CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000200500001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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 Age
SUMMAR Y
254
NEAR EAST
3. Current outlook for Iranian oil negotiations -unfavorable (page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
4. US Embassy in Prague recommends retaliation in plane incident (page 4).
5. Yugoslav opposition to Balkan Peace Observation Commission continues (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. British Cabinet defers decision on Chinese embargo (pages=5)
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NEAR EAST
3.
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The Department of State, in suggesting that Ambassador Grady stress to the Shah
the dangers- ,n h-er.ent; in the current Iranian attitude, characterizes the present Iranian
position as not only a rbasonable but designed. to remove all hope of negotiation
except on terms of cvnpiete capitfalationn.
US Ambassador Grady reports that he has
pointed out to Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq
that the presentation of ultimat%ms to the
British will make effective discussion with
them impossible. He urged Mossadeq to
reconsider his present course pf action, to
halt the provocative acts of govprn}nent re-
presentatives at Abadan and to attempt to seek
an agreement with the British within the principle
of nationalization. Mossadeq replied that he had
never contemplated talks with the British except
1.01.thin the framework of the nationalization law.
According to the British Embassy in Tehran,
the Iranians have demanded the company' s funds deposited in Iran, amounting to
approximately 300 million rials (roughly $8 to 9 million), and have announced that
the several thousand British, Indian and Pakistani contract laborers of the "ex-AIOC"
are now on contract to the lrgni.an Government. The UK Foreign Office is drawing
up a request to the International. Court of Just-lee for. "interim measures of protection"
against these and other Iranian interferences.
Cow; The Iranian attempt to implement the
section o:nationalization law calling for the transfer to the .Iranian Government of
75 percent of AIOC revenue earned since 20 March can hardly be acceptable to the
British, who have recognized the principle of nationalization but consider the Iranian
nationalization law both "illggal and unworkable. " The Iranians, having refused to
submit the oil dispute to the International Court of Justice, will not be dissuaded from
action by UK requests to the Court for protection. A further unfavorable factor is
the possibility that the tensions being created in the oil area by anti-British propaganda
!night result in violence, and thus close the door to a negotiated settlement.
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EASTERN EUROPE
4. US Embassy iara Prague recommends retaliation in Diane incident;
25X1 US Ambassador Briggs in Prague notes that
i
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a
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repeated Embassy efforts have
information from the Czechoslovak Government
regarding the two US planes that presumably
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landed to Czechoslovakia last week, and recommends early retaliatory action.
Briggs fears that the pilots are being subjected to pressure tactics and may even
be tried far espionage. In order to demonstrate the seriousness with which the
US views this incident, he recommends that (a) US authorities in Germany inter-
cept and impound two Czechoslovak commercial planes overflying the US Zone,
or (b) the US immediately cancel Czechoslovak civil overflights of the American Zone.,
that such action might alarm the Yugoslav people and would seem unnecessary since
Satellite pressures on Yugo sla\ri.a have not increased significantly during recent
months. Bebler expressed interest, however, in a US suggestion to expedite
rapid UN action in case a menacing situation should develop. He will seek
instructions on this from Belgrade and also will inquire into Belgrade's latest
views o,, a, Peace Observation. Cor iJssion limited to the Balkans. During the
conversat.,,m, Bebler indicated that Yugoslavia, in the event of Satellite aggression,
intends immediately too (a) call upon foreign military attaches in Belgrade to conduct
an inquiry into the cause and nature of the Satellite aggression, and (b) request UN
action in accordance with the procedure established by the General Assembly
resolution of 1.7 November. 1950.
In a recent conversation with a member of the
US UN delegation, Yugoslav delegate Bebler
reiterated his government's present opposition
to the establishment of a Peace Observation
Commission limited to the Balkans. He stated
Ccamnen Bebler's views indicate that there
has been no change in Yugoslav plans in the past two months and that the Yugoslav
Government has no intention of bringing its case before the UN prior to the autumn
session of the General. Assembly
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WESTERN EUROPE
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6. l ritash Cabinet defers decision on Chinese gmb-Ugo
The British Cabinet has deferred action to
prohibit at this time the transport to Communist
China in British ships of items embargoed under
the 18 May UN Resolution. The Foreign Office
states, however, that the Cabinet will be willing to consider such a shipping pro-
hibition if a plan for concerted action is proposed in the Additional Measures
Committee of the UN.
men The Foreign Office statement
suggests that the UK may be willing to implement the UN shipping embargo policy,
it is wary of putting the extensive British shipping in Far Eastern waters at a
competitive disadvantage by -proceeding unilaterally. The UK may also believe
that too ready acceptance of the minimal action contemplated under the UN Resolution
would tend to commit the"IJK to a general shipping embargo,- such as the-one the -IJS
has informally urged and officials in the British Admiralty have reportedgy re-
commended.
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