THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400030064-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2000
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: February 10, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTKAL INTELLIGE'NCS AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
State Dept. declassification
release instructions on file
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. ?m56
SUBJECTS The Political Situation in Indonesia
10 February 1956
Terms of reference for NIE K+5-56 9 "Probable Developments in
Indonesia through 1956" are attached,, In preparation for Board
consideration of the terms of reference,, this memorandum discusses
the significance of the recent elections in Indonesia and the
possible political composition of a new government The estimate
is presently scheduled for IAC consideration sometime in May>
However, if the recent moves to advance the date of convocation
of the new parliament from April to March are successful, we
recommend the completion date of the estimate be advanced to
mid4pri;l..o
1u Indonesia's sixth cabinets the moderate Harahap coalition
government, has suffered a series of political setbacks in recent
weeks., The PremierVs Masjumi party lost strength in the recent
Parliament and Constituent Assembly elections, and party unity
continues to be strained by rivalry between the right and left wings
NOTE: The substance of this mess randum has been coordinated with CCI:.
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CONFIDENTIAL.
led by Natsir and Sukiman respectivelyr The Dutch-Indonesian
talks, which the Harahap government initiated with the general
aim of improving relations with the Netherlands and assuaging
domestic political pressures, have reached a stalemate,. Two
members of the coalition cabinet,; the Nahdatul Ulama (ICU) and
the ?artai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) resigned from the
cabinet on the specific issue of Harahap ' e conduct of negotiations
with the Dutch. The withdrawals were probably due to more basic
general party disagreements and the loss of prestige suffered by
the Masjumi in the elections;, The cabinet has also weathered
an air force command crisis,, a campaign of press and parliamentary
denunciations and a series of mass rallies demanding its resignation.
2 ~. In order to influence the selection of 21 representatives
from the various minority groups in the new parliament] the Harahap
government must remain in office until the parliament convenes
The government has indicated it intends to do so by pursuing
caretaker government courses of action since the elections and by
initiating a bill to advance the allocation of parliament and
assembly seats from April to March. This bill will probably be
passed by the present lame duck parliament and the Harahap
government will probably be able to survive the shorter incumbancy
The government will face the risk of a no confidence mof>I'.,'n and
consequent unseating in getting the bill, through parliament.,
However, a vote of no confidence would be likely only with President
Sukarno's active support, and in view of the short time before the
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aew parliament convenes,, Sukarno will probably not take responsi.-
hility for the foxTmation of an interim government.. He probably
feels the Harahap government's tenure will not change a ignif i -
cantly the present bargaining positions of the major parties,,
including that of his favored National Party (PNI) .
Indonesia's complicated system of proportional represent-
ation and seat allocation does not permit final determination
of the allocation of parliamentary seats for several months
salter the elections On the basis of nearly complete unofficial
returns,, the American Embassy ice. Djakarta predicts the final
distribution will look like this: Out of 257 seats,, Mas, umi?
57; PN 57 and I satellite party; Ni. 45; ?K10 40; PSII~99
Oha.istian party., 8; Socialists (PSI)66; all others 34,< This
estimate does not include the 21 appointive seats,. Not enough
returns are available in the case of the :5 December constituent
assembly elections to make an estimate concerning the outco s;
though it is not expected to differ significantly from the
parliamentary elections.
One of the most significant results of the elections
was the unexpectedly large number of votes received by the Moslem
Scholars or NU party., The NU is a new force in Indonesian politics.:
It split off from the Moslem intellectual strata, the Mas jwni,,
in 1951 and until the recent, elections was relatively insignificant.
It is the most provincial of the Indonesian parties and has had
the least contact with Western democratic traditi ons The
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American Embassy in DJawcarta has characterized the NU as "a
rustic band of Moslem elders and temple keepers." The party
does not have a cadre of leaders experienced in administration
or consideration of important policy issuesv and derives its
strength from the influence of religious teachers among its
members- This influence is indicative of a broadened base of
political power in a country which has been controlled since its
independence by an educated elite of less than 6,000 people.
In the behind the scenes political maneuvering which is now
taking place, the NU has indicated a preference for a broad
coalition which would include both the PNI and the Moslem
parties -.- Masjumi and PSIIo While there are indications of
differences of opinion within the NU concerning ?KI partici-
pation, the NU would probably not participate in a coalition
which included the PKI
5:. The PKI has achieved the status of fourth largest
Indonesian party and possesses the best organizational discipline,.
Since the elections, the PKI has emphasized the possibility of
cooperation between the PKI and other parties; particularly the
PNI and the PSII., The Communists covertly sponsored and
participated in three anti-colonialist rallies which also featured
PHI and P5II speakers: At one rally President Sukarno spoke
on the lesson of cooperation demonstrated by the rallies which
might be carried over into leadership of the country, Cooperation
between these three parties on specific issues in the new
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parliament would corner about, 110% of the votes President
Sukarno9 who is still the most popular and probably the single
most powerful man in Indonesiag has demonstrated a strong
affinity for the PNI and for its cooperation with the PKI,
However,9 while the Communists will probably not be invited
into the cabinet, PKI influence and political growth is
highly dependent on the composition of the. new cabinet:
Possible alignments in new cabinet
a, On the basis of present indications? the next Indonesian
government wi_ J probably be a coalition of PNI, NUS, iSII.r and
er minor parties, Such a coalition, would be acceptable to
;President Sukarno,. Mi.rdisterta1 Posts hold by minor Parties would
probably be few. since many of the smaller parties were eliminated
or did not participate in the elections., The next most likely
coalition is a PKI, NU and Masjurrmi grouping. Masjumi participatiorx
in the cabinets, however,, would probably occur only in the event
that the aukiman faction of the Masju.ami reached a working agree-.:
mend, with the PKI and the NU., Natsir and Sukiman have long been
rivals but despite innreaseed indications of strain between them
AZ the past few weeks, Sukiman will probably, not leave the party,
7., The possibility of a Moslem parties coalition l sju i,;
NU PSII -- in the new eabinat cannot be ruled out,, although the
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