THE EGYPTIAN- SOVIET THREAT TO THE YEMEN *

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030029-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: May 14, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E ' AL X 3T LLIGEUC A E ' C!
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3mi-Sovj-at I-Imeat t t-be if D*
world attm1bi nbas af'sa-M4 G1 aaI
WE the USM qve 'era I e ?{i1.' IA4c,t'I ; c d
w1ifr ra-S c r to it : . I t fr i . mac, in ;h ? by
Irk vI of :: SaVomak in Jordan .1 the k?arden VIA,;.t of
c o c i b I tmwd t o as U ac ., 1 va: t o
ai ; .c s in thh Tin be2ore it its too lot*. , ' '
9 ,YYA and the , . uve a 4.%ci&l ine f;~. t:,co oa oli tsl
f'a b C F=4 Unity to do sea. If the Z a ut trump g in s
p ( o aaz a.;ac o liked `-o -aup Mh a: ack aaC,.
o t biea ftmimexas ie1 not am4- t1 t r he
"triftsh
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r a : c s Of Q111; .M- . da m been dia ?,-user with 1m-gj ,6
i la DD/Pp W. O 1&0 concur ill team.
DOCUMENT NO, t.,.....-~
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
C7 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO; TS S
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DATE: ZL I 0 Mr%AeImef%. n n al L ~r >(
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2. fte Soviet aspect of the campaign in the Yemen got um der
w; y in 1955 with the 1 of the 1928 Soviet-Yemeni ftiewUhlp
Tivaty. This was folloved by revival of Soviet Moc commercial
activities , in ! id.1956, by a Soviet agmement to supply
the with a large quantity of , probably h several times
the 9 million toga paymwt which In to be made for Umm. Soviet
shi my 'ae i opted by closu of the Sues Canal but have
.eco' been x4esuaa ai.> S 50 Soviet Bloc technicians have been active
in the Tin in the past six n hs and an agrmment for Soviet
construction of a T ,ai port on the Red Sea was announced in re el-A i1
Juut a few daYs after the I i ira ntay rejected, as too 12
the milli in Amwican aid offered by the Richards missi
MM PM1t devel. gat in addition to s iti bandlinp CC arms
sbi s, will, reduce the 's d ence on the WWitish-ccutrolled
port of Aden for its forei trade a
3 amThile, , which bas d much to enco
faeiU.tate the deval t of Soy et-Te ti ties,
with ? all enl activities of its c in MJlJtM7 training
activities, including efforts to develop Yemeni f' . n capabilities
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asd s s toward provision of volunteers for the QrWd foams,
area ntly continuing, Cairo Radio continues to provide stro
pr s support to the Yemen's claims against the British in
Adm. Moreover, the ians are reinsuring themselves by covert
support to the " Yemeni" movement which was active in abortive
;>f
coups against the Imm in 19W and 1955.
4. The ill and eccentric Imam ins suspicious of the
intentions of + irc Ic scow, and probably still s his acceptance
of aid from them in term of playing coo side inst the
Nomver,, recent developments have at least tempwartly increased
his susceptibility to Soviet and Lase attentives. Re is unhappy
over the inability of the American-owned Yawn Development Caqpay
to produce iwportant oil discoveries promptly, and unless the
c is able to satisfy him fairly sow, his frustration could
result in the icm of this sole a nt of American influence
from the c . is also probably still sn ing over the fact
that the Richards mission offered his country only owe of the million aid authorized for the Middle East. percent
Finally,
AacordJmg to a stelved-up
iF4gptlan subversion ign against e itiah position in
the Persian >. especially in ftmat and Owan -- is also
-3m
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he almost certainly coatis to lie that i Soviet
wills as to help him p ?ovrides a unique oppwtunity for pv suing
the easpaiga against the tish position in Aden to which he has
committed himself A
To what extent the rwtm will succumb to tiara
Soviet influence is net yet certain. could probably still. with-
draw his fo r isolatLLon and slam the door in the face of East,
West, and Egyptians alike. ver, his quarrel with the British
and ambitions for economic develo t T hing him in the
other dlzectian,, in the absence of substantial Western political
and economic support of the kind given to Saudi. Arabia and,, recently,
to Jordan.. there appears to be a good ice that within a year or
with the MM and
to extricate hi ltn if be attempts to do so, the feet
that his is a primitive, widely unpopular regime based a
religious minority naMs him es cielly v ble to a strongly-backed
plat to ovexthrow him. A VrocdsiaZ instrument for his replacemut
by a leftist- ti list regi already exists in the Egyptian-
backed "Free Y'e ni." m 'moo This Mm7ap, is still in contact
*
The a's ea r s to obtain Soviet suppcwt is refUcted in
recent l.icity given by the nls to a yurported Soviet
statement -- apparentl~y concocted by the Yemenis themselves --
cmdeming "British aWession in South T ." See e, the
moan Protectorate.-/.
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L
with tiaaident c nta witbitn the Cate which have in the past
re ly included even Crown Prince ZMr.
6. achiever by ftpt and the UMIR of a prepoMerant
inf It nce over powex the Yawn would not in itself upset the balance of in the Middle lest. critical , it woulWasent
d not
counterbalance Sa 's recent r re it away from F&Mb. Yili l r,
the prindtive 40.,000-man Yamesd army is unlikely to become a potent
new force the area, even with the beat of $ovis arm tad!
advisers -,. although it will become bed r able to harass the
British in Aden and perbaps even the Saudis. Emmvw., a success in
the Temen at this time w*LM be a great boost to
_- and
baps even Soviet -- mela and would help Airiscaw end Cairo sustain
their ca ign in the Middle Bast at the time it appeared to be
faltering. It would also serve to keep alive s 's dream of
ev uafly astablishIM his control over the oil resources of the
whole Arab world and w ruld extend the Soviet "presence" in the
area another long south to the edAp of the Indian Ocem.
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