CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000300250001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 27, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN r4:?0",
DOCUMENTNO.
CLASS.
XT REVIEW IEW OAT : TS g C
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AUT%0Hf p ,f
Office of, Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
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USSR
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Embassy MoAcow's views on Molotov and Zhukov visit to Warsaw
(page 3).
Comment on appointment of new Soviet Minister of the Navy (page 4).
Syria:-disturbed about future of or an age 7)0
US Political. Adviser recommends US policy shift 6n Trieste (page ')O
EASTERN EUROPE
Molotov speech alarms Yugoslav leaders (page 8)0
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USSR
. Embassy Moscow's views on Molotov and Zhukov visit to Warsaw:
The US Embassy in Moscow considers that
the appearance of Molotov and Zhukov at
the recent Polish holiday celebration indicates
the Kremlin has reassessed the international
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situation. According to the anbassy, the setback to Communist aims in
Korea can hardly fail to have rgpercussions inside the Soviet Politburo,
and it is possible that new policies will be adopted in consequence.
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Molotov's reappearance as a spokesman on
foreign affairs breaks a silence that has prevailed since his last speech
in March, 1950. During this period public leadership in foreign affairs
has. been assumed by lesser Soviet figures.
Although. Molotov' s appointment as Foreign
Minister in 1939 was soon, followed by a break with the Western
democracies, the Embassy points out that Molotov was also identified
with the policy of achieving a settlement with the outstanding power
then threatening the USSR,
The Embassy also considers it unlikely
that Zhukov was produced only for a single appearance in Poland. He
may be destined for some significant position, such as that of an
Eastern European counterpart to Eisenhower. While Zhukov is
identified with the idea of good relations with the wartime allies, he
also epitomizes successful conduct of a ware The Embassy inclines
to the belief that he will be involved in a build-up of Soviet military
preparations in Eastern Europe.
3. Comment on appointment of new Soviet Minister of the Navy-
The appointment of Vice Admiral N. G.
Kuznetsov to the post of Soviet Navy Minister, as in the case of the
recent reappearance of Marshal Zhukov, marks the return from semi-
retirement not only of a competent professional military man but also
one previously known to be favorably disposed toward. the West.
In 1948, Kuzn.etsov was one of four high-
ranking naval officers court-martialed on charges of divulging
military secrets during wartime. Kuznetsov was very cooperative
in his wartime relations with the Allies; the officers involved in that
trial were, significantly,, accused of permitting information on Ge.r-,
man weapons to ''be,passed to the British and Americans.
Prior to 1948 the new Navy Minister
enjoyed a distinguished career. He was People's Commissar of the
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Navy from 1939 until. the unification of the defense ministries in 1946,
when he became Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces. During the
period from 1939 to 1947, he was also Commander-inn-Chief of the
Soviet Navy. His demotion h January 1947 to Chief of Naval Training
Establishments preceded his subsequent disgrace,
Evidence on the reasons behind both
Kuznetsov`? s dismissal and his reinstatement is scant. He may have
been dismissed because of opposition to unification of the armed forces,
because of personal frictions, or because of his status as a non-political
professional who had outlived his usefulness.
His reinstatement could spring from a
need for professional, as opposed to political,, naval leadership, or
from the newly-hinted Soviet policy of "friendship" and "understanding"
with the English-speaking world.
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Syria disturbed about future of Jordan-,
The danger of an Iraqi-Jordanian union,
with designs against Syria and encouraged
by the British, is more acute since the
death of King Abdullah, according to the
Syrian Prime Minister. The Prime Minister considers that Prince
Tailal should be king, and is disturbed by the haste in naming Naif
regent. Syria stands for an independent Jordan that would work out
its own destiny without any outside interference.
Comment.- A union of Syria, Iraq and
Jordan under his leadership was Abdullah? s life-long ambition In
a limited sense, this paralleled the British long range interest in
developing a strong, stable Arab Near East. With the Jordanian
succession in doubt, there has been considerable speculation about
the possible merger of Iraq and Jordan Such a development, with
the subsequent incorporation of Syria, would be popular with many
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people in the three countries" It would, however, be violently opposed
by others, including the Israelis, who have expressed apprehension,
over the possibility of such a development.
EASTERN EUROPE
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Molotov speech alarms Yugoslav leaders:
High Yugoslav officials are concerned over
the Molotov speech in Warsaw because they
feel that it is the type of ','soundoff" that may
be expected if the USSR decides to attack-
Yugoslavia. In a conversation with Ambassador Allen on 23 July, 'Tito
alluded to this speech and emphasized his concern that the USSR would
seek compensation elsewhere for its undoubted defeat in Korea.
Cow Soviet,propaganda attacks on
Yugoslavia have recently reached an all time peak.. There is no
evidence, however, that a Satellite attack is imminent. Molotov's
brief reference to Yugoslavia in his Warsaw speech, in which he stated
that the Tito regime "cannot last long, 19 appears to be more of a warning
to Poland about what a Satellite should not do than a threat to Yugoslavia.
US Political Adviser recommends US policy shift on Trieste:
The US Political Adviser in Trieste believes
that the only possible solution to the Trieste
issue is the definitive partition of the Ter-
ritory along ethnic lines, whereby Italy
would receive practically all of Zone A and a substantial coastal strip
in Zone B;,, Since neither Italy nor Yugoslavia would willingly accept
such a solution, he recommends that the US radically-change its
current policy toward Trieste and exert pressure for an early Italian-
Yugoslav agreement, He points out that, if an early definitive solution
is not reached, the US must be prepared to accept, continued and pro-
bably increasingly hostile agitation within Trieste and Italy and a stiffen-
iliig Yugoslav attitude-toward Italy.
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Co The US has officially favored
the return of all of Trieste to Italy since March 1948, with the recommen-
dation that Yugoslavia and Italy settle the issue bilaterally. While Yugo-
Sill leaders hate asserted their willingness to reach a bilateral settle-
ment involving some slight rectifications of the Zone B border in Italy's
favor, this would still not satisfy present Italian demands.. The US
Ambassador in Belgrade, noting the increased seriousness with which
the Yugoslav Government has viewed recent Italian agitation, has been
counseling the US against further involvement in the Trieste issue,
which; he ;claims can be settled by evolution
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