CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000300530001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 30, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Rele 2~~m'6 : ~],~~35A00`+9~0530001-9
30_ August 1951
.25X1
~~~
25X1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLE~'IN
DOCUMENT NO:
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
[ ; DECLl1SSIFIEb
i
.CLASS. CHANGED To: TS S C
NEXT REVIEYY BATE: b ~ f
DAT~1.!'l~..lr,.?.5~, REVIEWER: J
25X1
25X1
Office of Current Intelligence
CEN'TRA.L 1NTELLIGENCF AG.E~TCY
-2.5X1
State Department review completed
TOP ~ SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 :CIA-RDP79T00975A000300530001-9
 Approved For
25X1A
SUMMAR Y
GENERAL
1p French expect to curb Vietanamese at fan Francisco (page 3)0
2a Rnd?nesia hesitant over signing Japanese treaty (page 3)a
USSR
New Soviet tactic expected in East-West trade campaign (page 4),
25X1
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 :CIA-RDP79T00975A000300530001-9
 Approved For
25X1A
~GEI~iER,f~,L.
25X1A 1
0001.-9
The French Minister for the :Associated States.
has "guaranteed'' that Vietnam's Premier
Tian Van Huu and other Associated States
representatives at-the. San Francisco conference
25X1A
will "not get out of linen " The French are highly. critical of Hun's .public
statements on a security pact and reparations from .Japans They feel,. how-
ever, that I3uu's remarks. were probably intended for domestic. consumption
in Vietnam,
Comment: French irritation over Huu' state-
menu is probably due to a desire to avoid any issue that might. further com-
plicate the San Francisco c?nferenee or prejudice the future international
prestige of Vietnamo `
France origi~aally asked. for two. billion dollars
in reparati?ns from Japan, but later bargained this claim against other con.-
cessions, fncluding representation for the Associated. States. at San Francisco,
If other countries present~re~paration claims at San Francisco,. however, the
French can be expected to renew their demandso ~~ While'~the French are as
anxious. as the Vietnamese for additional funds to balance Vietnam's shaky
budget, they are aware of Japan's inability to pay combined reparations;
2d on is hesi ant outer si in Ja anese treat
A spokesman 'of "the .Indonesian Foreign Office ,
told the US Ambassador that Indonesia will
probably object chiefly to the reparations clause
of the Japanese peace treaty.
If this clause
is.
.
.
not altered as clesire~, Indonesia will seek "some sort of campensatian, ~'
probably in the form of economic concessions. from the US, in return for
signingo
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 :CIA-RDP79T00975A000300530001-9
 25X1A
Approved For R
The ambassador ,notes. that Indonesia's signs-
tore will depenal to a .considerable extent upon deveimpments in San Francisco
and upon the reaction thereto of the Indoanes~ian press andpolitical leadersa
There is already a .strong threat. of dissea~sion within Indonesian s largest par-
ty -- the Masjumi -- which may make it somewhat difficult for the govern
meet to obtain. approval for signing the treatyo
USSR.
3o New Soviet t~.ctic,e,~pect~rl ;n Fact West rac;P c~m?p ;ono
ma ang it workd
..
the countries. of the Soviet 4rbito In its present form the EPU acts as a
clearing house for trade among Marshall Plan countrieso
The embassy believes that a proposal of this.
type would. fit into the strategy of the USSR's East-West trade campaign: now
under way in Western Europe It would dramatize the Soviet claim that
Russia is ready to cooperate ixn a general revival of this tradeo If the res-
ponse proved favorable, the Soviet Union would hope to open up a :new field of
action in its effort to weaken Western trade controlso This action might be
designed to widen the .split between US trade policy and the desires of certain
Western European countries to coa~ti~nue trade in essential commodities;
In the: embassy's view, however, the disruptive
possibilities of .such a proposal are slight9 given the functional nature ?f EPU
itself as a European clearing house and the interest European- states have in
k'
The US Embassy in Moscow is inclined to credit.
rumors that the Soviet Union. is considering a
proposal for a new orgaanization patterned after
the European Payments Union but also including
p .~~a-
wide clearing house would be in line with current M?scow.attes to portxay
the USSR as attempting to improve East-West tradeo However, the USSR. has
usually carried on its non-t7rbit economic relations by bilateral agreements
f om_n_,em*? A Soviet proposal for a Euro e
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 :CIA-RDP79T00975A000300530001-9
 2gp(p~rgved For
anct has .joined few post-war ia~t~rrnatioa~al organizations of any sorta '~ithin the
Soviet prbt, the USSR could yet up a~a EFU type of organization even-:though the
ruble is already freely convertible throughout the Orbit> 25X1
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 :CIA-RDP79T00975A000300530001-9
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/01/16 :CIA-RDP79T00975A000300530001-9
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 :CIA-RDP79T00975A000300530001-9