CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100240001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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6 March 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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NC CHANGE IN CLASS.
CECI.ASSIFIED
C J ?:, J. CHAP-GOD TO: TS S
NEXT REV!=W DATE:
DATE/ ' REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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State Department review completed' TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Turkish Ambassador fears USSR may raise Straits question
(page 3).
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NEAR EAST
3, British military planning alternative for Suez base (page 4)
WESTERN EUROPE
25X1 4. French want voice in Spain's defense role (page 5).
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GENERAL
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1. Turkish Ambassador fears USSR may raise Straits question:
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Turkish Ambassador Goker in Moscow
has informed US Ambassador Kirk that
he believes the Soviets may raise the
question of the Dardanelles and the Mont-
reux Convention at the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers meet-
ing. Goker stated that the USSR had made no approaches to Turkey
concerning the Straits since 1946. However, he regarded the Soviet
note of mid-February protesting the alleged Turkish shelling of a
Soviet tanker as a possible initial move to reopen the issue. To
date the Turkish Government has not replied to the protest. The
Turkish Ambassador considers that complete silence of the Soviet
press on the incident indicates a Soviet desire to utilize the incident
for diplomatic purposes rather than immediate propaganda.
The Turkish Am assa or's apprehensions apparently stem
from the fact that the Montreux Convention comes up for possible
revision this year. It is noteworthy, however, that to date only the
Western powers have sought to broaden the agenda of a Council of
Foreign Ministers. Soviet propaganda silence with respect to the
Pamir incident may not be unusually significant, since the Soviets
frequently treat explosive incidents with caution.
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3. British military planning alternative for Suez base:
plan of the British Chiefs of Staff for the
future defense of the Suez Canal Zone in-
cludes the following features: (a) a phased
evacuation of the Suez Canal zone, beginning immediately and to be
completed by 1956, with "civilian" technicians replacing the military
specialists; (b) the leasing by the UK of the Suez base after 1956,
with administrative control in British hands but with Egyptian "parti-
cipation" and with the Egyptians responsible for policing the base;
and (c) the possible creation of a "temporary" base in Israel. The
British Embassy in Cairo has sharply criticized certain details in
this plan, and believes that to sell the Egyptians on any "joint de-
fense" arrangement for the area, the UK must first demonstrate
faith in Egyptian military capabilities by resuming the suspended
arms shipments,
Comment: This is the first specific evi-
dence that the British military has accepted the Foreign Office's
thesis that the main body of British troops will have to be located
outside the Canal Zone. Both the military and the Foreign Office
seem convinced that British forces must have access to the Canal
Zone itself in time of war.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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4. French want voice in Spain's defense role.
A French Foreign Office official has indi-
cated to US Embassy officials in London
that the French Government "wished to be
able to convince themselves" of the mili-
tary necessity of including Spain in the West's defense effort. He
implied that this could be done only if the French assist from the
beginning in determining how Spain can participate.
hif the US is in-
terested primarily in pain's military facilities, a bilateral relation-
ship between the US and Spain may offer the best solution. However,
if the emphasis is on the use of Spain's manpower, then the inclusion
of Spain in NATO will be necessary--a step that would entail great
difficulties, particularly irr Britain and France.
Comment: This is a plausible report of the
French Government's current attitude and possibly reflects its sin-
cere desire to avert later political difficulties in France over the
handling of the Spanish question. Last summer Foreign Minister
Schuman stated that the admission of Spain to NATO was the only way
to solve the question of the strategic utilization of that country.
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