deal with the Nationalists.
Chinese Nationalist forces are in the process of disintegration, thus tending par-
tially to resolve the inter national.p.roblens that their presence in Burma has created.
Comment:
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3. French seek US assurances of noninterference in North African internal
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The French Foreign Office, "deeply stirred" by
the "official treatment" accorded Tunisian 25X1
nationalist leader Bourghiba on his current visit
to the US, has approached the American Embassy
in Paris for written assurance of US noninter-
ference in North African internal affairs.
Foreign Minister Schuman and President.Auriol 25X1
are personally aroused over the question, and the cabinet has refused Clear-
ance for a US Military Survey Mission to proceed to Tunis. Meanwhile, this
mission has met delaying tactics and firm demands from the Resident General25X1
in Algiers for exact details of the survey proposal in that area.,
Comment, 41
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Despite assurances to Schuman a the
US was not anxious to have the Moroccan question discussed in the UN, the Foreign
Office in Paris Iremained deeply distrustful
of the US attitude toward the nationalist movement in North Africa. These
French suspicions cloud the outlook for a rapid working out of US- French air
base arrangements and US acquisition of further military facilities in North
Africa.
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Dutch seek to delay revision of Dutch-Indonesian agreement-,
The Dutch Ambassador to the US has stated. that,
although his government recognizes the Union
Agreement with Indonesia "as dead, " the present
cabinet, which negotiated the Dutch-Indonesian
agree n s, finds it difficult to agree to a revision at this time.
Any tactic designed to delay consideration of
this question until the Dutch elections in the spring of 1952 must, moreover,
avoid any suggestion of a "Netherlands willingness to revise" the Union
Agreement. The ambassador suggested that the initiative for a delay should
come from Indonesia, possibly from Vice President Hatta, and added that
"Dutch interests would not necessarily be harmed" by such action.
Comment. It is probable that the Dutch are
convinced of their inability to achieve a compromise and are seeking US
support to prevent Indonesia from taking unilateral action. Also, the present
government may fear a cabinet crisis if the Indonesian question, which has
been relatively quiescent, is not injected into domestic politics.
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