THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SCENE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030040-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: March 27, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
27 Mara') 1957
STAFF ME/4DRARDUM NO. 18-57
SUBJECT: The Italian Political Scene
1. The current weakness of the Segni Government marks another
stage in the erosion of the coalition's cohesiveness since DeGasperi's
death, and illustrates anew the narrow limits within which the Italian
democratic center operates. A basic element in the present situation
has been the trend in opinion away from the political extremes over the
past year or two; the slow decline in Communist strength, accelerated
by events in Hungary, has reduced the political threat of the PCI. This
in turn has loosened the cement binding the center coalition. The con-
sequent greater maneuverability of the non-extremist Italian political
parties has recently been manifest in: (a) more independent attitudes
toward controversial legialation; (b) withdrawal of Republican (FRI)
pledged voting support for the coalition; (c) repercussions from the
Toga appointment; and (d) most important, heightened efforts of the
Social Democrats (PSDI) and the Nonni Socialists (PSI) toward unification.
As a result, speculation is rife concerning an imminent cabinet crisis
and the possibility of early national elections
2. An immediate issue threatening the government's tenure has
been parliamentary consideration of the Agrarian Contracts bill. Al-
though the government coalition some time ago agreed on a compromise
version of the bill, the PRI withdrew its support when the legislative
process was resumed recently. Segni then called for a vote of confidence,
which was won by only a very narrow margin. The issue is far from
resolved, however, since Segni is committed to passage of the bill un-
changed if he wishes to retain the Liberals (PLI) in the coalition.
Yet he faces opposition not only from the II, but also from elements
of the PSDI, a government party. His opponents have reserved the right
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ee debate each provision of the bill separately and he is prepared to
nake a confidence issue of every clause if necessary, While further
oonsideration of the Agrarian Contracts hill could thus entail the fall
of the government, it is possible that the issue will be avoided for the
inmediate future. It is also possible that when the bill Is reconsidered
Segni will be able to maneuver it through by threatening to lead his-
Chrietian Democratis Party (CD) toward a center-right position.
1,
On the other hand, the value of such a tactic has already
been somewhat reduced by the outcry against Segnies recent appointment
oC right-wing Cl) deputy Togni as the first Ninister of State Partielpation,
The grant to a conservative of substantial control over state holdings in
Industrial and commercial enterprises has provoked heavy criticism from
the left and loft-center, including many elements in the coalition,-. Reper-
eeesions have been particularly serious within the PSDI; open conflict
between Vice-Premier Saragat and Party Secretary Matteotti caused the
latter to tender his resignation. While his offer has been rejected and
the controversy temporarily stilled, the issue highlights the dilemma
facing the PSDI2 whether to continue participation in a government which
may increasingly turn right to compensate for lost strength on the lefto
or to leave the coalition before arrangements for an alternative aligument
have entered, a final. phase,,
This dilemma and the growing enervation of the government are
largely attributable to the increased. pace of Socialist unification efforts
over the past year. The difficult and protracted negotiations between tho
PSI. and PSDI have affected not only the participants, hut the various
metaof the coalition, with a lonsequent debilitating effect on Segni 's
position, These negotiations appear to be making slow but continous pro-
gress. Nenni seemingly received a rebuff to his unification policy at
the February PSI Congress, but its complex results and current indications
that his influence is generally undimished suggest that he was merely
werned by hie party to move with more caution toward an approved goal,,
For his part, Saragat is under pressure from the PSDI ranks President
Gronehle and the Felropean Socialist parties to amend his suspicious
attitude and his insistence on ideological concessions by Nenni. In
fact, Nennlvs position regarding the PCI and foreign policy questions
eey closely resettles that of aragat himself when he broke with the
PSI in 1947e
5, While the principals thus are cautiously feeling each other
out on further unification movee? the rank and file of their parties
increasingly seem to be making contact on the local level:, The obstacles
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to unification in terms of labor affiliation, the cooperatives, and
financial support remain very sUbstantial. But progress is also being
made on these problema, The current defection of several small PSI
groups in industrial cities from the Communist-dominated COIL to the
Social Democratic UIL are particularly significant, since the labor
union issue is often regarded as the foremost barrier to unification.
6. Neverthelees. both the PSDI and the ISI -- and especially
4r functionaries -- Will continue to fear any dramatic shifts in
nomition, and progress toward unification will therefore probably con-
true to be 'lev. Saragutls obvious conoern that he would be over-
owed by Nenni in a reunited Socialist party is duplicated among
velitical job-holders in both parties. Yet there is mounting pressure
on Saragat to take a clear stand with respect to both the unification
issue and the question of PSDI participation in the government. The
scheduled PSDI Congress in June is inereasingly regarded as the touch,
etons for Saragatos intentions and, by extension, for Socialist unification.
7. The cumulative effect of the above political issues could spell
the fall of the Segni Government at virtually any time. On the other hand,
there still are elements of strength in Segnils position. Although plagued
by the Imgeletliem inherent in the position of the Italian democratic cen-
ter, Segni has had some emcees in promoting his legislative program, gen-
erally with Socialist support. Under present conditions it would be very
difficult to replace the current government with one equally effective.
To change the conditions would require either drastic political shifts --
which we do not anticipate -- or early elections. Here again Segni de-
rives some strength from the general reluctance to take responsibility
or such a controversial step; the determining elements favoring and
opposing early elections appear in rough balance at present. Moreover,
elections this spring will soon be out of the question on grounds of
timing, and summer elections are widely abhorred. There now appears to
be a slightly less than even chance that national elections will be
called before their scheduled time next year. Thus, Segni may be able
to retnin office for a while by playing on fears of untimely elections?
nnd by maneuvering to pick tip necessary support alternatively from the
right and left in steering a course through the forthcoming difficult
legislative period.
8. If the Segni Government nevertheless were to fail in the
near future, there would probably be a somewhat increased chance of
elections before the end of 1957. However, a protracted crisis or the
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early collapse of a succeseor government might be a ererequiste to a,
zgal for elections, since President Gronchi appears determined to retain
the present parliament until it obviously prevents foreation of a rela-
tively stable government. Prolongation of Segnius tenure or the success-
ful formation of a new government with reasonably good prospects for sur-
vival therefore would probably result in adherence to the 1958 electoral
schedule.
9. The Italian political scene thus will probably be marked by
continued instability and uncertainty until the general elections, whieh
may not occur until next spring. But changes could take place during
the interim which would substantially alter the political situation.
The center coalition era and its principal determinant -- the threat
froz the extreme left -- may be coming to an end. If Socialist unifica-
tion is achieved and the Christian Democrats cannot make compensating
gains on the right? the postwar center monopoly, of power might be termi
nated and a period of politicalexperimeetation might begin.
.LO . On the other hand, Christian nemocrecy is still a powerful
political force with considerable popular appeal. If the Christian
Democrats were able to reconstruct their center coalition after elections
most likely if Socialist unity were not achieved by that time -- they
could continue to govern despite the confusion on the left, In that
event the Italian political scene would appear little different than
It has over the past several years. The Italian Soeialists, frustrated
in their efforts to gain a voice in government, would probably drift
back Into cooperation with the Communists. Italy would be given a further
dose of Iematilleee,wIth its implicit dangers for the longer term.
II. Of these two alternative political developments, we believe
there in a slightly greater chance that the farmer? i.e., the terming-.
tion of center coalition government, will occur. However, the outcome
will be affected by various domestic and international developments --
many of which are incalculable and particularly- by the future of
Soaialist unification efforts? to which the Social Democrats now seam
Zoo hold the key. 25X1A9a
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