CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 21, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1A I A
25X1A
pproved For Relase 2Q03,Lti0P2: 6QEMA00020000
21 July 1951
25X1
Copy No. Z -
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BLLETIN
DOCUMENT 000001,
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
[ I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO; TS S C A%
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
REVIEWER:
Office of Current .Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25X1
25X1
25X1
Army and State Department
review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5
 Approved Fort
25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
US-Philippine treaty of alliance.sugge tcd (page Sao
Current views on European Army concept (page 3).
Opposition to adxni.asi nn of Greece and Turkey in NATO conti.nu .s
(page 4)..
Comment on b
NEB EAST
ssin.aUion of King Ahduilah (page 5),
Britain wanes US to withhold Iranian aid (page 7).
EA4TERN EUROPE
8. Yugoslavs fear possible consequences ' of West:Prn, support of Italian,
claims to Trieste (page 8).
LAT.' AMERICA
10- 'U ,i,. . Cl 1e;f of St f to discuss military mead-ers with UN a.na.d US
officials (page 9)a
25X1A
25X1A
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5
 Approved For
25X1A
25X1A
GENERAL
I- US-Philippine treaty of alliance suggested
In the opinion of US Ambassador Cowen, a
bilateral US- Philippine pact of alliance would
help substantially to allay unfavorable Philippine
reactipn to the draft Japanese
ea
e t
p
c
reaty.
Such an arrangement would quiet Philippine fears over the resurgence of
Japanese military power and serve as a "face-saver" in the current
uproar over the peace treaty.
1nmt Although popular protest continues
against the reparations clause in the Japanese peace treaty, the Philippine
Government, vidently realizing that the US is adamant on the reparations
issue, is now directing its criticisms against the inadegate security
provisions of the treaty. President Quirino told his Council of State
on 17 July that adequate controls to safeguard Philippine security are
more important than reparations, and that, since the treaty fails to
provide sufficient guarantees, it is therefore unacceptable to the Philippines,
If the government can turn public attention toward the security problem
and subsequently negotiate a US-Philippine alliance, it will have neatly
resolved the dilemma created by its extravagant public demands for
reparations.
25X1A
2. Current yi .w on European Army concept.
The Italian representative to the NATO council
of deputies expresses skepticism that an
effective European Army can be formed.
The Netherlands Foreign Minister states
that his government is still unconvinced that
such an army is desirable.
The Italian, representative believes thathe
French view a European Army primarily as a
means of insuring French hegemony over
Germany and Italy and that national differences
would prevent real progress toward European
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5
 Approved F
0200001-5
25X1A
25X1A
integration in any field unless the US constantly participated as the "honest
broker. " The Dutch Minister remains "very skeptical" of the Army's
success and the sincerity of present German cooperation,
CoLUragnti The views of the Italian representative
go beyond those expressed to date by the Italian Government. The Nether-
lands is not represented at the European Army Conference, and its opposition
stems from dislike and distrust of French leadership on the continent and,
to a lesser extent, ~t e fear of a rebirth of German power.
The Freh have recently shown new enthusiasm
for their original proposal for a European Army which was designed to
avoid the re-establishment of a German national army and particularly
of the German General Staff The Germans appear willing to accept the
European Army idea, once German denditions --b chiefly in regard to size
of units are met, The Italians support the French.proposal in principle,
only if the implementation of the European force does not delay Western
defense.
The UK remains cool to the European Army
concept, but proba~ily will accept a compromise of the proposals recently
made at the Petersberg and Paris talks. In the event of UK approval and
adherence to the concept of a European Army, as well as more evident. US
interest to counterbalance France and krmany, the Dutch will be more
ready to participate in the discussions for organizing the Army.
General. Eisenhower believes that the solution
of the problem of European defense is impossible until the German problem
Is solved, and states that the time has come to pre4p for immediate action.
urke linNATO continues -
I In the NATO deputies' discussion of 16 July,.
the Netherlands and Portugal supported the
Norwegian position against the admission of.
Greece and Turkey to NATO. The Netherlands
pointed out that to admit Greece and Turkey would be to lose the homogeneity
of the present regional group in NATO and to change it into a purely military
alliance-
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5
 Approved Forj Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300?00001-5
25X1A
Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands agreed
with other NATO countries on the military necessity for using Greek and
Turkish tro6ps in the Mediterranean, but reiterated their suggestion for
a regional alliance tied to NATO through "reciprocal obligations, r' in effect
through a military liaison.
CoWment., The crux of the difficulty is the
requirement for unanimous NATO agreement on the admission of new
members. The small NATO countries are heartened in their opposition
by the reluctant attitude of France, whose final, decision awaits the
formation of a government, The UK's agreement with the US Phsition.
probably can serve as the opening wedge to achieve favorable action on
the admission of Greece and Turkey.
NEAR EAST
4. Comment on the assassination of King Abdul laho
The assassination of King Abduliah of Jordan
by a terrorist reportedly in contact with the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem
removes. a resolutely Ott-Communist, pro-Western ruler from the Arab Wild.
