CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100330001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 16, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 March 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENNO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
If ' DECLASStF;ED
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DATE or
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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USAID, DOS reviews completed TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
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GENERAL
1. Indian Prime Minister takes personal interest in Moroccan
situation (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. French obstructing ECA, program in Indochina (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
4. Communist strength in Austrian police force revealed (page 5).
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GENERAL
1. Indian Prime Minister takes personal interest in Moroccan situation.
On 12 March, an official of the Indian Min?-
f---.
istry of External Affairs read to US Ambas-
Henderson portions of a private
sador
message from Prime Minister Nehru to the
French Government in which Nehru expressed the hope that France
would take appropriate steps to ensure the eventual independence of
Morocco. The official stated that the Syrian Minister and the Indian
Charge in Baghdad had suggested the move and that the governments
of the Arab countries had been confidentially informed of Nehru's
action. According to Ambassador Henderson, Nehru wrote in most
friendly terms, although he displayed sympathy for the Moroccans
and other North African nationals. The Ambassador believes that
Nehru's new interest in North Africa has been stimulated by a de-
sire to strengthen his influence in Arab countries of the Middle East.
Comment: It is doubtful that Nehru's mes-
sage will have much effect on the French in view of French sensitivity
to external interference and the antagonism raised by Nehru's earlier
outspoken criticisms of colonialism in Indochina. On the other hand,
the message may improve India's position in the eyes of those Arab
nations which opposed Indian recognition of the state of Israel last
September.
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3. French obstructing ECA program in Indochina,.
After more than a month's study, French Economic
Counselor Penavaire, an old-line "colonialist" in
General de Lattre's High Commissariat who re-
portedly holds a narrow concept of Vietnamese in-
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dependence and is suspicious of US aims in Indochina, is delaying the
conclusion of bilateral aid agreements between the US and the three
Associated States of Indochina. Acting under authority based on the
Franco-Vietnamese agreements of 8 March 1949, Penavaire has pro-
posed amendments to the text worked out by US and Vietnamese repre-
sentatives that are in almost every case identical with those previously
either deleted or rejected by US negotiators. In reporting this French
action, Indochina ECA Chief Blum observes that such French intran-
sigence can only reinforce the Asian belief that the Associated States
are far from being independent of France.
Comment, The fact that General de Lattre himself
has recently expressed suspicions of ECA activities in Indochina sug-
gests that Penavaire's attitude reflects more than the private view of
one isolated French official.
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 WESTERN EUROPE
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4. Comnignist strength in Austrian police force revealed:
of gradually weeding out Communists (appointed in large numbers
under Austria's provisional government in 1945) has been much less
effective than responsible police officials have suggested.
Comment. This investigation will afford,
for the first time, a comprehensive picture of the composition of the
police. According to an unofficial press report, 50% of the adminis-
trative police, 33% of the secret police and 20% of the regular police
voted the Communist ticket in the police union elections. Discontent
with economic conditions and with the government can only in small
part explain this unexpectedly large pro-Communist vote. Although
the investigation may result in forcing Austrian officials to make
greater efforts to remove or counteract Communist influence in the
police, civil service laws and the fear of Soviet retaliation will con-
tinue to hamper these efforts.
as revealed a the n erior inis er s policy
An investigation of Communist strength in
the Austrian police fort
LF
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