CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000300030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Rele e?2fl0Q1 6 SEG E AQQ 0030001-4
30 dune 1951
Copy No.. 79
CUMRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 2
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW BATE: -__----`sic ---
DATE REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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US Ambassador in. Moscow. comments on Gromyko interview (page 3).
FAR EASt
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o. esia will embargo rubber to China (page
NEAR EAST
8. US considers proposing a sixty-day moratorium in oil dispute (page 7)o
WESTERN EUROPE
9 British delivery of Polish tankers reviewed and delayed (page 8)0
10. Interim interzonal trade agreement probably would release Berlin
exports (page 8)0 .
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GENERAL
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US Ambassador in Moscow comments on Gromyko interview:
serious effort. to achieve a Korean settlement, regardless of its propaganda
implications. I ;rkfeels that the Chinese People's Republic is also behind
the move.
US Ambassador Kirk in Moscow believes
that Gromyko's specific on-the-spot answers
to important questions indicate that the Soviet
Government considers the Malik proposal a
Gromyko's insistence that cease-fire negotia-
tions remain separate from political and territorial questions implies
that such questions will be raised later in. connection with the Communist
terms for settlement. There is no evidence that these terms will not
initially include Chinese Communist membership in the UN, control of
Taiwan, Chinese and Korean participation in the Japanese peace treaty,
as well as the evacuation of all foreign troops from Korea.
The US Ambassador is inclined to suspect
that the Chinese Communists are unwilling to continue the costly camp-
aign. and that urgent requirements of the Chinese over-all program neces-
sitate abandoning the venture, at least for the present. He speculates.
that the importance of China to the USSR constrains the Soviet Government
to react with greater flexibility than is customary with the Eastern European
Satellites.. Considerations. of face make the Chinese Communist Govern-
ment prefer that the USSR initiate the advances.
In answer to British proposals for further
soundings of Communist China, North Korea and possibly the Soviet Gov-
ernment. Kirk emphasizes that Gromyko carefully sought to avoid. govern-
mental discussions in favor of direct negotiations between military comman-
ders, The Ambassador considers that the opening move should be made
by General Ridgway and the South. Korean commander.
Damm nto There is no evidence that the Peip-
ng regime is anxious. to .sue for peace at this. time. It is possible that the
USSR's desire to avoid direct involvement in the war and increased material
support for the Communist forces is the primary motivation underlying the
proposals.
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60 ,I_doneiawill. embargo rubber to China:
The Indonesian Cabinet agreed on 27 June
that rubber should be included unconditionally.
in the list of strategic Indonesian exports
that, in accordance with the UN embargo,
will be denied to Communist China.
Comment: Indonesia abstained in the UN
when the embargo was voted. Subsequently, the government prepared a
list of strategic materials to be prohibited to China; this list, however,
excluded rubber. donesia historically has not shipped rubber
to Chin
e reversal of Indonesia's position ;occurred after the US Ambassador
Inakarta had stressed that, under the Kern Amendment, Indonesia
might not qualify for US aid if it omitted rubber from its strategic list.
Prgtcts for the strict implementation of the embargo by Indonesia
are limited, however, since the, government lacks the administrative
machinery to control adequately the destination of privately owned
rubber.
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SOUTH ASIA
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, NEAR EAST
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8. US considers proposing a sixty-day moratorium in the oil, dnsputeo
The US Department of State is prepared to
suggest a "moratorium" to Iran and the
adoption of innteriaa arrangements for 60 days
between Iran and the Annglo-Irannian Oil Com-
pany that would, without prejudice to the
issues Involved, permit operations and oil
shipments to continue until a more perma-
nent settlement could be worked out. When
this proposal was submitted to British Foreign Minister Morrison for
comment, he indicated that the US proposal, appeared both helpful and
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constructive, and expressed the'UK's willingness that such an approach
be made. Mr. Morrison urged, however, that it be made clear to the
Iranians that operations of the oil industry must be under full AIOC manage-
ment, and that interim financial arrangements must be along the lines
already proposed by the AIOC.
Comment: While the new proposals offer a
ray of hope, it is unlikely that they will be acceptable to the Iranians,
especially in the form suggested by Morrison, unless Iran is willing to
make a major change in its oil nationalization policy, In view of British
experience with Iranian intransigence, the UK probably does not attach
much hope to this current effort to break the impasse.
WESTERN EUROPE
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British delivery of Polish tankers reviewed and delayed-.
owned tankers being built in British ports. Meanwhile, the Foreign
Office reports that the trials of the first two tankers, delivery of which
had been expected by mid-July, have been postponed by two weeks, and
are now scheduled to begin on 9 y.
Comment:. Review of the issue in the light
of the Iranian crisis and delay in the trials follow vigorous US represen-
tation along those lines. The stated UK position remains that the vessels
will be delivered due to the legal principle involved and to fear of retaliation
Foreign Secretary Morrison expressed in-
terest to4JS Ambassador Gifford in the idea
that the Iranian oil crisis might justify de-
laying the delivery of the Polish Government-
10. Interim interzonal trade agreement probably would release Berlin exports:
v- - -I. c+.+..vuuww~u v ed- "A 1J # ALMA AUUL.LICPIIP' LYYLEL &AM
Soviet authorities in that city may resume
clearing West Berlin export permits if a new
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sentative of the Bonn Government reports that the East Germans appear
favorably disposed toward a two months' extension of the present interim
agreement,, which will expire 2 July. Meanwhile, the Soviets failed to
pass any export permits on 28. June, and the backlog is now over 7, 000,
US officials believe the USSR is determined
to exert strong pressure for the early conclusion of a trade agreement.
The chairman of the East German state planning commission said on
28 June that if all interzonal trade agreements, including interim arrange-
ments, are allowed to lapse on 2 July, then complementary agreements
will also become invalid, resulting in the stoppage of the delivery of
electric current and coal to West Berlin.
Comment: The determination of the Soviet
authorities and the East Germans to get an early trade agreement might
prompt them to apply further pressure In the form of cutting off coal and
electric power supplies to West Berlin. In that event, West Berlin could
resort to its three months' stockpile of coal and its own adequate, though
more expensive sources of electric power,
interzonal trade agreement, or an interim
agrangement, is concluded by the' East and
West Germans without delay and confirmed
by Allied authorities. The Berlin trade repre-
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