SOVIET-FINNISH RELATIONS-POST PORKKALA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 19, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL IRTELLIGENCE AGETTC%
~C~ 0~' TQATIt~NA.L ESTITfiATE~S
t1MENt NO.
NO C E IN CLASS. Q
U DEC
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: NR TQ-2
a-T~: r1~-rn~~~~~ Bo ReviEwE~: d ~ g ~ - ~-
STA~`F t~~}RA.TII?UM I1~1? x.-55
19 ~t~aber 2955
~~JECTs ~AVIET-.FINP3IS'f3 RELATIONS?..POS7~ pflI~KiC1~L~
la der the tee of the ~av~,~atr-Finnish a~ee~ent a~ publ~.cly
announced tra ~9 *~ptember the II5SR re~in~s3.shed. its militmry bass an
Pc~~ 3.aa e~chan;Ce fart a ~O~aP ea~nsioa ai" the went Saviet-
F~.nnish t~,itual Assistance Pant. Recent rapartt~ fa Fin]a r~1 ~indicats
that a+thesr matters af' ~soncern to the Winne auas~a as the return eaY' pa?3.e~
axner~a ~ and return off' Eare~.ian territtarv' and thta Saimaa Canal. ~rere
pa~t~b~ab3.~r cc~asidered' and that f;atvre disesusaions ~ stacah msttscre mint
ba ftn?thca~ing? Hczt~~r~$ present evidence iud3.ttates ths.ic no ~'.
ag~emente were made Bather thaa those ~ae~.. Tie qu~~d ~rc~un a?
the current agreement isa
Sa~.et xsaie~ ?ff tittr.~g {lega7.ly ~v3.et until x997') and s rema~l.
off' Sa~iet tsraaps f"rora Finland within ths~e mcanths ~ ixi gar
~'3,nniata actseptance oi' a coztsiderable extex>~iara ~].~75 inst~d a? 195)
of the legal. restriction and abligatians iaapcaseci open thsan by the
N~atual Assistana~e Paat of 3.9~.8;~'
The i'callawing chart diaaussiara ig intended to paixit up same aspects a.~
the negatiatians- and to slrgCast pra'bar~.e Sovir~t r~oti~etic~ne as well aa3
the implications oi' this resent developmc3xst upon atrategicr~l.ly l.oaated
Finlandrs ability to ma9atr~in its pos~.tian of ~datiaate bal.ance'~ betweoza
East and tdssto
~ This pact stipNal.atas that ~1) F3.n7.axad will net +a~atc-a? intca a~^ a1.].ia~el~
cot take part 3.n any csoa3.itian directed against tae 't~5'R; {2) P'inla
will ~Cight tea x?tapa7. azr~r attack against ?f?s3[y tar against the IISSP~
Fin3.aa~d by 9 ar by any caunt;~y- alli+ad t~ith i',erm~any; axtd
3) tote [TSSR and F'in3.arad shall canfer in case it is esta,~>13 shed that
that threat of an d atte~tak is presento
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'fi'r
2. ~ atmtrast with the intensive Finnish pre-settlement speculat:[an~,
the teacme of tI~ announced agreement appear relatively limited and blend,
Finnish Roptimiats" who emrisagred for more sweeping soviet *oonceasior~s"
were clearly disappointed. On the other hared, the more erbre?e pessimist
of a minority segment who feared intensive Soviet pressure to suing Finland
closer tv the D~SS~ prorvecl unjust3.f'iedo The sofas]. settlement appears to
reflect a reasonable balanr~ing of~gains and losses for both sideso Tate
nature of the Qircumstanaes surrounding the negotiations also suggest that
mtch of the "real' negotiations leading to the accord had taken place be-
fore the arrive], of Finnish President Paasikiv3 and his dele~tior~ in
Nlcsco~ra ~'~lel'$a$ the i2lvitation C&me Frith $pparent BLidden~ it wa8 acctepted
immediately by Paasil~ivi, within 1D days of the invitation the F3.rmish
delegation was in 3~Iosco~w, and the ~aegotiations were ~amplated during e
week-ends Y~oa?ecraer, reports of the SaQists negotiating posture reflecst
a pre-deter~ained Sov~3et position a nd the ae~Lennen~t wsa aoaoa~panied by +a
considerable Soviet emphasis upon the prerogativ+a of thr~ F`inaish psesidest
to detePmine foreign policyo Fir~al3.y, subsequent official activity on ~?
part. of PmM. '~c~&kanaa, who has "leaked" hints of possible f'ku~ther diaaus-
sions and aoncesaions, has added weight to this interpretationo
i~
3o S~. Motivations? In the postSa~iet palioy toward ~`in].axtd
has bean developed with aii o~nriaus st~?died attention to larger Soviet
foreign policy objectives, anc~ esper~ially with an eye to Finlaiyr3ts
Saardinaviaa neighbors4 The nature sad timing of the recent Sariet mav~s
indicate that e~tternal aonsiderations were probably paramount in motivat-
ing the. to accept the sacrifioe of military be~z?fit~t-albeit of de-
clining sigaificez~ee-~whioh resulted From the lacat3an of siseable milif~
fames (5a~?~ army troops, lOQ~D security troops, and I jet fighter regiment}
just 12 miles foram Ael.sia'~ci. Sesidse being in line wit~t the preeaat Soviet
effort to reduce world tensions and to *aormalise'~ relations, especf,a].1y
with neighbarirrg and small" states, the more i~mm~ediate gains aoa~templated
by the Q:~ probably included:
8. the strengthening of the i1SSRos diplo?atic position in the eoming
Big Four foreign ministers' meeting when it is expected that the
gnestian of bases on sforeigaa soil will play a major roleg
b. the st eain~ of neutralist sentimante in Scandir~vit-'by a
demo~s~~on of ~reae+oaablenese". Svah a fm~tification of
neutralist sentiment-sigxts of which have already appeared- ~ri11
.probably strengthen the Soviet Bargaining position in the fort
coming discussions 'between the t~SR sued the tQorwegian azd Swedish
prime ministers and the Danish minister ai` ag~rieu].turq ate.
ganearally ~reaken Norwegian, Danish, sad Iaelsttdio support foot
NATD while eimu],tanacuslp reinforcing Sweden~s non-alliance polivy.
