CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100530001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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10 April 1951
Copy O.c
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE LLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGE--D TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: .
AUTH: HR 70?''
DATEj!/'
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Army and DIA review(s)
completed.
w DOS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Embassy Moscow sees possibility of indirect Soviet inter-
vention in Korea under cover of Mongolian "volunteer" assis-
tance (page 3).
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WESTERN EUROPE
3, US Ambassador pessimistic about Spain's defense capabilities
(page 4).
4. Militancy waning in Italian Communist Party (page 5).
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GENERAL
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1. Embassy Moscow sees possibility of indirect Soviet intervention
in Korea under cover of Mongolian volunteer assistance:
Embassy Moscow believes that the USSR
may attempt to bolster the Chinese Com-
munists and still avoid direct Soviet involve-
ment in the Korean war through the de-
vice of providing "volunteer" assistance from the Mongolian Peo-
ple's Republic to the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces.
Such an intervention would merely be a mechanism cloaking actual
.Soviet participation in the Korean war, since the ostensibly Mongolian
units could in. fact consist of Soviet army or air force units containing
nationals of various yellow races in the Soviet Far East and Central
Asia. This intervention would be welcomed by the Chinese and could
alleviate criticism of the USSR which has undoubtedly developed with-
in the Chinese Communist Party and among the Chinese people in
view of the heavy losses in Korea caused by Soviet failure to pro-
vide sufficient planes and equipment.
In the Embassy's opinion, inauguratii-!_i.
of effective Communist air intervention. from across the border
should be recognized on the one hand "as "final. and total abandon-
ment by the Chinese People's Republic of willingness for a nego-
tiated settlement," and on the other hand as an "unequivocal act
of war against the UN.."
Comment: In response to questions
concerning the alleged Soviet plans to utilize a "volunteer army"
including Mongolians in Korea, the Department of the Army has
commented that (a) the Mongolian People's Republic has an army
of about 30,000, with some token mechanized elements and an air
arm of sorts; (b) this force could be increased to a strength of
100,000 by utilizing other Mongolian personnel; and (c) it is doubt-
ful that more than five well-trained divisions of Soviet Mongolians
could be formed at this time. No all-Mongolian units are known
to exist in the Soviet armed forces, and few of the Soviet Mongoloid
nationalities would be trained in technical skills (which the Chi-
nese Communists also lack).
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WESTERN EUROPE
3. US Ambassador pessimistic about
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Anti-aircraft exists only in project form. Present flying equipment
The US Ambassador in Madrid has for-
warded the following statements from a
report of his Air Attache: "The Spanish
Air Force possesses only two radar sets.
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would last only a few days. The majority of the Spanish Air Force
.have never seen a jet." In the Ambassador's opinion, a comparable
,situation exists in the Spanish Navy and, to a slightly lesser degree,
in the Army. He comments that it is becoming increasingly obvious
that Spain will be incapable of defending the Pyrenees or any other
line unless it is given military equipment and assistance.
.Comment: mment: The US Ambassador's com-
?ments are believed to be completely accurate. For more than a
year; service attaches in Madrid have emphasized that. Spain could
only briefly delay an attack bya strong modern military force. In
March 1951, US Army Intelligence estimated that Spanish forces could
delay a ground attack through the Pyrenees for a maximum of two
weeks.
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4. Militancy waning in Italian Communist Party:
of even the most active Italian Communist militants were hindering
the active development both of the party and of Communist-dominated
"front" organizations such as the General Labor Confederation and
the Partisans of Peace. He also admitted that the party might have
to send militants from Communist strongholds in North Italy to the
southern districts in order to: build up party prestige in those areas..
Italian Communist leader Secchia ad-
mitted at the party congress on 5 April
that insufficient zeal and a devotion to
sectarianism or opportunism on the part
The US Embassy in Rome comments that
Secchia's admissions confirm its belief that the Italian Communist
Party has lost much of its momentum and that the decline in enthu-
siasm among the masses and even among party militants may pre-
vent the Communists from enlisting the support of the majority of
Italians in their campaign against the Atlantic Pact.
Comment: Secchia's statements confirm
the increasing lack of interest in Communist Party activities pre-
viously reported as prevalent among provincial elements of the
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party. Party discipline, however, will probably ensure that these
elements, despite their lack of zeal, vote "correctly" at the forth-
coming municipal elections. The Communists will probably not be
.able to remedy the lack of militancy confronting the party unless
economic conditions deteriorate.
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