The end of Abdullah? s influence will most immediately and directly, affect
the British who rely on the British-trained, officered, and financed Arab
Legion *e army of Jordan) as the only competent and dependable Arab
army in the Near ,East. The confusion and possible disorders which may
result can only benefit the anti-Western elements in the Near East-
The sixty-nine year old king had many enemies
both in the neighboring Arab states and in Jordan. Distrust and resentment
of him stemmed from his apparent willingness to try to sign a treaty with
Israel and from his sporadic attempts, in conjunction with his nephew, the
Regent of Ira% to establish ;x Greater Syria, consisting of Jordan, Iraq,
and Syria.
The former Mufti, currently in% Lebannns is
strongly anti-British. He had attempted to set up an independent Arab
government in Palestine after the creation of Israel and has violently opposed
5
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5
 Approved Fora Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A00030g200001-5
25X1A
the incorporation of the major part of Arab Palestine into Jordan.
Riad al-Solh, the former. Prime Minister QL
ebanon who was assassinated in Amman on 16 July, was a contributor
to the former Mufti' s funds. Unconfirmed rumors that a carload of.
Leb4nse gunmen had been stopped at the Syrian border on their way to
Jordan to avenge the death of Solh suggest the additional possibility of a
connection between the two assassinations.
Prince Naif, the king's "'second son, has
been named temporary regent. Abdullah's eldest son Tallal, the heir
apparent, is currently undergoing treatment in a mental institution in
Switzerland. Under the terms of the constitution Tallal's mental condition
precludes his becoming monarch, and his fifteen year old son Hussein
accordingly is the legal successor. 25X1
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5
 Approved Fo
25X1A
25X1A
Britain wants US to withhold Iranian aid
0001-5
The British.Ambassador in Washington has
Informed the Department of State that his
government assumes the US will withheld
25X1A
Including the proposed 9 ? pillion dollar Export-Import Bank loan.
Comments The Foreign Office has held
consistently that British and US interests in the Iranian Situation are
essentially the same, and that the US therefore ought fully to support
British efforts to penalize irresponsible Iranian behavior. The Foreign
Office has also been considering a trade embargo against Iran, but so
fatr':tb have been no indications that the US would be asked to participate
in such action.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5
 25X1A
Approved For
25X1A
}001-5
EASTERN EUROPE
Yugus~zy fear ss -le o?rn gueiees o Western au 'Mort of 1talfia%
1aims to Tr s e
'25X1
Yugoslavia _has pratested to the US9 BritLgh
and French I overoments against the western
poi,icy for the return of Trieste, to Italy. The
Yugoslav Government has warned the Western
25X1A
PQwers that t1 its seriously weakens Yugoslaavia? s innterna onal
position and encour?ag8s Italian irredentiists who are now eai.~'ng for the
retu of all of Trieste as well as the Yugoslav citnea of Polar Istria and
eveniahMti,? o. ports. The Foreign Office official who made the representa-
tions to US'Amhas ador Afi.en stated that Moscow, through the Communist
Parties In I yq Greece and Au stria9 wfb.s making every effort >> prevent
a rapprochement he`Lween Yugoslavia and these counntries
CaMM2BI The recent Western reaffirmation
of the Mach 1948 ~ripairt to declaration was made to allay the curremt.
.
Italia agita' Lon over 71,eate which. was aroused by the refusal of the Allied
P i,Ui :ry Government to recognize Italian Jurisdiction over Trieste courts,
Yugoslav leaders are taking a, seriou view of the current Italian agitation
over the %sue, probably because it eolncWWie,s with Italian demands for a
revision of the military clauses of the Italan Peace Treaty.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0003002p0001-5
25X1A
25X1
LATIN AMERICA
25X1 A 10. Rraz ief of Si f to discuss mill, matters with UN and US officials:
Brazilian Foreign Minister .eves da Fontoura
has -informed the US Ambassador that the
purpose Ge feral Cots Mont i.roes visit
to the US is to discussa' the position of
Brazil's armed forces. in relation to the UN and the US. Neves made it
clear that d,,.s u.ssio of these points would inevitably bring forward the
quest on of equipment for the, Braziilia n armed fo es
The Foreign Minister also stated that the
ge q ai had no
tnstruo on s , than those An the Military f ield and ha
may s ~, i :ag ,A n e5 a .e ~~ of US capita in .Braz J and re ae !.lru of x roleum
equi m ~rA 11arL bi my field, to
Co?e:o Genera! Gabs Mo Ii~n.os, Chief of
the Armed Forces G e e. ?afl Staff a ?rlves in a New York on 23 ~u~y for a
series of talks with UN off ic alk'jn New York and US officials in Washington.
It is quite likely that, as these conversations proceed Goes Monteiro w
bring up such economic matters as the question of oil refinery and factory
equi anent -- as i. ndicated by the US Ambassador,
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5