The reatoval tti' Soviet objection to Finnish r~e?beartship in the
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l~rdic Council, and probable Finnish ac~xe~aian to the Gouattsil,,
is further ind'~ cation of Soviet ?t'foaf~; to strengthen neutralist
sentiment in the Scandinavian area?~
~,. The USSR possi~-].y also envisaged certain gains in its direct
relations with Finland wh3oh cou~.d re~alt fPOm this d~osst~t3ota of
"reasonablenesa"e
Scxviet emphasis upon the need -far develo?~ing Soviet-Fi~aish
~~atual confidence" has been axtrsmely ervident s3~ae 1952.
?ver the long~aul, therefore, this Sore:?t step can be v3.ewed as
another indication of a contirnaad Soviet effort to ?karoo" rather
than pressure the Finns, and thus to accomplish by peacef'~
penetration what has proven so difficult foot them to accomplish
~ hard fisted methods in the past.
by ~-hort term advantages wrere a3so possibly contemplated in that
the resent settlement could influ?nce next trSnter's p~?asid?nt~.
election in favor of Free, Faasikivi or some candidate,' (e.g.
gekkonen)s who be considered to have followed a so-cs3led
nPaaaikivi line", of friendship" with the tiS R, ~-r?ver, if sLtah
'had been a ma,~or Soviet consideration at this time it is likely
that the USa~ tarould have volunteered aevnral additional concessians
which whilo of lesser substantive value-~wg. return of p~r3sonars,
use of the S ].-~aouRd Y~tve had ca~ic~eral~le emotional
appeal4 The absence of ar~? concession on Karelia be sspe~sia31.3*
significaxat since it is unlikely that S~~ear~old. Pa;~ikivi t~.17.
r~ again, and the chances of the "Soviet second ahoice~ P~,~~
~ekkonen~-~-lead~+r of the A;grar~.an I'arty--rar371 Pa'obab~,y be hurt
since mach of Rekkonettes s~uppart has coma from the displaced
itarelians, mar$q' of w~.om are undaubtedlgr disappointed aver the
outcc~ne of the negotiations, Hawerter' the fact #l~t the Sc~vi?ts
have not played other ea~?ds~ at th~.s tisae, 3naluding soaps of
littl? substantive value, srxg~;ests that more deals ac~uld be itx
the offing. If these cards are ?layed prior to the elections its
~'an. - Feb stash "concessions" could indicate increased Soviet
effort to influeaice the Finnish internal. politic?a7. dQVelopment.
~n~?an?~e
5. ~. catiQ~ F
,
_
The concl~adin ? statetrtents ~in the last steif'~' ~aeino o=t F.n],~d (l~C+~B-55,
~eva~lopats in Finland during 195, 28 Feb 1955 a.?eada ~?.ain no case
does it appear likely that the Finns'.und?~? fi~eseeable internal and external.
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conditions, would yield to demands which vm~l.d seriously impair their
natianal 3,r~depenc~enoe." This estimate was based e. ~entially upon cl.earatat
indicationa~ of a continued str?ngtheniag od' ~, eoonomiic--~litical
conditions in Finlandf and the demonstrated skill of the F3n~ f~ resis~.kiag
Soviet tbre:~ate and/cn? blandishmeats? 4rith limited qualifiesationy develop-
ments duri~?~g 1955 have tended to reinfaree the general validity of this
estimated .Although the acceptance of a 2A year extension of the 2~.itual
~ssiatance Fact suggests #~,? possibility of as e+~e~tu$7, erosian of deep-
seated Fin~,ish cautions a significant "dropping of the guaz~" does not
aPpe~" imm~.nent. r~eover, s~,nce the Finns generally agree that the tertm3
of the N~it~aal Assistance Paot are in accord with the ' Basic realities of
their inte~?national position they do not consid?r it to bye in oonflict
with their national interests, Reference to the agreement has, in fact
permitted ~~ Finns to avoid taking steps under paes~are t~acn, Rests as
well as WestD which wou~.d h eve been compromising to their "neutral'
postured
6. In the same previous eta,^f memo on~ F'ia3and it was also noted t,~a$
"d ?.aaly clear effort by this USSR to aohieve a disproportione~'G.a gain 3ffi
negotiatiosas with the Finns during the fca~eseeable future would indicate
a signfificant alteration of Soviet policy to~~~ard Finland' and night indicate
a basic revis3.an of Soviet policy tcwrard Europee" As noted above, the
recent quidp~ro-qu,~~ aerta3nly does no+~ indicate any suoh p~?spg?ionate"
gain. Mar~3aver~ in view of the trend ta~rard Increasing internal Ffnn~~h
stability ~~nd the advantages that the US~R derives from its present rela-
tionshlp w:~.th Finlaad9 e.go trade and exploitation of Finland role as a
buffer tion~~ and as a "sho~ur-Dees" ~ a oontint~atioa of Sanriet toheranae of
Finnish 3n,3ependenoe and emphasis upon the carrot rather ttasn the stick.
can probab;~y be egpeotsdd
25X1
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